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Abstract 
This thesis will address the question `how has the concept of national security 
changed in 21st century Spain?’  It will account for the shifts in modern Spain’s 
approach to security policy and is based on an analysis of three recent 
administrations and their decisions, such as to support the US invasion of Iraq, 
as well as the responses to the economic crisis of 2008, and changes heralded in 
a process of national security strategies.  To date, Spain’s security in a broader 
sense has been little researched and this thesis examines a number of themes 
including securitisation, the indignados movement and the role of ministries in 
national security strategy. 
Case studies are used alongside Katzenstein’s constructivist approach to 
analyse the evolution of security policy.  The thesis synthesises the Copenhagen 
School’s `sectors’ approach with a constructivist model to develop a concept of a 
culture of security in Spain supported by Clausewitz’s `remarkable trinity’ to 
address the role of Spanish Prime Ministers. 
This approach has not been developed with regard to Spain before and, in 
conjunction with an analysis of the National Security Strategies of 2011 and 
2013, it is argued that Spain’s executive, the Prime Minister, still exerts an 
excessive influence on national policy and institutions.  Interviews with key 
stakeholders and policy-makers underpin the argument that security in Spain 
remains contested and that recent initiatives to promote a broader security 
agenda are not supported in organisational structure or policy. 
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Introduction and Research Question 
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and analyse the dynamics and behind the 
construction, framing and delivery of Spain’s Security Policy. 
  
I first became fascinated by Spain in the early to mid-1990s whilst studying at 
Liverpool.  The country had taken up its role on the international scene again with 
a confidence and optimism we do not often witness in the UK. In 1992 the 
Barcelona Olympics, the Seville Expo and the creation of the Single European 
Market did not pass unnoticed in Liverpool, an international city with a long 
history of trade and the influence of globalisation.  Benefiting from EU funding, 
students from Spain increased exponentially in the UK at this time, bringing with 
them ideas and opinions and sharing views with me on subjects as diverse as 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, the marking of the “discovery” of the Americas, 
relations with the US and inevitably the UK’s place in the world.   
 
This thesis represents the next stage of that discussion as I endeavour to 
articulate what is meant by Spanish security and aim to analyse the dynamics 
behind the construction, framing and delivery of Spain’s Security policy.   
 
Like most states, Spain has a long history of flux and changing relations with the 
world. Over the last century it has experienced isolation, civil war, dictatorship 
and a renowned democratic transition.  In the last thirty years, Spain has joined 
the European Community and made great strides in maturing its economy, 
particularly through the growth of Spanish financial institutions, most notably in 
Latin America.  At the same time Madrid has also experienced the growing threat 
of international and domestic terrorism, both directly at home and in a global 
context, suffering one of Europe’s worst terrorist attacks during the election 
campaign of 2004.  
 
Spain’s shifting position in the world is evident in the field of security and defence 
and, more so than many other similar-sized countries in Europe, it has 
traditionally been hesitant about how it should conduct itself in its relationships 
with NATO and the US, as well as in wider military interventions, although it has 
a strong record of peacekeeping under both the UN and the EU.  The thesis 
proposal originally drew upon a broad agenda for security studies that was 
established in the 1990s and expounded by the Copenhagen School of Buzan 
and Waever (Buzan et al. 1998).  There have since been a number of criticisms 
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of the School based on its rather state-centric focus, lack of rigour and a failure to 
address grassroots input to what are normally national or state-led debates and 
this is discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
This has meant that beyond the initial basis for research, this thesis has had to 
develop a suitable framework that is more eclectic than the original Copenhagen 
School approach and includes drawing on Clausewitz’s approach to strategy, 
although this mainly involves aspects of Constructivism, particularly the works of 
Katzenstein (1993, 1996). 
 
The approach has been to look at examples and cases that have emerged in 
Spanish policy-making in recent years and examine how the concept of national 
security has responded.  This has been pursued through examination of the 
legislative and policy-making response by three recent Spanish Prime Ministers 
and their governments.  I aim to analyse what makes up contemporary Spain’s 
national security policy drawing on a structure that combines the Copenhagen 
school approach with elements of Constructivism. 
 
The literature review argues that there exists a range of approaches to analysing 
security and foreign policy that could be used to develop an analytical model.1 As 
in many other countries, how foreign and security relations are investigated 
remains the subject of debate both within and outside national boundaries.  What 
initially needed to be addressed was the relationship between how the 
international system is viewed (namely International Relations (IR) theories) and 
then how this could lead to an analysis of security and foreign policy.  Along with 
the entrenchment of the various paradigms between different interpretations of 
the international system, there also exists the debate over the level of analysis, 
concept and assumptions with regard to how the agency-structure approach 
could be used.  In reality, international studies comprises a range of increasingly 
complex theories and paradigms.  For the research on Spain to be valid, there 
                                                   
1 Texts on Spanish foreign and security policy written since the transition do not seem to have made 
any contribution to or evaluation of prevailing theories in IR, foreign policy analysis or security 
studies.  Holman offers some recognition in Integrating Southern Europe but within the rest of the 
subject, theory is barely accorded any attention.  An example would be Armero’s Política Exterior 
de España en Democracía or Pereira’s La Política Exterior de España, which stubbornly cling to a 
descriptive analysis as suggested by the titles.  This is surprising when the advances in theory are 
considered, and even more so when the changes that have occurred in Europe’s and the 
international political landscape need to be understood. 
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needed to be a consistent theoretical framework and understanding of the 
international system. 
 
A brief Introduction to Spain  
Contemporary Spain is considered to have emerged following the death of the 
dictator General Francisco Franco Bahamonde in 1975. Spain’s celebrated 
transition initially generated little analysis of the foreign and security policy which 
reflected the Atlantic and European dominance of Spain’s economy at that time, 
as a consequence, Spain was seen to almost resume its expected place in the 
world.  
With ETA (Euskadi ata Askatasuna- Basque fatherland and Freedom) as the 
main threat to the political process, the military shadow generated most interest 
in the challenges of transformation and reorganisation of a large, populated 
European nation-state.  Preston’s Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1987) 
focuses on the internal dynamics of the successful regime change with only 
limited attention to the international picture, whilst Powell’s2 Dimensión exterior 
de la transición política discusses the international support of the then-EEC and 
NATO’s prominence with regard to Spain’s reinsertion into the international 
system.  In sum, Spain’s international security during the transition was not an 
issue of major divisions, reflecting the notion that the domestic agenda overrode 
the international, something that changed during the years of democratic 
consolidation and continues to this moment in time.  
Europe’s economic and political expansion along with a Cold War imperative of 
US and Atlantic integration for Madrid mean that it now appears difficult to 
believe that Spain’s international security could have evolved differently.  As 
early as 1960, an overture to join the then EEC (in 1960) showed an early 
vocation by the Franco regime.  One of the key ideas underlying the 
methodology of the research has been a wholehearted acceptance by Spain’s 
elites and citizens that European integration and Spain’s role as protagonist is a 
wholly positive phenomenon.   
Domestically, the complexity behind Spain’s relationship with the US has been 
an underlying theme of the research, and it incorporates a scepticism among 
                                                   
2 Preston’s The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1986) and Powell’s La dimensión exterior de la 
transición política Española (1994) make the connection between reform of a backward military 
and overseas functional change. 
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Spaniards that has proved difficult for national policy-makers to reconcile.  An 
effect of the 1953 Bases Agreement3 was recognition by the US of the Franco 
regime at a time of Spain’s acute vulnerability in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War.  Literature reflects the impact of this tie, with works by 
Preston and Balfour (1999), Calduch et al. (1994) that explore Spain’s post-war 
posture and, although the US did not `save’ the Franco regime, a narrative has 
developed that US security concerns prevented an opportunity to remove or 
significantly reform the Franco dictatorship during this period. 
It is difficult to draw clear parallels between the Franco regime’s foreign policy 
and Spain’s security in the 21st century.  However, one enduring feature has 
been the persistence of suspicion towards Washington and anti-Americanism 
within contemporary Spanish society. This has directly related to the Franco 
regime’s endorsement by the US, in spite of a norm among many elites that 
NATO membership was synonymous with Spain’s European project4, which was 
radically challenged when Prime Minister Aznar gave his whole-hearted support 
to the US Global War on Terror. 
Deep splits over NATO membership in the 1980s indicate the schism that would 
continue to feature in Spain’s security and foreign policy in later decades.  
Sources at the time (New Left Review, Preston and Smyth) identify a division 
more complex than a left-right division, it drew on a tendency of tercermundismo 
(thirdworldism) within the Spanish intelligentsia and a tradition of isolationism that 
was in part a legacy of the Franco years, a matter discussed in the next chapter. 
This thesis will discuss how Spain integrates emerging security matters with 
domestic and national concerns.  Whilst there is significant data and evidence 
regarding the changes in national defence policy over this period, the process of 
identifying and analysing security policy in a domestic agenda has been little 
researched beyond a handful of case studies. 
                                                   
3 In return for strategic basing of US military forces, Spain received financial, military and diplomatic 
assistance from Washington that continued until the 1990s. 
4 The NATO membership debate and referendum was perhaps the most pertinent example of 
Democratic Spain’s open division regarding US ties and foreign policy.  Initially opposed by the 
PSOE Socialists, a U-turn in power by PM González was subsequently endorsed in a close-run 
referendum in 1984.  Academic research on the topic is extensive but the issue is little referred to 
in contemporary Spain.  Preston and Smyth, Heywood and Pollack among others provide a full 
discussion of this topic. 
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Although not a major focus of the thesis, the Barcelona (Euro-Mediterranean) 
summit of 19955 marked a highpoint of Spain’s diplomatic activity as part of a 
broadening security agenda between the EU and its neighbours.  Undoubtedly a 
success for Spain, it showed a commitment by the EU to supporting an ambitious 
programme of coordination and cooperation in a region not known for 
collaboration and understanding during a period of change following the end of 
the Cold War.  Gillespie (1994, 2001) has devoted significant research to this 
theme, charting the Barcelona process’s evolution into the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), which encompasses broad-based initiatives to reduce 
region-wide insecurities.   
At the time of the Barcelona initiative, academic literature identified a 
convergence of new securities and the emergence of critical thinking in the 
Mediterranean region’s approach.  The issue of `security’ blended hard traditional 
methods (such as that favoured by realists) with those that faced Spain and other 
Mediterranean states, such as migration, regional terrorist groupings and isolated 
or pariah states such as Libya.  It was argued that, as events in the Balkans 
demonstrated, traditional security thinking was being challenged6 and in need of 
new responses. 
Academic writing on Spain’s security in the 1990s identified three trends: 
• NATO’s distinct Cold War deterrence was now `flexible’ and less politically 
sensitive for many Spaniards. 
• Spanish security concerns were encompassed within a model of 
Europeanisation encapsulated by the role of a powerful Prime Minister (namely, 
Felipe González who promoted the idea of Europe being the solution to all of 
Spain’s ills). 
• Institutionally, new international organisations and arrangements had 
emerged that suited Spain’s national and regional agenda.  These included an 
active UN peacekeeping role that Spanish troops were well suited to7 and 
Spain’s neutral posture in the Israel-Palestinian conflict had won it plaudits for its 
significant role in the Middle East peace agreements in 1992. 
 
                                                   
5 This launched the Euro-Mediterranean partnership between EU states and all countries around 
the Mediterranean basin, nowadays known as the UfM. 
6 Grasa, R `Evolución de la percepción de las amenazas a la seguridad en España’ Revista CIDOB 
d'Afers Internacionals No. 26 (1993), pp. 65-76. 
7 Spain’s Guardia Civil have been hailed as relevant to modern peace support operations, this body 
blends civil policing with a military command and control capability. 
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In review, Spain’s security, per se tended to be grouped in with the foreign 
relations and external relations aspect of the EU accession process. 
 
The Regenerationists and Contemporary Spain: The Impact of José Ortega 
Y Gasset. 
The consensus in Spain of enthusiasm for European integration has an 
established history. In the 1980s keenness among the political elite, supported by 
the media, academics and businesses meant that entry to the European 
Community was generally uncontested.  This enthusiasm drew inspiration from 
the works of the 1920s Regenerationists, whose ideas largely emerged at the 
start of the century.  Following the 1898 humiliation of military defeat in Cuba, the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico (among Spain’s last colonies) at the hands of 
independence forces assisted by the United States, Spanish society and elites 
underwent a crisis of national identity coupled with a sense of despondency.  
This lent itself to isolation from Western Europe, and, with non-participation in 
WW1, this meant that Spain underwent an introspection that set it aside from 
other European nation-states.  The impact of such seclusion (now more than 100 
years ago) may appear academic, but Spanish thinker José Ortega y Gasset is 
(and remains) cited exhaustively for the assertion that “Spain is the problem, 
Europe is the solution”, which appear in numerous works on Spain during the 
accession process of 1985/6.8  Less known, but in a similar vein is Joaquín 
Costa’s “Europe is school, food store and hygiene”.  Ortega y Gasset’s work in 
particular is emblematic of a widespread unwritten rule in Spanish politics that 
solutions to all manner of domestic problems can be found in European 
integration and identity.  Today, Spain may have a more nuanced opinion of 
Europe, particularly after the economic crisis of 2008, but among voters, media 
commentators and elites, there is little appetite for the scepticism evident in other 
European nation-states.  A product of this is that debates about European 
integration are generally one-sided in many areas of Spanish policy-making, 
generally accepting of the notion that solutions can be found and imported into 
Spain, particularly from the European Union. 
 
The literature review encompasses two key areas:  an analysis of works relating 
to Spain’s post-1945 foreign and security experience, with particular emphasis on 
                                                   
8https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316159116_The_United_States_of_Europe_and_Jose_
Ortega_y_Gassetpolitical_philosophy_1  [accessed 01 Mar 18]. 
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the period of democratisation and the post-Cold War, and an in-depth discussion 
of the debates regarding international relations, security policy and foreign policy 
analysis.  This goes on to establish a framework which can best be described as 
a synthesis of the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach and Constructivism.   
 
Going beyond a superficial study of Spain’s security policy and IR, the review 
concludes that an approach that offers something more than mere analysis of 
states in the international system is required.  In this context the emergence of 
Constructivism in international relations theory offers an analysis that goes 
beyond a structure which just focusses on relations between states.  Whereas 
traditional approaches may appear an appealing option, the period coinciding 
with Spain’s reinsertion into Europe towards the end of the 1990s saw the 
emergence of works based on the Constructivist approach. Constructivist 
thinking identifies that shared values, ideas and culture are essentially key to 
understanding a state’s place in the world. 
In analysing foreign and security policy, the way a nation-state like Spain has 
identified its security differs from that of other established EU member 
states.  Francoist Spain’s understanding of security and threat, namely in terms 
of a mission to defend Christian Spain from Spain’s radical Left and national 
separatists (Preston, 1993), upheld a model of repression and dictatorship right 
through to the 1970s.   Francoist Spain itself was a coalition of conservative 
Catholicism, nationalists and landed interests with a shared belief that the 
essence of this approach called for the very construct of security, threat and 
reaction to be built upon ideas, norms and values.   
This association underwent a significant transformation after Francoism and, as 
the research explores, the formulation of foreign and security policy is 
significantly more intricate than a traditional model of ministries, nation-states 
and international systems.  Drawing upon Wendt’s (1992) arguments, it is 
possible to identify that issues such as immigration, unemployment and also 
cyber-technology represent how interests and behaviours influence Spain’s 
policy to the present day.  Finnimore (1996) found that outputs could be identified 
in ideational (imagined in some cases) as opposed to material concerns.  A 
challenge therefore has been to find an approach that encompasses a means to 
analyse the key issues in Spain’s security, such as the decision by the Aznar 
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government to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as to scrutinise the 
role ideas, norms and change can play in security policy. 
My research demonstrates that Spain’s process of security policy development 
reflects an organisational culture that is at significant variance to traditional 
notions of security and foreign policy, which consequently requires a theoretical 
framework based on a wider model of sectors influenced by changing ideas, 
norms and perspectives.  Spain’s National Security Strategies, first published in 
2011 and then again in 2013, provide evidence of the interplay of factors in policy 
formulation.   
 
Within Spain’s academic community, the conceptualisation of security has not 
been widely examined or debated academically by a broad audience in spite of 
the wealth of evidence available.  This thesis develops the concept of 
securitisation within the Spanish system and its relationship with norms, ideas 
and change. Discussion of how security is conceptualised in Spain has provided 
a good opportunity for establishing frameworks and eventually extending analysis 
to how this could relate to other countries in the Western Mediterranean and 
North African Maghreb.   
 
The research amalgamates original primary research into the dynamics behind 
Spain’s security policy through interviews and state materials and develops a 
model for analysing security through an adapted Copenhagen School approach.  
Such a model offers the opportunity of developing a framework for use in other 
emerging security and foreign policy studies.  As the literature review 
demonstrates, examination of countries and societies that sit outside a 
conventional Atlantic or European identity is often not done justice by applying 
the traditional models used in International Relations theories. 
   
Contemporary Spain has endured one of the highest unemployment rates within 
the EU, and during the economic crisis suffered a level of youth unemployment 
among the highest in the developed world (Salmon, 2011).  Its economic and 
recent political turbulence has been extensively commented upon and seen as a 
significant driver of a response in those areas but, as yet has not been analysed 
within the context of national security. The case studies demonstrate that Spain’s 
recent experience of articulating economic insecurity is a relatively new paradigm 
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that shows a security sector in a very difficult position by western national 
standards.  
 
The other focus of the case studies, Spain’s decision to ally itself with the US in 
the `War on Terror’ and support for the Iraq invasion in 2003, involves discussion 
of the rationale underlying domestic political concerns, which tend to suit a 
narrow economic elite or personalised opportunity for action within the executive.   
The thesis pays relatively limited analysis and attention to ETA (Euskadi Ata 
Askatasuna)9 the Basque terrorist group.  ETA to some represents a legacy of 
Francoist Spain in the modern democratic nation-state namely, a separatist 
movement united by a concept of nationhood that rejected Franco’s centralist 
regime and in turn the democratic settlement of the 1970s, the movement’s 
continuation into the 21st century continues to occupy research into its roots and 
support base, but also the Spanish state’s response.  As this thesis will argue 
more in chapter 3, its impact on both the political system but also the Spanish 
right has developed into less of a security threat (especially since the 2011 
ceasefire) but a theme that raises questions about the Spanish nation-state and 
deeper ideas about national identity.   
 
As a result, ETA is only looked at in passing in this thesis, as its evolution as a 
threat both predates and goes beyond the parameter of this research. This is not 
to downplay its significance, but rather to recognise that the theme deserves far 
more than the few paragraphs that this thesis can offer.   
 
International terrorism has been met with an uneven and uncoordinated 
international response by EU nation-states. Much of the European legislative 
agenda linked to the EU has its origins in member states’ policies — Spain is not 
unique in importing or copying policy (Ballesteros, 2016). The thesis also 
discusses how policy-makers (and other actors) have invoked an existential 
threat to justify extraordinary policy measures. While such a phenomenon has 
been documented in other countries, there has been little examination of 
securitisation in the case of Spain.   
 
                                                   
9  ETA (Fatherland and Freedom) is synonymous with the Basque terrorist campaign for 
independence which began during the Francoist period.    More discussion on the impact of ETA 
on Spain in this study is covered in chapter 3. 
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The emergence of Spain’s National Security Strategy relates to that of other 
similar-sized EU member states. The UK National Security Strategy of 2010 
provides a useful model for comparison and a potential topic for further research.  
Both the UK and Spain face similar questions of identity and a contested 
conceptualisation of the state, although in Spain’s case economic insecurity 
remains a very tangible concept to its citizens and political players.  This in turn 
presents an opportunity for research that can contribute to a wider knowledge of 
how states engage with their citizens on such matters. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Contemporary Spain for the purpose of this research refers to the period from the 
start of 2000 until the summer of 2013.  The time-frame begins four years after a 
landmark in the consolidation of its democracy, with the conservative Partido 
Popular (Popular Party) entering its second term of government.  That year also 
marked the start of the single European currency, probably one of the most 
ambitious EU projects since the end of the Cold War.  My research period 
culminates with the publication of the Second Spanish Security Strategy in 2013.  
Following the economic crisis and defeat of the PSOE, I allocated a further year 
for the Rajoy government to offer any trends or outputs and, as anticipated, 
Defence and Security policies were updated early on among the administration’s 
priorities.10   
 
The research strategy took a qualitative approach with regard to the process of 
interviews and policy analysis.  Until recently, the open nature of Spain’s 
administration, particularly in Defence, meant that most sources were relatively 
accessible.  The research has been based on a three-stage process.   
The first stage consisted of three elements, beginning with analysis of internet-
available primary sources (government publications such as the Security 
Strategies, legislation and other official communications) and, given the policy-
centred nature of this research, a significant portion of initial study focuses on the 
nature of security policy and strategies since 2003.  The second element took the 
form of examination of the relevance and interplay of Buzan’s sectors, and 
considered criticisms of shortcomings in the Copenhagen School model.  
                                                   
10 The Arab Spring remained a pressing issue, along with ETA, the economic crisis and the 
indignados movement at that point in time. 
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Significant policy changes in the Spanish case and the impact of ideas and 
norms (in effect drawing on the constructivist model) will show the nature of the 
policy community within the country’s relatively open political system. Spain has 
been largely overlooked in the context of analysis from the Copenhagen School 
perspective, but bringing this to bear in conjunction with a Constructivist 
approach (which represents the third element) is viewed here as instructive in 
developing insight into discussion of national security even beyond Spain. 
 
By way of a second stage, Interviews with policy-makers in Madrid (see 
Appendix 1 for a list) along with discussions with academics and policy 
practitioners enabled a qualitative approach to be developed as regards both the 
process and nature of security policy in Spain with a specific focus on the case 
studies.  The third and final stage was to develop the two case studies, namely 
the decision to support the US war in Iraq, and also the emergence of economic 
security as a national policy agenda. These case studies are analysed in the 
context of a conceptual framework based on the notion of the Copenhagen 
School (developed in the first stage of the research) which has been expanded 
and honed by  embracing input from constructivist models based on the impact of 
norms, ideas and notions in defining Spain’s needs. 
 
Structure of the thesis  
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters, and following this introductory chapter it 
tackles analysis of how Spain’s security and international standing have evolved 
since 1945.  Chapter two includes an analysis of the main theoretical 
components behind International Relations (IR) theory given their prominence in 
academic analysis.  The traditional divides of realism and liberalism have gone 
much further, and yet the chapter concludes by arguing that study of Spain’s 
international security is not sustained by the pillars of competing views over this 
intellectual divide.  This tends to be supported by adherents and advocates of the 
Copenhagen school, which I devote some time to analysing by investigating the 
sectors approach to analysing security. 
 
Chapters three and four look at two in-depth studies of contemporary security 
events in Spain.  The thesis considers the divisive events behind the decision to 
support the US over the issue of invading Iraq, overhauling a long-standing 
distancing adopted by Spanish governments from supporting outright US military 
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intervention.  This case study considers the impact of the 2004 Atocha train 
bombing in Madrid. This attack, happening at the end of a bitter electoral 
campaign perhaps brought the spotlight to bear on the contested nature of 
Spain’s security.  The second case study (chapter four) looks at the impact of the 
profound and damaging economic slump that began in 2008 under the Socialist 
PSOE party.  Using the two case studies the research will look at how security 
perceptions have influenced the idea of national security policy. 
 
In 2011 and 2013 Spain published two National Security Strategies, which 
represent a significant policy development and cannot be seen in isolation from 
the two case studies.  Drawing on a history of Defence Directives, chapter five 
examines security policy outputs in contemporary Spain and uses a 
Clausewitzean paradigm to explain the approach of the state, civil society and 
the executive, while it also discusses the impact of Presidentialism by the Prime 
Minister in Spanish policy-making.  The chapter draws on significant primary 
sources in the form of interviews with military personnel, think-tanks, a former 
advisor to the PM and a Ministerial advisor in the Defence Ministry. 
 
Chapter six will address the policy of the three most recent Prime Ministers in 
Spain; José María Aznar (1996-2004), José Luis Zapatero (2004-2011) and 
Mariano Rajoy (2011- present).  I explore the Constitutional arrangements behind 
security policy-making and try to assess ways in which the idea of 
Presidentialism, first identified back in the 1980s, has evolved. The Zapatero 
government in particular attempted to shift away from this trend, and the 
consequences of this are also discussed on Spain’s security in this period. 
 
The identification of what constitutes national security policy is discussed in 
chapter seven.  National Ministries are briefly examined together with the idea of 
policy hierarchy.  Chuter (2006) identified a tangled policy hierarchy which, when 
viewed bearing in mind the constructivist approach, illustrates how policy 
importance can be inconsistent in reflecting norms, values and the environment.  
Katzenstein et al. offer an approach of examining the culture of security (1993) 
that drives national security interests, and this is developed to explore the 
relevance of the Copenhagen School. 
 
Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis outlines the interviews undertaken during the 
research phase of this thesis.  In particular, access to sources within Spain’s 
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Ministry of Defence was granted due to confidence in my previous employment in 
the British Army, which appeared to open doors that were less open to a civilian 
researcher.  As a result a loose relationship was built with a number of 
individuals.  Other ministries were less accommodating, however think-tanks, 
particularly the Royal Elcano Institute did assist in a number of ways, and these 
in conjunction with other sources informed a range of issues discussed in the 
thesis.  Only on the topic of Perejil Island, and particular criticism of ministers 
was I requested to withhold identities during the interview process. 
 
Summary and Key Research Questions 
 
My motivation behind this thesis is to answer the question of `how has the 
concept of national security changed in 21st century Spain’.  I do this by following 
a methodology which assumes that the study of Spain’s security policy is 
overlooked within Spanish academia and a number of studies of Spain are used 
alongside a constructivist approach to analyse Spain and the evolution of its 
foreign and security policy.  I synthesise the Copenhagen School’s sectors 
approach with a constructivist methodology to develop a concept known as a 
culture of security in Spain.  This is then advanced to explain and interpret the 
events of the last two decades. 
 
This is not to say that the traditional IR models of realism and liberalism are 
irrelevant; for instance, it is perfectly possible to conduct a study of Spain’s 
security policy from a realist perspective (focussing on state-to-state activity for 
example) but for the purposes of documenting the changes, constructed 
securities, opinion and interests at issue, then the Constructivist approach seems 
to position itself more effectively within a theoretical framework. 
 
The study is brought to fruition by establishing a model that is essentially a 
synthesis of the Copenhagen School’s sector concept and Constructivism 
drawing on the approach of Katzenstein.   Applying the model to Spain also 
opens up vistas for potentially extrapolating the model beyond Spain to the cases 
of specific countries across the EU and the Mediterranean, and the work opens 
further avenues regarding nation-state, security and the western Mediterranean.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Theorising about Spain’s Security and Foreign Policy: The Contribution of 
Theory. 
 
Any academic look at security has to acknowledge the challenges that 
International Relations (IR) theory presents in any academic study of a nation-
state’s policy output.  More than that of many other significant European nation-
states, Spain’s external policy after the Second World War was one where the 
domestic national interest dictated foreign relations.  Whilst this may appear a 
truism, the fact remained that Spain required a responsive balance between 
domestic and international politics after 1945, which continued until well after 
democratisation, (Pollack, 1987, p.12).   
 
Although this thesis does not look at the 1945-75 period in significant depth, any 
research on Spanish foreign and security policy and the ensuing changes after 
the end of the Cold War and beyond (such as the impact posed by the 
September 11 attacks) requires analysis and debate regarding the construction 
of a theoretical framework.  In common with other studies focussing upon how a 
country views its place in the world, theory concerning Spain’s foreign policy has 
traditionally been too narrow 
 
In foreign policy terms, nearly all observers point to the considerable changes 
that have occurred since Spain’s transition to democracy, with this particular 
period inspiring a number of works (Pollack, 1987 and Del Arenal, 1992, 
Gillespie, 1995 and 2001).11  In spite of the range of analysis and output, there 
still lacks a systematic foreign policy analysis and accepted security policy theory 
that could be used to develop an analytical model.12  As in many other countries, 
how foreign relations are investigated remains the subject of debate, with 
analysis of US foreign policy, for example, having been produced by hundreds of 
academics on what is almost an industrial scale.    What initially needs to be 
addressed is the relationship between how the international system is viewed 
                                                   
11 There are many works, and more recently these have attempted to record and analyse Spain 
and its international security in the last century. They have been well complemented by the role of 
think-tanks, which are discussed further in chapter 4. 
12 Texts on Spanish security and foreign policy written since the transition do not seem to have made 
any contribution or evaluation to prevailing theories in IR or foreign policy analysis.  Holman provides 
some recognition in Integrating Southern Europe but within the rest of the subject, such theory is 
barely accorded any attention.  This is surprising when the advances in theory are considered, and 
even more so when recent developments in Europe and on the international political landscape 
need to be understood. 
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(namely IR theories) and then how this can offer context for analysis for security 
(and foreign) policy.   
 
With the entrenchment of the various paradigms among the different 
interpretations of the International System there also exists discussion over the 
level of the analysis concept and assumptions regarding how the agency-
structure approach is to be used.  However, even before these two topics are 
addressed, there should be a consistent theoretical framework and 
understanding of the international system (Burchill and Linklater, 2005, p.13).  
Once that is established, a discussion of the constructivist school (Wendt, 1992, 
Katzenstein, 1996) offers a useful method of exploring the issue along with a final 
examination of the Buzan et al. (1998) approach via sectors. 
 
This thesis will address the traditional challenges of mainstream international 
relations (IR) theories in explaining Spain’s foreign and security policy and build a 
model based on social constructivism as a criterion for assessing foreign policy 
which can then be applied through a discussion of sectors. 
 
Spain’s Security and Modern History 
 
Spain as a nation-state for academic enquiry in defence and security has 
traditionally sat at the margins as a reference point, although works do exist in 
Spain on its foreign policy.  This not only reflects Spain’s loss of power in recent 
centuries but represents Spain’s peripheral position in much academic thinking, 
this is also partly attributable to academic traditions within the country which have 
exhibited a tendency towards a historically-based analysis when looking at its 
own national experience.13 
Academic literature on Spain’s external relations and security reflects two 
traditions: one of Spain’s contemporary history (that stresses policy analysis, 
particularly on the foreign side), and more recently, security policy.  Spain’s 
experiences in the twentieth century dominate works on its modern history, with 
the Second Republic, Spanish Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship eclipsing 
much other analysis of the Spain of the period.  This means that anybody 
                                                   
13 Traditionally academic writing on Spain’s security and foreign policy has tended towards 
historical narratives.  Academic research output tended to come in the form of weighty tomes of 
chronological description, Celestino del Arenal (1991, 1994, and 2011), although this is of some 
use to the undergraduate and students of Spain’s diplomatic history. 
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attempting to research literature on Spain in the period from the 1930s onwards 
is promptly struck by the heavy bias in favour of the key themes of state collapse, 
civil war and right wing dictatorship.14 
Given this characteristic of the body of writing on Spain (with a generally strong 
accent on historical narrative) any investigation of broader issues therefore runs 
up against the challenge of having to sift through a literature overwhelmed by the 
Second Republic’s drift into the Civil War and Francoist pre-eminence (including 
colonial conflicts in North Africa).  The Crisis of 1898 is another example of 
events driving academic output.  The loss of Cuba and major colonies are 
reflected in an academic tone of Spain being examined as a nation-state riven by 
internal events that overlap with overseas crises (normally involving failed, often 
imperial projects).  In fact, anything more than a cursory examination of literature 
leads us to `the disaster’ (el desastre) of 1898,15 which some claim (Calduch et 
al, 1994) paved the way for dictatorship, the Second Republic and, of course, the 
Spanish Civil War.  Even works that examine international relationships in this 
period are done so in the light of trauma or a Spanish exceptionalism.16  It is rare 
to identify anything resembling `mundane’ or banal policy unless some 
occasional insights into the Franco regime’s bureaucratic postures and 
behaviours are examined. 
Cold War events overshadowed much of the period of the Francoist dictatorship, 
along with the contradiction of Spain’s rehabilitation (after 1945) of an open 
economy despite the authoritarian instincts of Francoism.  A range of works on 
Spain’s relationship with the United States pointed to Spain’s Atlantic posture in 
embryonic form.17  These indicate post-Civil War Spain’s perspective of 
international security (Powell, 2007) and a number of concepts appear to inform 
analysis at this time. 
                                                   
14 In terms of a topic for conflict literature, the Spanish Civil War has allegedly been described as 
second only to the First and Second world wars.  As a result, even today output on Spain’s civil war 
generates interest and output. 
15 Más se perdió en Cuba (`Far more was lost in Cuba’) like other works from the time, builds a 
narrative that Spain lost the final vestiges of confidence in its posture during this period and that 
this in turn set the scene for an introversion that existed up until the 1980s. 
16 Preston’s works on the Spanish Civil War (1992, 2006, and 2011) focus on the trauma, 
destruction and roots of the conflict.  One aspect less considered is the international security 
aspects of the period.  Although Balfour (1999) does address some issues. 
17 The Bases Agreement has been analysed on a number of occasions. Pollack, Preston & Balfour 
among others cite this as a starting point in the evolution of Spain’s place in the international 
system, notably through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Francosim through to the 1980s. 
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1. Spain’s foreign, security and defence posture was disproportionately 
influenced by external pressures and less by domestic concerns (although, 
admittedly, the Civil War 1936-39 was unprecedented in its impact on Spain). 
 
2. The insistence on strict internal regime security, which was such a distinctive 
feature of Francoism, fed off (or ‘securitised’) fears of the Civil War and the 
Republic’s failure. 
 
3. Analysis of policy-making under Francoism was often based on areas such as 
the US, the Cold War and relative national isolation.  More analysis could be 
undertaken that would add to an understanding of contemporary Spain. 
 
The last years of the Franco regime were marked by two events in foreign and 
security policy, that of the failure of the nation-state to defend interests in North 
Africa18 and also the rise of Basque nationalism, a threat so spectacular that the 
assassination by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — Basque Fatherland and 
Freedom) of Franco’s Prime Minister (Admiral Carrero Blanco) in 1973 
symbolised the depth of insecurity in Francoist Spain’s final years.  As a 
consequence, the most significant security threats facing the Franco regime 
could be described as ETA’s political violence, and protracted decolonisation 
from North Africa, where a legacy presence of Ceuta and Melilla (two small 
communities) remains a security issue pertinent even now.19 
The proliferation of theories concerning the international system in the 1945-
199020 period tends to be overwhelming in breadth and complexity, even in the 
relatively focussed context of the Cold War. The reality is that two more 
conspicuous paradigms of the international system exist: that of the Realist 
school and, in contrast, the Liberal approach.  On top of this, the Marxist/Critical 
Theorist model has been promoted, and broadened the legitimate scope to the 
emergence of Constructivism for some analysts.  Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of analysing foreign and security policy the main debates still lie between the 
realist and liberal schools of IR theory. 
                                                   
18 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Morocco successfully challenged and gained territories held by 
Spain in North Africa to the point where only the Spanish Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla remained by 
the 1970s. 
19 These contested territories pose migration problems given the borders with Morocco. 
20 The period after 1990 saw a process of confrontation between the opposing blocs begin to fall 
down as the East could no longer sustain the Cold War.  With the emergence of the post-Cold War 
world, new theories to explain the behaviour of the international system have gained credibility. 
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Realism and Neo-Realism 
 
Realism offers an analysis of the international system where the thrust of the 
approach explains how states interact through looking at patterns of behaviour 
and policies between states.    Realism views the global polity as a world of 
nation-states in perpetual conflict with one another, and an international system 
which lacks a supranational institution capable of adjudicating the range of 
conflicts (normally based on national interests) present at any one moment in 
time.  Within the realist scenario, the role of the state is clear and unambiguous; 
it is to be the guarantor and arbiter of the national interest which would be served 
through the provision of security.  The state is the focal point of expression within 
this model, it alone expresses national interest. 
 
The simplicity of realism is given added weight by its established pedigree 
among western academics.  Characterised by its utility in explaining a broad 
assortment of manifestations of state behaviour across what is a diverse range of 
nation-states in terms of sophistication and location, the roots of this framework 
are drawn from a long-standing tradition going back to ancient texts such as the 
work of Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian War.  Written in the 
period of classical Greece it described the conflict between Athens and Sparta 
and adds a certain aura through its status as arguably the first piece of 
international relations analysis.  Knutsen claims (1997, p.11) that there is a 
tradition from these roots whereby writers21 have identified a grounding of realist 
theory which gives the model a classical credibility in turn made popular by 
(mainly western) writers who have themselves been schooled in education 
processes driven by classical influences. 
 
Another reason for realism’s pre-eminence was the discrediting of idealism in the 
inter-war years.  Its failure by the 1940s was as much a factor in the 
predominance of realism in IR as were the strengths22of a model which favoured 
security and rational models over inter-state relationships.  Instead of trying to 
                                                   
21 For example, in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s Contending Theories of International Relations they 
cite the forefathers of twentieth century realist theorists as being writers such as Thucydides, 
Machiavelli’s The Prince and Thomas Hobbes, see also Snyder (1962, p.25).  
22 E H Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis is an indictment of idealist thinking.  Analysing the idealist 
assumptions at the end of the First World War, these were identified as a major cause of the 
instability that preceded the Second World War. 
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theorise as to how states should or could interact (as in the case of idealist or 
normative models), realism found favour more as a baldly descriptive approach 
regarding state behaviour.   
 
Within a post-war Europe that rapidly evolved into a Cold War scenario, states 
had to be capable of confronting threats within a military-security paradigm that 
divided the continent into two camps (communism against capitalism).  
Considering the notion that states were perennially in conflict (in many cases 
militarily), the realist prescription was therefore to achieve an equilibrium or a 
relatively stable balance to maintain some form of international order.  In the 
period of the Cold War and the concept of military deterrence, realism came to 
be a dominant theory with regard to explaining the behaviour of the US and other 
military powers.23 
 
The realist model’s straightforwardness, which is perhaps its greatest virtue, is 
also the approach’s Achilles heel.  The twentieth century exhibited far more inter-
state activity than could be explained away in terms of a simplistic model of 
power rivalry.  Emphasising ‘the state’ as the sole actor in international politics is 
too narrow and inaccurate a description in a world marked by economic blocs 
(the EU for example), organisations such as the UN and military-political 
alliances such as NATO.  Economic relationships cannot be said to be under the 
control of individual states (even the US) and the concept of power in military 
terms alone is not consistent with broader notions of power, particularly with the 
presence of wealthy, yet militarily or physically weak, nation-states24, or even 
what has come to be known as “soft power”. 
   
Realism is further challenged by globalisation and interdependence, which 
undermine state autonomy.  In effect, the model of the powerful autonomous 
state offers little relevance in what is a global economy that relies on 
                                                   
23 Realism explained and justified the position of the Atlantic alliance’s members.  Even small 
NATO members were exhorted to maintain a contribution to the military ‘balance’ and therefore 
ensure peace.  However, just what this meant to countries that did not feel threatened by the Cold 
War, specifically those on the margin of Europe, or else facing different risks to those of NATO 
members, remains unclear.  This is precisely what this thesis seeks to call attention to; Spain did 
not fight as a necessarily involved nation in the Second World War and, despite its anti-communist 
credentials, did not actively participate in NATO until the late 1990s. 
24 Kuwait is the best example of a small state having power beyond its size in terms of population 
or military strength.  Its 1991 liberation from Iraq’s invasion by a huge military coalition led by the 
US bore testament to its disproportionate influence within the international system, while there are 
also other small states who, despite their limited capabilities in a realist sense, enjoy significant 
leverage. 
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relationships and dependency upon the production or support of other nation-
states.  No state can be considered to be truly independent of other regimes. 
 
Another debate regarding the realist model lies in its definition of power.  While 
military power may be easy to envisage, in a wider sense however, power itself 
remains an ambiguous and much-debated concept.  For a state to be powerful, 
the main requirement rests upon its ability to defend and promote its national 
interests (regardless of how these interests are to be defined).  The realist 
assumption of power differs, not only in its emphasis upon the concept of military 
power, but also in its assumptions with respect to what constitutes the state and 
its ability to act in a uniform and autonomous manner.  From a realist 
perspective, power is best summed up as being a measure of a nation’s 
capabilities.  According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff: 
 
“Power connotes the ability of one actor to influence another actor to do, or 
not to do, something desired by that actor.  The actor exerting such influence 
does so by means of the capabilities that it has available” (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 66) 
 
The debate over power’s definitions will always be ongoing; however, the extent 
to which power can gauge a nation’s influence is not disputed.  Exactly where 
power lies within a state is the focus of academic interest.  Power is fundamental 
to the agency-structure debate and is subject to a range of interpretations.   
 
Yet recent developments have focussed on how military power has lost its 
potency in relation to contemporary security policy thinking (Luard, 1998, p.60).  
Recent experience of the US failure to secure its occupation of Iraq in 2003-10 in 
spite of deploying overwhelming military force against lightly-armed insurgents 
has been a striking manifestation of military power’s limitations, so the very 
concept of power and its applicability to how states can exert influence effectively 
remains obscure. 
 
Given the inadequacies of a crude realist model for analysis, based in part on 
economic interdependence, the neo-realist response represents a school of 
thought where analysis of the international system remains focused on the state 
while recognising the need for a wider analysis of the state’s activities within a 
more integrated world economy.  Trans-national actors take on a more prominent 
role in line with the increased awareness of the economic potency enjoyed by 
multinational corporations and in some cases NGOs.  This offers a simplistic 
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view but the fact remains that the realist approach still subscribes to the view of a 
world governed by narrow power considerations managed by uncomplicated 
interpretations of the state. 
 
While the globalising nature of economics and trade became acknowledged in 
the neo-realist school of thought, the process of analysing state behaviour 
remains fixated upon the system of nation-states.  Therefore the method of 
interpreting national behaviour or policy has often been developed on political 
and empirical grounds that have focused on foreign policy output.  In any 
analysis of Spain, using this model would see little attention to the input of 
domestic politics or economics.  It is in the realm of understanding national 
decision-making that neo-realism does not provide a sufficient basis for the 
analysis of a nation-state’s policies.  According to various interpretations, 
decision-making is the product of numerous dynamics, both within and outside a 
state. 
 
The Liberal Approach 
 
Returning to the theme of analysis that extends beyond nation-states, the liberal 
approach reflects domestic policy concerns motivated by economic and political 
priorities. These not only have ramifications upon the allies of more than a nation 
state, but also reflect the preoccupations and interests of the domestic population 
as well.  In effect, the behaviour of states cannot be explained by policy output, 
but instead by the input from the interests and shared concerns of communities 
and organisations.  Being influenced also by idealism, which implies that ideas 
and principles are more important than goals, this paradigm has roots in the post 
WW1 period when militarism was rejected in European politics. 
 
The need to not just explain, but also to predict or inform foreign policy events or 
changes has been a driver for the emergence of the International Relations 
discipline.    Because realism does not seek to offer a prescription, for the 
purposes of analysing security or foreign policy it is of limited use for 
understanding how countries like Spain have emerged as states in recent 
decades.  Whilst the liberal approach may also lack a fully predictive aspect of 
foreign policy analysis, it does provide a model for understanding the influence of 
ideology and political thought in a manner wider than national interest.  This 
development was then taken a step further when the subject of International 
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Relations became influenced by the need for a rigorous analytical approach, 
particularly during the Cold War where policy-makers saw a need for 
understanding the postures of rival military and political ideologies such as 
Communism and the post-colonial liberation movements. 
 
Because realism attempted to avoid prescriptive or (normative) agendas, it is 
constrained by its reluctance to offer any understanding of potential eventualities.  
This coincided with the emergence of positivist and behaviouralist science.  By 
offering different perspectives into the international system and the area of 
relations between states, including the use of modelling in an attempt to 
accurately predict outcomes or scenarios, the descriptive approach of realism 
could be criticised for not offering the academic rigour of scientific modelling. 
 
A methodological approach of scientific analysis, while on first impressions is to 
be applauded, has not been without flaws.  For example, in order to model 
across nations, values (of a variety of categories) need to be allocated in the 
construction of independent and dependent variables.  Attempts at modelling that 
were evident in the Cold War in predicting Soviet actions, were at best so 
subjective as to render their objectivity near-worthless when it came to satisfying 
the demands of a wider academic audience.  This problem is not confined to IR 
or foreign policy but could be said to hamper much wider contemporary 
academic debate. 
 
While modelling’s failings in terms of objectivity have generally not been found 
acceptable, it is also apparent that theories that have emphasised different 
variables or approaches to examining relations between states offer an 
alternative approach to the study of IR.  In particular, the identification of key 
factors offers the process of foreign policy analysis a basis upon which 
comparisons between policies and regimes can be made and, although not 
ground-breaking, this does provide some criteria for analysis.  In addition to the 
progress this brought to analysis of foreign policy this was an opportunity that 
allowed a fuller explanation of the liberal approach or pluralist models of IR. 
 
“Gone is the realist notion of a monolithic state pursuing national interests; 
gone is the idea, central to realists, of a clear analytical division between the 
domestic and international politic: and gone is the conception of a hierarchy of 
values with military issues being most important.” (Smith, in Carlsnaes and 
Smith, 1980). 
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Smith identified the benefit of a wider model in international relations, dismissing 
precisely the role of the state and military power as key concepts in 
understanding IR.  Contemporary Spain, like the rest of the world, has 
experienced globalisation and economic interdependence as one of the major 
features of the last 100 years.  Modern relationships between states are now 
conditioned by a wider range of factors other than simple power and also by the 
less tangible factors such as domestic societies within states.  In effect, the 
separation of ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ remains more complicated than a 
simple split.  Internal events (for example an overthrow of a government) have 
ramifications on the international system and the same can occur in reverse, 
when international events have major implications for seemingly disconnected 
countries.25  At the heart of the model, the case was argued that in an 
international system dominated by liberal states (namely democracies) war would 
become obsolete as a method of resolving conflict.26   A liberal approach in 
seeking to preserve peace therefore, could be to expand the number of liberal 
states to create an international system more disposed towards conflict 
resolution rather than war. 
 
Often following a normative approach, the liberal argument in international 
security is based on the need to promote and support the processes of 
democratisation and interdependency.  In the model of integration between the 
nations of Western Europe (such as Spain), the model of realism appears less 
relevant in recent decades.  The Cold War may have been a binding influence in 
security terms upon Western Europe, but in analysing the process of European 
political integration, an alternative view to pure security is expressed.  In 
essence, European members have, since the Treaty of Rome (1958), sought to 
strengthen ties between nations in a huge range of areas extending from 
economic integration, rather than solely along the lines of a security alliance.27 
 
                                                   
25 One consequence of the behaviourialist approach of the 1960s was the shift of academic interest 
to wholly new areas of study in attempting to explain international policies.  John Burton’s World 
Society articulated this shift away from the state-led model in the early 1970s, arguing that 
emphasising states was missing the real dynamic of domestic society. 
26 This democratic peace notion has persisted to the present. In effect the argument promoted by 
many policy-makers (in the US in particular) is that the promotion of democracy helps to avoid 
global conflict – therefore for some, the outcome of `democratic’ state has been used to justify a 
range of military activities. 
27 Europe’s integration process started through economic means (the European Coal and Steel 
Community being the first tangible step) and did not automatically include the United States.   
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It is not simply due to the construction of an alternative model along 
liberal/pluralist lines that realism is seen as inadequate in explaining a state’s 
foreign policy.  In spite of the strength of the reaffirmation of neo-realism28, the 
fact remained that the discipline of IR remains contested.  Whilst it could 
therefore be argued that the liberal approach’s emphasis on values and shared 
ideals offers some explanations as to how states can and should behave, it does 
little to genuinely inform new debate as to how foreign and security policy is 
determined. 
 
In spite of the shortcomings outlined previously, until the 1970s the realist model 
was vindicated by the experience of the US and its allies during the Cold War.  
The state effectively supported a peaceful international division by ensuring a 
powerful military capability that would not only deter enemy attack, but would 
also go to considerable lengths in upholding national interests.  Relationships 
between states depended upon the power situation of the day; weaker states 
looked towards the leadership of superpowers, whose status was inevitably tied 
to the military aspect of power.  Conservative and perhaps pessimistic in nature, 
the model of realism claimed to draw upon the experience of historical relations 
between states. 
 
“The realist holds that politics is not a function of ethical philosophy.  Instead, 
political theory, including realist theory, is derived from political practice and 
historical experience.” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1999, p.65) 
 
Neo-realism, a restatement of the main aspects of realism that acknowledged 
new approaches to social research, did go some way to improving the standing 
of this school of thought29.  However, the whole question of the state in 
international relations is central to any analysis and, indeed, to its role in the 
construction of foreign policy. 
 
Alternative Interpretations of International Relations  
 
                                                   
28 Waltz’s ‘structural realism’ placed the role of structures within states on the agenda.  This raised 
the issue that states were not homogenous and, just as significantly, that the role of structures had 
to be considered, bringing the agency–structure paradigm into the realist debate. 
29 The realist model appeared dated by the 1970s.  Traditional realist models of the twentieth 
century were built upon the model of classical realism according to Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis and 
Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations.  While they articulated a strong case for that particular model 
of analysis, transformations in the nature of social science research required changing, and in 
some cases more exacting styles, such as behaviouralism and positivism. 
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At the same time as the emergence of behaviouralist sciences in looking at 
societies and how they progressed, the impact of analysing capitalism on 
theories explaining interactions between nation-states in the form of aspects of 
Marxist IR theory also evolved.  The latter was joined by even more models, such 
as Green IR and feminist IR, which offered alternative strategies to understand 
how states and people relate in an international system.   
 
In one way, structuralism as a way of explaining international interaction through 
dependency theory, articulated a school of analysis which struggles to help build 
a framework relevant to developed nation-states.  Besides this, the discipline of 
International Relations has mostly overlooked North-South issues in favour of 
studying relations between countries of the developed world, which devalues 
wider relevance to any study of the foreign and security policy of a developing or 
peripheral nation-state.  Even during this shift, which coincided with the latter 
years of the Franco regime, such notions of changing thought barely feature 
Spain and, academic output in Spain sat under Francoism’s shadow, social 
enquiry was firmly repressed and only a handful of works were produced often in 
the UK or US (with the works of Preston, Thomas and Payne being notable 
examples). 
 
Earlier (pre-Second World War) Marxist thinking had seen the cause of the First 
World War as a product of a colonial scramble on the part of the European 
powers.30  While it saw capitalist states fighting each other, it identified domestic 
economic demands rather than the absence of order as the driver which had 
pushed states into conflict with each other (such as a scarcity of resources).  
Somewhat ironically though, the role of the state in this approach remained 
preoccupied with security in defending its interests (regardless of who or which 
class was to articulate these interests).  This ambiguity about the role of the state 
undermines Marxist schools of IR.  Traditionally Marxist theory saw states as 
being a function of elites; however, the capacity of states to mobilise or at least 
enjoy the acquiescence of the population as a whole is not clarified.  To conclude 
that the state is irrelevant in international relations is mistaken, yet Marxist 
                                                   
30 Lenin’s work Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism in 1917 articulated the case that the 
start of the twentieth century marked a phase in capital accumulation which would inevitably lead to 
conflict between the capitalist powers.  
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theoretical development continued to be held back by this weakness to provide a 
simple, widely-accepted model.31 
 
In the post-Cold War era some features of Marxism did play a more useful role 
through its contribution towards other disciplines in the form of the critical theorist 
approach.  This emphasised a move towards understanding the dynamics of 
societies which compose nation-states and organisations.  Nowadays critical 
theory has emerged as a school in its own right, with considerable sway in 
contemporary debate, and it presents a number of opportunities for further 
research.  Critical theory has spawned the most useful analysis for the study of 
the internal dynamics behind foreign and security policy.  Identifying the system 
of IR, national interests and even realism’s anarchy as `constructions’, this offers 
a number of useful avenues along which to analyse an individual nation-state’s 
foreign and security policy.  One of the essential aspects of constructivism is its 
focus on national interest, which is  
 
`a political and cultural context in which foreign policy is formulated` (Burchill, 
2005, p.187). 
 
Anything more than a superficial observation of foreign policy and IR leads to the 
conclusion that an approach that offers more than merely analysing states in the 
international system is required.  The approaches of realism and the liberal 
schools had created an impasse in the methodology when examining Spain’s 
security.  The thesis’s approach was ensnared in a binary division between two 
factions that appear as prevalent as the study of states and security.  This 
deadlock or blind alley, as scholars have identified,32 had led to the IR 
approaches appearing rather like a cul-de-sac, with little scope for developing 
understanding, in this case Spain was no exception. 
 
In this context the emergence of constructivism in international relations theory 
presents a more in-depth analysis than just a structure that focusses on relations 
between states.    Increasingly, as IR debates appear less relevant to Spain, 
events, policy pronouncements and postures have been telling us that, within the 
                                                   
31 Halliday states that the Marxist approach has been reinvigorated by the effect of the ending of 
the Cold War upon IR analysis.  While accepting that its shortcomings had hampered its evolution 
during the Cold War, the ending of traditional structures of understanding has opened up new 
opportunities since 1990 (Halliday, 1994). 
32 There is no lack of analysis of the divide and its hindrance to research, Buzan writing in Collins 
(2007) and Katzenstein (1993) are relevant sources on this topic, however there is a multitude on 
this topic. 
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Partido Popular and PSOE administrations, the quest towards framing and 
analysing security in more effective ways has become more key as an underlying 
aspect of this research.  The integration of the domestic sphere or environment 
(so important within Spain’s security in the context of the international picture) at 
the end of the 1990s has thus been applied through the medium of the range of 
ways offered by the works of constructivists such as Katzenstein and Wendt, 
among others, and this is developed in the following chapters. 
 
Whilst traditional approaches may seem appealing for the purposes of analysis 
(an approach seen in many Spanish works), the period coinciding with Spain’s 
reinsertion into Europe’s mainstream in the 1990s saw the emergence of works 
now identified as the constructivist approach. Constructivist thinking effectively 
identified that shared values and interests are essentially more helpful in 
understanding a state’s place in the world than traditional schools of analysis. 
 
The thesis considers Spain’s emergence from the doldrums of Francoism’s 
international standing and the challenges of the transition years to coincide with 
the emergence of renewed thinking about security.  This timely, albeit 
unconnected contribution, offers an approach to developing the research 
questions and ideas offered by constructivism, of which a lot of the works 
developed coincided with the election of the Aznar government in 1996.  There is 
more to the concurrence than the passage of time, as IR’s evolution has 
emerged from the acceptance of the notion tied to the Westphalian system,33 
and, in spite of the emergence of critical approaches, analysis tends to remain 
generally anchored to a model that struggles in the context of contemporary 
Spain.  The departure from traditional IR offers new interpretations of Spain 
through new approaches (such as sociology, for example) and in turn may raise 
additional questions about the contemporary nation-state, the thesis also draws 
on the idea that Spain more than most EU member states has significant and 
unresolved questions about identity and society (Heywood, 1995). 
 
In the case of analysing security and foreign policy, in the post-war period, how a 
nation-state like Spain identified a concept of security differed from neighbouring 
nation-states.  In this context, the way that Francoist Spain identified security and 
                                                   
33 This refers to the one of the first accepted moments when certain European powers were 
identified as having arranged itself into a system of states as a product of the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648). 
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threat (namely from the radical Left with national separatists) propped up a model 
of repression and dictatorship right through to the 1970s, which reflected the 
dynamics of the regime, itself a coalition of conservative Catholicism and 
nationalism. The essence of this approach is that the very construct of security, 
threat and reaction is built upon ideas, norms and values.  Spain differed under 
Francoism and as this thesis will explore this still has an effect on its security 
thinking today. 
In this model of contemporary Spain the input from constructivist writers such as 
Wendt (1992) reveals that the formulation of foreign and security policy is 
significantly more intricate than in a traditional model of ministries, nation-states 
and international systems.  Drawing upon Wendt’s arguments, it is possible to 
determine that issues such as immigration, unemployment and also cyber-
security represent how interests and behaviours influence Spain’s policy 
formulation to this day.  Finnemore (1996, p.132) identified that policy outputs 
could be identified in ideational (imagined in some cases) as opposed to material 
concerns and this in turn opens up another avenue of research in the form of 
constructed threats and situations such through `speech acts’. 
These topics reflect insights into Spain’s society and political elites in the period 
under study.  Although the physical speech acts by Rajoy and Aznar are not 
analysed in depth, the contribution by traditional IR schools to this aspect of 
Spanish policy is somewhat limited and drawing on aspects of the constructivist 
approach offers different interpretations of the environment in which events have 
taken place.  A theme throughout Europe after the Cold War and the 1990s is 
that rapid (and at times unpredictable) change has taken place.  Spain, although 
separate from much of the Cold War’s progress, was bound up in the challenges 
of the decades of the 1990s, both by design but also by a European vocation that 
appears at times alien to a UK audience. 
 
Constructivism offers a conceptualisation of how to analyse societies’ responses 
to transformations under a range of circumstances.  Wendt34 makes the case that 
`people act towards objects on the basis of the meaning they have towards 
them’. What this thesis addresses is how security relates to Spain’s society and 
the idea of a culture of security.  Through the research, Spain’s identity, both as a 
                                                   
34 See Wendt `Levels of analysis vs agents and Structures Part III’ Review of International Studies 
18 1992 p.183 
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referent object but also as a factor or driver in its security is identified as a 
significant factor.  Whilst national identity is part of the concept, what is 
impossible to ignore when looking at contemporary Spain is the impact that 
unresolved matters, precisely on the issue of national identity, have on the 
challenges facing the modern Spanish nation-state. 
 
The concept of norms provides an analysis of Spanish shifts in posture during 
what were seen as divisive moments — one of the issues when looking at the 
early 21st century was the support offered by ideologically disparate governments 
to support Bush’s highly controversial invasion of Iraq on what were dubious 
legal grounds.  This decision jarred somewhat with a number of norms that 
upheld the international legal system.  Certain constructivists (Kratochwil, 1986) 
offer analysis into how to go about interpreting the depth of this significant act, 
but also assist in comprehending why apparently `irrational’ decisions can be 
seen as a more coherent choice. 
 
Constructivist interpretations of norms in Spain’s security offer explanations for 
what are (in often traditional IR terms) contradictory modes of behaviour. The rise 
of the indignados, from a small protest movement to become a sudden global 
phenomenon resonated very differently in Spain in contrast with other nation-
states such as the US or France, and the impact of this phenomenon is still 
keenly felt in Spain’s political culture.  In addition to norms, constructivists also 
place value in understanding `rules’ within a nation-state’s culture.  In Spain’s 
case, the concepts of hispanidad, tercermundismo and antagonism to US 
security overtures by many Spanish voters, all reflect Spain’s national culture, 
values and interests, which, although hard to define or measure with any degree 
of precision, continue to play a significant role in Spain’s security and overseas 
relationships. 
 
Bringing constructivism to bear is not an attempt to articulate that Spain is 
somehow unique or exceptional, but rather an assertion that the approach of 
constructivism is relevant to social, political and policy-making aspects of 
security.  As the thesis will demonstrate, it is only by analysing the impact of the 
domestic sphere on policy that Spain’s culture of security can be understood in 
terms of how it has evolved and actually reflects interaction within the Spanish 
political environment. 
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Although the constructivist school can be acknowledged as almost as broad-
ranging as the liberal approach or that of the realists, in the case of Spain this 
diversity also offers challenges.  As much as a strength, the diversity and breadth 
makes any coherent analysis exposed to reservations engendered by the very 
range of ideas and approaches in play.  Katzenstein (1993) for example 
contributes a significant amount to the thesis’s approach with a concise and 
straightforward model which goes some way to simplifying what can be a broad 
school sometimes mired in different methodologies. 
 
In the context of Spain, where analysis of the political and cultural context of 
democratisation, economic insecurity and ethno-nationalist terrorism has proved 
so significant in understanding its current `national interests’ and security 
structures, an analysis of how structures are formed socially is the approach 
most suited to the research.  Wendt (1994, p.385) identifies the state as still the 
principle unit for analysis and, in the case of Spain, the state’s output is still the 
focus for the research.  What is most important in all this is the process whereby 
the structure of a national interest is created.  Shared ideas, the concept of 
`Hispanidad’, and even Spain’s place in the world are all socially constructed and 
how this arises and what this means as a `construction’ are all important in 
gaining an understanding of the process of analysing a nation-state’s output. 
 
Given the significant transformations and changes within the political arena, in 
particular as regards the foreign and security policies of Spain, the constructivist 
school offers a genuinely alternative approach to that offered by the long-
standing IR approaches of liberalism and realism.  That is not to say that 
constructivism offers an ideal or perfect solution, as, in the same way that critics 
have focussed on realism, the emphasis on the state as being the central factor 
risks over-analysis of outputs and policies, as opposed to the society and 
populations that create the social constructions (in this case national interest).  In 
effect, constructivism could be accused of emphasising the end-states of security 
or organisations rather than perhaps the role of individuals, elites or groups. 
Looking at how language can be used to build an imagined international system, 
provides scope for understanding the process of change and how evolution has 
taken place in the areas of security, communities, or even national interests.   In 
the context of Spain, which has gone through almost unprecedented change 
during the last 40 years, constructivism offers a framework for understanding the 
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process of change and allows for a synthesis of other theoretical frameworks as 
outlined by Buzan et al. (1997). 
 
Spain and Traditional International Relations Theory 
 
When analysing Spain, a number of observations can be made regarding the 
utility of traditional IR models.  The main assertion of this paper is that Realism, 
Critical Theory/ Marxism, and to a lesser extent the liberal approach, do not 
appear central to a successful analysis of Spain’s security policy.  With its own 
historical experiences and geographic idiosyncrasies in the context of Europe, 
Spain could justify an autonomous stance by pointing to the peculiarities of its 
contemporary history.  The liberal approach offers greater opportunities for 
research through its contribution in explaining transnationalism and deeper 
relationships but it does not account for the competition and changes that can 
happen within international relations in the same way as realism and 
constructivism do. 
 
The last forty years illustrate that Spain traditionally has, and at times continues 
to display, a relationship with both the developing and industrialised nations that 
is at odds with its status as member of the NATO alliance and European Union.  
The concept of the Ibero-American35 community for example, promotes a post-
colonial relationship with Latin America in an area considered by the US to be its 
own back yard.36  The isolation endured during Franco’s period in office reflected 
hostility, not only from Western Europe, but also Spain’s own perspective 
towards Atlanticism and the rise of the US.  Francoist Spain had not traditionally 
shown interest in embracing an Atlantic community, which in many ways (with 
the exception of anti-communism) did not accord with the dictatorship’s values.  
Therefore a model that adequately explains Spain’s foreign and security policy 
draws on a more sophisticated array of sources than just realism or the liberal 
approach. 
 
                                                   
35 This encompasses the two Iberian nation-states of Portugal and Spain with that of the Latin 
American nation-states (including Brazil). 
36 This has not been without problems, as Spain’s colonial experience and isolation during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries left the country looking out of kilter. Spain, which was the only 
NATO member to do so, condemned the US invasion of Panama in a motion passed in the United 
Nations.  Yet less than 15 years later it had aligned itself with the US over the invasion of Iraq. 
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Looking at Spain’s own role in the international system, the most obvious 
shortfall of realism is its over-emphasis on the role of the nation-state as the key 
actor in understanding Spain’s security or national interest.  Cold War aggression 
being directed at another is seen as not only an instance of US-led justification 
for the model of a North-Atlantic led alliance, but also as a failure in interpreting 
just what constituted a security threat.37 Spain’s experience of security since 
1945 had not been conceptualised in terms of an incursion from Central or 
Eastern Europe but instead reflected its experience as a former colonial power 
and south-facing Mediterranean nation-state with territory in North Africa.38 
 
Spain, the Cold War and IR theory 
 
With the height of the Cold War being an epoch of Western realist thinking, 
Spain’s isolation not only led to a divergence from the Alliance-led response to 
Eastern bloc threats39 since its relationship with the Atlantic alliance remained 
ambiguous, but also in being outside the ‘umbrella’ of nuclear or conventional 
protection Spain suffered no harm in any way.  Whether Spain unfairly benefited 
is unclear but the fact remains that its security was never compromised by being 
outside the NATO alliance. 
 
Spain’s non-participation in the NATO alliance (up until the end of the 1980s) did 
not disrupt Europe’s balance of power40 from a realist perspective.  However, in 
spite of the realist model of the US-led alliances not having relevance for Spain 
(and other countries) in foreign relations41 after the 1960s, it is surprising to note 
that Spain’s integration into the world community should have come as a result of 
US pressure.  
                                                   
37 See Tickner, J ‘Revisioning Security’ in Booth and Smith (1995, p.176) where a good case is 
made for bringing in some of the debates about what constitutes security. 
38 Even at the end of the Second World War, a time when Spain was arguably at its weakest, the 
Spanish empire in North Africa gave it a significant role in the Strait of Gibraltar and Atlantic 
approaches to the Mediterranean. 
39 Pollack (1987) makes the case that Spain enjoyed relations with the countries of the Eastern 
bloc, which contradicted many interpretations of the Francoist authoritarian regime. 
40 France’s withdrawal from the Integrated Military Command in 1966 left considerable 
repercussions in the NATO alliance that exist even today.  The question of leadership within the 
NATO alliance and the role of the nuclear deterrent can be seen to have influenced French foreign 
policy in a manner similar to that of Spain, namely that French security concepts did not coincide 
with those of Washington.  Withdrawal effectively destabilised NATO and yet did not harm either 
France or NATO in the longer term.  This does not prove the invalidity of the alliance, as France 
remained a member, but it did undermine the claim that strong decisive leadership under the US 
was a prerequisite. 
41 Cortada’s Spain in the twentieth century provides a review of Spain’s foreign policy before, 
during and after the Franco regime. 
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While Franco may have been eager to promote himself as a bulwark against 
Communism, the fact remained that his support for US policy extended no further 
than the Bases Agreement of 1953 (Preston and Balfour, 1999).  The regime’s 
claims to pursuing an unaligned foreign policy not only ensured that Spain’s 
position in the Western sphere remained ambiguous, but also meant that some 
linkages were retained that transcended Cold War divisions.42 
 
The realist perspective of power does little to explain Spain’s foreign policy 
during the Cold War.  The military evolved according to an internal security 
paradigm and did not experience conflict outside the territories of North Africa or 
domestic terrorism.  In some senses the North African territories would be 
considered internal disputes, as they remained colonies rather than states and 
were centred on the topics of poverty and decolonisation; areas of security 
overlooked by realism.43  Spain’s security and defence in the post-1945 period 
evolved in keeping with the internal security paradigm with little reference to 
international or wider events. 
 
While Spain’s recent history drives much of its international posture, other 
countries in the Atlantic alliance have also espoused positions that contradicted 
much of the NATO alliance’s stance.  For Greece the Cold War was much more 
about using US fears to bolster the national position towards Turkey rather than 
the strength of the Warsaw Pact in the Balkans.  Meanwhile France pursued a 
clear national policy as opposed to NATO’s wider needs.44  Linkages and 
peculiarities of the South European member states (within both NATO and the 
European Union) have a greater impact upon their domestic and overseas 
security considerations than simply power enjoyed by the US 45 and therefore 
                                                   
42 Cuba and the Arab world during the 1960s were the ideal places for Spain to develop 
relationships that not only helped Spain to gain some prestige during the Cold War, but also 
allowed access to products and markets despite US pressure.  One question remains unanswered, 
which is whether or not more tangible relationships existed than any of simple opportunism.  
Whatever the case, the fact remained that these were useful for Spain’s overseas agenda. 
43 Morocco’s seizure of Spain’s last colony in 1975, now Western Sahara, reflected not just a desire 
on the part of Morocco to annex the colony, but also reflected internal problems within Morocco.  
This is basically Spain’s main security threat from the Maghreb; the vulnerability from sovereign 
nation states seeking to exploit relations with neighbours as much as from such states themselves. 
44 France spent many years of its NATO membership outside of the Integrated Military Command 
and therefore provided an example to those in Spain uncomfortable about membership. 
45 Kavakas in Does Size Matter? Referring to Greece’s role within European foreign policy-making 
he asserts that Greece felt barely threatened by its Eastern bloc neighbours (Bulgaria, Albania or 
Yugoslavia).  This meant it viewed its security as being something very different from that of the 
North European NATO members (1997, p.5). 
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theorising about them in this period invariably dictates that internal matters were 
influential on national security. 
 
Spain for much of the Cold War (1946-1990) was neither Atlantic-looking nor 
democratic. The weakness of the Spanish state meant that its foreign policy role 
was subordinated to domestic demands of an economic or political nature 
(although the opening up of Spain to tourism and Europe did represent a 
significant shift).46  Traditional realist interpretations of global politics attribute too 
much capability to `strong’ states, and in many cases understated the 
contribution that could be made by non-state actors.  In some cases, weak states 
were themselves subordinate to the power of non-state actors (it could be argued 
that the 1974 Portuguese Revolution of the Flowers was just such a case).  While 
Spain’s regime may have not been a case of an impotent state, post-war 
economic policy was driven by the crucial imperative of modernising the Spanish 
economy following the devastation of Civil War and isolation.  So important was 
this programme that it embarked upon an opening up of the economy that 
conflicted with the political (and in some cases security) needs of the regime. 
 
Even with the emergence of neo-realism, and the understanding of the role of the 
state in dealing with non-state and global institutions within the traditional 
framework, there still remain questions about the role of realism in IR as a source 
of analysis of foreign policy.47  However, the failings that existed within realism, 
with the idea that security was the sole concern of the state, and even the 
terminology of “security” being disputed, leave the need for a viable explanation 
of the period still unaddressed.  It is the assertion of this thesis that Spain’s 
security during the Cold War was dictated not by a realist model of states in 
perennial competition, but instead that its own internal integrity and foreign 
relations were maintained by its economic and political circumstances of the 
particular era in Western Europe. 
 
                                                   
46 Preston (1993) portrays the later years of Franco’s regime well in this regard, whilst Powell 
(2010) addresses the role of economics in driving the relationship with Europe. 
47 Traditional theory of International Relations addressed the results of the absence of world 
government, maintaining that some sort of theorising is required to understand the interaction 
between states that can often be seen as confusing or even anarchic.  During the twentieth century 
considerable changes at the supranational level have made the concept of world government more 
tangible.  The creation of the United Nations or even the League of Nations were attempts to bring 
about some ordering within global politics. 
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In order to reject the role of realism in this analysis of the international system the 
realist school needs to be viewed from a non-state perspective.  Despite the 
emergence of neo-realism, the fact remained that the theory was wedded to the 
concept of the balance of power between states as the route to peace.  Indeed 
Rosenberg argued that the idea of the balance of power was in fact ‘the major 
cause of the theoretical underdevelopment of international theory’ in this period 
(Rosenberg, 1996, p.5).  Yet eventually an alternative to realism was to be 
supplied with the emergence of critical models and the rise of sub-national 
threats to nation-states during the 1960s.48 
 
Realism or neo-realism lacks an approach for understanding Spain’s experience.  
First, the Franco years were a period of isolation, part and parcel of which was 
that barely any competition with another state, let alone a European neighbour, 
could be contemplated.  Francoist Spain was technically an unrecognised state 
in the 1940s (thus further complicating sensible realist analysis).  The Cold War 
was neither of pressing concern politically or even militarily to Spain and, if 
anything, it could be argued that it served the Franco regime’s best interest in the 
sense of being able to exploit Spain’s non-ideological characteristics.  Practically 
speaking, although difficult to situate in theory, Spain has always had some 
dialogue with the nations of Latin America through the concept of Hispanidad, 
which in English it can best be described as ‘Spanishness’.  A Third World-led 
foreign policy in combination with a form of non-alignment could be considered 
progressive and Francoist foreign policy, articulated initially by Castiella followed 
a tendency known as ‘Thirdworldism’ (tercermundismo) (Pollack, 1987, pp.47-
49) . In practical terms therefore, Spain was to devote a substantial effort to 
articulating a policy of support for interests of the Third World, often at the 
expense of its relationship with the US and other western allies.  Ideologically, 
this policy can at its most paradoxical be said to have its roots in Marxist 
interpretations of international relations and yet was very much a staple of 
Francoist international politics. (Pollack, 1987). 
 
                                                   
48 As decolonisation both overthrew former powers (France in Algeria and Indo-China for example) 
it also created newly independent states that faced internal threats to security as well as external 
national disputes.  In Latin America, Asia and Africa states were overthrown or collapsed due to 
both internal and external pressures.  The causes of these changes have been vigorously debated 
with regard to how they relate to economics, levels of industrialisation or even the superpowers.  
But the main consequence was that the international system grew significantly more complex at the 
same time as interdependencies entered strategic thinking. 
 
43 
 
Marxist international relations analysis divided the world into peripheries and 
cores of development.  This model of uneven development was a cause of 
political disparity which in turn stirred political conflict between nations.  The view 
from the Franco regime’s standpoint, however, was that the governments of 
states were an expression of society, not an ideological statement.  From this it 
followed that the position which Franco adopted towards ideologically hostile 
nations (such as Cuba) was conditioned by his regime’s unwillingness to damage 
or jeopardise any longer term linkages between Spain’s Foreign Ministry and, for 
example, its Cuban counterpart.  Spain’s engagement with the international 
system of the Cold War meant that a country which was a beneficiary of US 
military support49 and a right-wing authoritarian dictatorship could legitimately 
declare itself sympathetic to the interests of countries like Communist Cuba and 
even support the Algerian independence movement.  At the expense of aligning 
the ideologically like-minded nations, Spain built upon its relationship with 
economies (such as food exporters) and populations (Cuba had been a colony 
until 1898) that were of significance to Spain.  Francoist foreign policy was 
articulating a position closer to Marxist interpretations of international policies 
than realist analysis would suggest.50 
 
The third-world focus was so enduring after democratisation that Morán as the 
PSOE government’s first foreign minister pointed to it as one of the key tenets of 
the administration’s foreign policy.51  In this period, Spain’s foreign policy sought 
to carve out its own ground, which in turn raises questions about the role of its 
civil service.52  A mixture of hispanidad, tercermundismo and Franquismo 
combined to give the Franco regime a sense of autonomy and influence and yet 
Spain remained firmly tied to US defence interests in terms of basing and other 
sensitive topics such as the presence of nuclear weapons.  Ideologically, and this 
is difficult to theorise, Francoist Spain sits outside the interpretation of (neo) 
realist security thinking.  Tercermundismo with its obvious Marxist roots, looking 
back now sits very uncomfortably with the regime’s internal politics following the 
                                                   
49 In 1953 the bases agreement was signed by Spain and the US.  In return for Spanish ground 
and naval facilities, the US provided funding and equipment for the Spanish military. 
50 Pollack (1987) argues that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had adopted positions at odds with the 
Franco regime and this persisted well beyond the democratic transition. 
51 Fernando Morán was the first Socialist foreign minister.  Notable for anti-Americanism and a pro 
Third World stance, it was no accident that he was a career diplomat under the Franco regime and 
represented continuity in policy beyond the transition to democracy. 
52 Pollack (1987) argues that the Spanish Foreign Service demonstrated a continuity in long 
standing approaches on issues from Francoism through to European accession. 
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Civil War and raises questions about the role of interests beyond a national 
coterie within the Spanish state. 
 
Thirdworldism’s origins are interpreted according to the regime’s distribution of 
power.  Pollack (1987, p.104) tends to emphasise the fact that continuity was a 
reflection of the Foreign Ministry’s professionalism, though the benefits (such as 
grain and energy) made the policy appear more akin to seizing upon an 
opportunity to obtain necessary supplies than purely an ideological decision.  
Despite the rhetoric of the policy towards the Third World (Tercermundismo), the 
fact remained that the economic and industrial direction of Spain was distinctly 
Atlantic and European-orientated.  Holman argues that the real motor of Spain’s 
transformation was the process of Atlantic Fordism53 and advances the case that 
the state’s role in exploiting transnational flows was limited to being an internal 
arbiter, for which reason its role was not a crucial focus during this very 
significant time. 
 
From the realist paradigm, what posture did the Spanish state pursue as a result 
of the Cold War?  The Franco regime’s oppressive role within the internal 
dynamics of Spain did not alter the nation-state’s position as a weak European 
example of such.  The regime’s outward orientation was inconsistent as a foreign 
policy, with, for example, Franco tying Spain’s security to the US through the 
1953 military bases accord but at the same time pursuing a policy of goodwill to a 
number of US ‘enemies’ in the Soviet bloc and Arab world.  One explanation of 
this could lie in how Franco’s regime was positioned during the Cold War in that, 
unlike other countries in western Europe, there was never any intent to deter a 
threat from the East, but instead, threats towards Spanish North Africa were 
more relevant to Spain (as was also experienced by France’s experience in post 
WW2 Algeria). 
 
When analysing the Franco regime and its interpretation of international politics, 
there exists a divergence between the statements of intent and the actual nature 
of the regime’s posture.  In spite of the fact that the realist analysis of European 
or Atlantic security did not apply to Spain, the regime had placed itself 
                                                   
53 This was a variant of Fordism which Holman saw as a specific imported process into the 
economies of the Mediterranean Europe.  It was a replication of the mass-production concept that 
Holman claimed made a unique contribution to the modernisation of society in the South European 
dictatorships, see Integrating Southern Europe, (pp 5-30). 
 
45 
 
economically within the Atlantic model by the end of the 1950s, and by the 1960s 
had applied unsuccessfully to join the European Community.  Relations with 
Latin America through the concept of Hispanidad lacked cohesion54 but were 
consistent with a broad pattern of Spanish claims to a very limited form of 
influence. 
 
Consistency in external relations during the Franco years through to the modern 
age is best seen in the areas of tercermundismo and Hispanidad.  Whether the 
critical/Marxist interpretation of Spain’s global role was simple opportunism will 
forever be debated.  Franco’s regime was politically isolated, and somewhat 
insecure with regard to Europe’s democratic nations, therefore the developing 
world offered it only limited credibility as a European ‘power’.  Whether this 
reflected a more deep-seated tendency of ‘progressive’ policy is thrown in doubt 
if the sole objective of Spain was to develop a role for the advancement of its 
self-interest, which again is an underlying aspect of realism. 
 
European integration was (and remains) an area that allowed Spain’s posture to 
display a greater constancy.  While placing Spain on the edge of the Atlantic 
security camp, Franco’s regime was eager to cultivate the benefits of the 
Common Market.  Spain’s failed application for membership demonstrated the 
clearest indication of the regime’s vocation.  Despite being turned away from the 
EEC,55 the economic patterns of inward investment to Spain reflected an 
economic posture that was more welcoming to the benefits of Western markets 
than the existence of a progressive foreign policy indicated.  The question of 
Spain’s apparent enthusiasm for the integration process has remained at odds 
with the more ‘Thirdworldist’ orientation of successive foreign policy interests.56 
 
The Construction of Democratic Spain’s Contemporary Security 
 
                                                   
54 This incoherence reflected the fact that Spain held very little tangible benefit for Latin America 
during the Cold War, and also that Latin America was not a homogenous group of nations but so 
politically diverse that continuity is hard to achieve in any sense of the post-colonial relationship. 
55 The European Economic Community was the title given to the body set up by the Treaty of 
Rome, also known as the Common Market.  It later became the European Community after the 
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and, following the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the 
Maastricht Treaty), it was again renamed, this time as the European Union. 
56 Adolfo Suárez, the first democratic Prime Minister of Spain (also a former official of the regime) 
pursued a continuation of the Third Worldist stance while also remaining favourable to a Western 
alignment.  He was also Prime Minister in a period when Spain’s application to join the European 
integration process was reactivated. 
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Democratic Spain’s decision to settle the issue of NATO membership through 
national referendum having joined in 1982 prior to the EEC accession preceded 
the end of the Cold War and facilitated its full integration into NATO’s command 
structure in 1997.  However, from the perspective of literature regarding Spain’s 
security, debate focussed on analysis of the end of the Cold War rather than 
domestic matters and national security (Aldecoa, 1994 and Marquina, 1994). 
For Madrid, the end of the Cold War did not herald the emergence of new 
challenges faced by those states which were more exposed to the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union (such as West Germany and the UK).  For Spain, 
and Prime Minister Felipe González in particular, it represented an opportunity 
for Europe to rethink its security and offered a model of Europeanisation; (Rubio 
Garcia, 2004, p.213).  Works demonstrate that long-held concerns of Madrid on 
both the domestic and regional fronts could finally be addressed at the regional 
level.  Gillespie (1995) and Arteaga (1999) argued that Spain could now assert a 
position of influence within Europe.  An early indication was on the occasion of 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nine months after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
This pointed to the issues that would confront Spain in future decades.   Protests 
and demonstrations broke out among social groups and those opposed to 
Spain’s support for the military action.  This demonstrated that for Spain `el fin de 
un siglo de aislamiento español’ (the end of a century of Spanish isolation) 
(Barbé in Gillespie, 2000, p.47) would not simply transform it into an activist 
military power but social and national interests would need to be accommodated. 
Spain’s initial foray into military intervention following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
(1990) may have been modest,57 the rise in protest groups and mobilisation of 
actors has yet to be fully analysed in the light of events in the 21st century. What 
can be taken from this time is that there existed an ambiguity in Spain’s policy — 
a close (albeit ambiguous) military relationship with Washington but one where 
activity would be strongly constrained by popular opinion.  (Barbé, 1999, p.38) 
Yugoslavia’s collapse offered a significantly difficult challenge and opportunity for 
Spain’s role in Europe.  The Balkans, never traditionally a Spanish concern, 
represented a new problem to European NATO members.   The PSOE’s 
enthusiasm for contributing peacekeeping troops generated both goodwill and 
                                                   
57 Support was based upon a contribution to a multinational naval presence in the Gulf and some 
military transport aircraft, whilst US facilities in Spain were used extensively by Washington for 
bombing Iraq.  No combat took place involving Spain, but for Madrid the contribution marked a 
significant departure from its usual policy of non-involvement. 
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credibility at a time when possible enlargement towards the East looked 
increasingly on the agenda, which was something articulated as a threat within 
Spain. Yet the security risks to Spain were typically presented as state threats of 
weapons proliferation and ethnic conflict (Spanish National Defence Directive 
1996).  Prior to the EU Maastricht negotiations in 1992, Spanish support for a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was broadly welcomed, with 54% 
of Spanish voters in favour according to a Eurobarometer poll, Barbé (1999, 
p.49). 
As will be discussed in later chapters, the 1990s are cited as Spain’s national 
debate being subordinated to the European project.  In spite of the shifting nature 
of security, literature refers to Spain as not having a formal process but a gradual 
insertion of its security into the wider European imperative.  Spain’s NATO 
membership was only partially resolved in 1986 and, although it was assumed to 
be settled with full membership in 1998, literature generally fails to address the 
formulation or process of security policy.58   
Even so, Gillespie, Heywood, Arteaga and Barbé, among many others, cited a 
Spanish epoch of success in its international security.  Former Foreign Minister 
Fernando Morán identified an appropriate role in his España en su sitio (Spain in 
its place) (1990), which had cited a role for Spain that was based on its 
relationship with the developing world, neutrality and support for a social 
democratic economy.  Morán may have been overly optimistic but there was 
clear evidence that Spain had reached some sort of equilibrium at this point.  
“as the century turned Spain had undoubtedly come a long way since the first 
moves of repositioning that took place in the early 1980s and its presence and 
achievements during the 1990s were notable in many respects”  Gillespie and 
Youngs (2000, p.220). 
Spain, the Copenhagen School and a Culture of Security 
 
One outcome of the theorising behind this topic, and developed towards the end 
of the thesis is the concept of a Spanish `Culture of Security’ this in part draws on 
the approach of constructivism but also elements of the Copenhagen School.  
This synthesis comprises a significant aspect of the research and derives input 
                                                   
58 The Partido Popular’s decision to insert Spain’s military into NATO’s Integrated Military 
Command in 1996 was not subject to significant academic debate or discussion.  This was 
described an act of `seguridad común’ (common security) even though the security benefits were 
never clearly spelt out but was seen as a way of changing perceptions of Spain by its neighbours 
and allies. 
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from the Constructivist aspects of norms, culture and society but also recognises 
the value of sectors. 
   
The Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Research Institute (Copenhagen School) 
emerged as offering an understanding of the security concept through the 
widening of the notion of security to encompass a range of sectors.  It also 
developed the model of securitisation, and regional security.  For the purposes of 
Spain, the use of sectors is perhaps the most pertinent.  The original model 
identified five sectors for analysis: 
 
• Military/state 
• Political 
• Societal 
• Economic 
• Environmental 
 
Buzan et al. explain some of the shift by trying to marshal the study of security 
through the use of sectors, as opposed to a unidimensional aspect of the state. 
 
“Generally speaking, the military security concerns the two-level interplay of 
the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ 
perceptions of each other’s intentions.  Political security concerns the 
organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies 
that give them legitimacy.  Economic security concerns access to the 
resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of 
welfare and state power.  Societal security concerns the sustainability, within 
acceptable conditions, for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture 
and religious and national identity and custom.  Environmental security 
concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the 
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend”. 
(Buzan, 1983, p.20). 
 
It is in the light of broadening security that the Copenhagen School offers useful 
input into how countries like Spain use a model of securitisation; by widening the 
source of threats and examining the issue of referent objects (namely `who’ or 
`what’ is to be protected) this conceptual step enables more comprehensive 
policy analysis.   
 
In developing a more extensive referent object away from the narrow concept of 
the state’s own security, not only can the impact of threats be better understood, 
but also a nation-state’s capacity to meet its security needs.  This broader 
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analysis which examines the impact on the referent object is helpful in explaining 
intent in the sense that a country’s reaction to a particular threat could potentially 
be predicted by examining the impact on a specific group within that particular 
nation-state.  For Spain this means that a shift away from the narrow focus of 
military-related security towards one of wider security opens up the sphere of 
policy to include environmental, international aid and even economic 
considerations. 
 
This process is not particularly new or innovative.  The broadening of security at 
the end of the Cold War was a natural response to the idea that the conflict had 
placed unnecessary strictures upon policy and that non-traditional threats 
actually posed more of a threat to peoples and civil societies. Nowhere was more 
appropriate to appreciate this than in the developmental agenda.   
Therefore, security requirements (from the state, international organisation or 
NGO perspective) should address such security “gaps” accordingly by drawing 
upon the relevant sources of policy expertise and skill, as opposed to specific 
security specialists.  Not that this indicates that there is no scope for the military, 
but rather that policy responses could be considerably more wide-ranging than 
was previously thought.  
 
Securitisation 
 
Figure 1 identifies three policy outcomes to an issue that emerges.  It can be 
`non-politicised’, namely not debated or identified as being of significance.  It can 
be `politicised’, which effectively means that it is dealt with in the normal manner 
of that state’s political system or, in the case of `securitisation’, it can be 
addressed as an extraordinary threat, or else, to use Copenhagen school 
terminology, identified as an existential threat.  This can lead to all manner of 
specialised, and occasionally radical, policy outcomes. 
 
Figure 1:  Securitisation 
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Source: Buzan (1998, p.23) 
 
The model of securitisation offers and interesting insight into the policies pursued 
by the Bush, Blair and Aznar administrations following the 9/11 attacks in the US. 
 
Almost immediately, the NATO allies identified the terrorist attack under Article 5 
of the NATO charter, which states that  
 
“each member state is to consider an armed attack against one state to be an 
armed attack against all states”. NATO, 1949. 
 
Securitisation therefore could be seen as explaining the capacity or willingness of 
groups within a nation-state to address and respond to unprecedented threats or 
demands upon that state.  The Madrid bombings of 2004 enabled a securitisation 
to Spanish policymakers that offered them a certain licence to implement policies 
that they recognise are unlikely to elicit political support.  However as the thesis 
will demonstrate this was not a clear-cut case as the PSOE embarked on a 
different approach reflecting the interests and values that underpinned the 
government at that time. 
 
Spain’s `Culture of Security’. 
 
One aspect arising from the research has been the identification of a `culture of 
security’ to explain the procedures behind the nation-state’s attitudes and values 
with regard to its own security. The words `culture’ and `security’ may appear to 
be antonymous at first, but there is evidence drawn from Katzenstein’s works 
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(1996) that `security culture’ reflects a deeper awareness of the nation and the 
state’s approach to security. 
 
Contemporary military operations have blended culture and anthropology, 
particularly in counter-insurgency conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East.  
This is based on NATO doctrine on understanding national and local 
environments, social structures and the needs of societies at grassroots level.  
This approach can also extended to national and international concerns, namely 
the `strategic level’.  While still not wholly accepted as helpful to military 
capability, the application of sociological and anthropological approaches draws 
on constructions of societies, security environments and also threats. 
`Security’ is less problematic from an academic standpoint as it already has an 
established (perhaps an entrenched) approach that is relevant to studying Spain.  
In these circumstances Katzenstein’s contribution of The Culture of National 
Security’ (1996) offers an approach that also informs a constructivist approach 
towards Spain in the context of the thesis. 
 
Spain’s culture of security reflects a number of characteristics identified in the 
thesis. 
1.  A highly centralised `Presidential’-led approach to security — often framed in 
a personal, male-dominated manner. 
2. A dichotomy where think tanks, academia and scholars tend to exert a limited 
impact, even while Clausewitz’s concept of civil society’s `primordial violence’ 
highlights the possibility of spontaneous political action. 
3. A highly securitised policy of domestic counter-terrorism, nominally a reaction 
against ETA’s, but one that has positioned Spain’s Interior Ministry robustly as 
regards domestic security policy. 
4. An established history of importing security concepts and lexicon into Spain’s 
policy-making process, but this with a particular sensitivity to US-related matters. 
5. An incremental adoption of new securities through the varied methods 
brought to bear in National Defence Directives (DDNs) and Strategies. 
Spain’s security policy traditionally avoided party polemics until the deepening of 
ties between the Aznar administration and Washington at the start of his second 
term (with indications of this already much in evidence at the time of the Madrid 
Summit in 1997). 
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With this in mind Spain’s culture of security, evidenced by Buzan’s adapted 
model (1998) and further developed in Katzenstein’s paradigm (1996, p.53) in 
chapter 6, it is possible to identify deeper constraints and influences on future 
security policy.  This thesis focuses on Spain’s processes and attempts to create 
a system of policy through National Strategies, culminating in the 2013 
document.  It is my contention that Spain’s culture of security reflects aspects of 
national identity in conjunction with features of Spain’s state model that was 
developed in the wake of its democratic transition. This in turn enables the 
framing of what constitutes the national `Culture of Security’. 
 
Three concepts of Spain are explored: as Europe, the `State’ and the `nation’.  
This model can be seen as drawing on the Copenhagen school but synthesises 
with aspects of constructivism and critical theory. 
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Figure 2: Spain’s Culture of Security (adapted from Buzan, Waever et al.)59 
 
 
Referent Object Threats…….according to…………Securitizing Actor 
 
 
 
              The US & Americas 
  Spain as Society       Elites/Government 
    
              The past (isolation) 
 
 
     North Africa 
Spain      Spain as State        
     The EU (post enlargement        Anti-EU interests  
      
 
 
     The EU 
  Spain as Nation                Foreign Culture 
                 The historic Nations  
   (Autonomous Communities) 
 
                                                   
59 Adapted from Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998, p.172) which looked at France originally but for the purposes of this research certain sectors and groups 
have been amended to accommodate the interests and groups pertinent to contemporary Spain. 
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• Spain as `Society’ (European Society) 
 
The concept of Spain as `Society’ (European Society) addresses the rise of 
modern Spain post-1986 (with the accession of Spain to the European Union).  
This encapsulates the concept of a country that is committed to European 
integration (on Spanish terms), has been a significant recipient of Development 
and Cohesion funds and has in turn enjoyed some prominence within EU 
institutions (Javier Solana as the EU representative on Security and Defence 
until 2009) and NATO Secretary General 1995-9.  
 
This argument focuses on an idea of the Spain at ease with Europe, somewhat 
wary of further expansion but perhaps more driven by a fear of peripheralisation 
and/or demotion to the ‘second tier’ in Europe.  An example of this fear could be 
seen with the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004, which competed with Spain 
as the EU’s fifth largest member state, a status that only failed to gel owing to the 
huge increase in Spain’s population as a result of immigration after 2000.  This 
concept of a Spain at ease in Europe flagged markedly after 2005.  Recent 
Spanish debt problems and economic legacies from qualifying for entry into the 
Euro have led to significant increases in Spanish indifference to EU membership. 
This model draws on the ideas of regenerationist writer José Ortega y Gasset 
that are developed in the thesis. 
 
• Spain as a `State’ 
 
Related to the concept of Europe, the model of the Spanish state refers not only 
to the classical realist approach, but is also linked to the model conceived in the 
1970s as a result of the transition to democracy.  Spain is a country essentially 
European and modern, yet retaining some of the institutions and characteristics 
that have been problematic (and yet enduring) in its political system and civil 
society.  In the 1980s it was traditionally unsure of military institutions, possessed 
a large public sector supported by strong trade unions and was also a corporatist 
model of social-democracy promoted by successive governments (Heywood 
1999). This interpretation of Spain has stood the test of time as a result of its EU 
accession but is subject to constant change.  This Spanish state could be 
considered capable of surviving come what may and with or without EU 
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membership (unthinkable though this appears), and it is this that drives much of 
Spain’s domestic policy. 
 
• Spain as a `Nation’ 
 
The nation-state question is perhaps the most difficult interpretation for concepts 
of `Spain’ and is the nub of the constructivist approach.  Consisting of 16 
nationalities `indivisible as one’, Heywood (1995, p.113), this reflects the 
perennial question regarding the future direction of Spain.  A cause of Civil War, 
a recurring threat throughout the Franco-era and perhaps the most enduring 
legacy of the transition to democracy (in the form of the ongoing ETA problem).  
This concept of a country of nationalities, with some five different official 
languages and an institutionally decentralising country (with a complicated 
system of devolved powers and funding), means that this is perhaps the most 
critical area for future examination of how Spain or its autonomous communities 
address just how it sits in the world. 
 
It is clear that there could exist more conceptualisations of Spain regarding such 
issues of civil society and critical thought.  No observer can reasonably consider 
Spain without focussing on at least one of the three concepts though. 
 
There can be overlap between the three Spains but they are perhaps best 
looked at in isolation as the three all pull in different ways.  The concept of Spain 
as a nation clashes quite markedly with that of the Spanish state and therefore 
these models offer an alternative approach to examining Spain’s national interest 
and foreign and security policy. 
  
The Securitising Actors 
 
• Elites and/or Government 
 
The most obvious securitising actors can be found within the state’s elites and 
institutions.  This contention holds that political leaders, state officials and even 
the military can articulate the existence of the threat or, securitise the threat 
faced by the referent objects or civil society.  This is reinforced by the influence 
of the media (or even social media), which often has a disproportionate impact 
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on the state.  In the case of Spain the research will identify who the securitising 
actors are, and how they interact at the policy-making level.  The role of Felipe 
González is regularly cited as key to Spain’s experiences and accordingly the 
thesis will develop the impact of the executive on the process. 
 
• Anti-EU & Nationalist interests 
 
A notable feature of Spain has until recently been the positive attitude adopted 
by national elites to support for the EU with all its attendant advantages and 
agenda.  This does not mean that there are no securitising actors that would 
challenge the EU consensus; on the contrary there has always been a 
nationalistic streak on the Spanish Right.  Recent trends by far left parties and 
other nationalist opinions challenge this consensus, with demands that test the 
Madrid government’s allegiance to EU commonality.  The declaration of 
Kosovo’s Independence in 2008 (which was bitterly opposed by Spain) amply 
identifies how EU positions that increasingly enter the sphere of traditional 
(realist) security can affect internal relationships, with the consequence that, not 
just in economic terms but also politically, Spain must reconcile how these 
securitizing actors can impact on the relationship between Spain and the long-
standing European project. 
 
The approach derives from a notion of the nation-state in a broader sense than 
conventional realist thinking.  Traditional security thinking would focus upon the 
foreign and defence ministries.  In the securitisation model adopted from Buzan 
(1998, p.6), there exist three key referent objects that underpin the modern 
Spanish nation state, namely the European Spain, the “Nation” of Spain and the 
Spanish State.  All of these reflect the modern Spanish nation-state but also 
identify the fact that more than one referent object can exist.   
 
A multitude of threats exist to challenge these notions of Spain.  A 
comprehensive list is impossible, though obvious examples would be threats 
such as those to the environment (climate change).  However for the purposes of 
identifying how these threats are articulated, the model goes on to assert that 
nation-states pose a threat to the concept of Spain thriving as a European nation 
in that the traditional state elites perceive potential for a security threat to Spain’s 
European interests from around the world.  Another interpretation could be seen 
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as stemming from the temptation to promote hispanidad — a concept of identity 
that has less to do with Europe and is built upon links with Spanish-speaking 
communities (the Constructivist approach).  While not an immediate traditional 
threat to Spain, this concept, which is perhaps paternalistic, does distract from 
Spain’s model of European integration. 
 
Clausewitz and Spanish Security 
Karl von Clausewitz has dominated the focus of students and academics of 
strategy and conflict for more than a century, and his work “On War” (Vom 
Kriege), written in the mid-19th century, is one of the most cited sources on the 
analysis of strategy.   This is developed in chapter five through his theory on the 
interplay of state, society and the use of force in relation to Spain’s national 
security policy. 
A military writer at a time of momentous strategic change (the early decades of 
19th century Europe), Clausewitz epitomised the development of military thinking 
and analysis of the relationship between politics, strategy and the application of 
organised force.  Although unfinished,60 his work explored and has informed 
generations interested in the joining of the use of force and its context in state 
strategy.  Although military success through study has been attributed to 
Clausewitz, he is best seen as a commentator on both the nature and character 
of conflict61 and the wider implications in the formation of strategy, which is 
where his work is most relevant to this research.  
This thesis does not aim to dissect Clausewitz, but as Ballesteros identified 
(2016, p.25) there is a requirement to understand the methodology behind the 
`elaboration of strategy’ that not only applies to Spain but also to other models of 
national security or foreign policy.62  In order to inform the analysis, Clausewitz’s 
`Remarkable Trinity’ is examined.  The Trinity has been exhaustively pored over 
and picked apart by generations of scholars of war and strategy, but not so in 
                                                   
60 Clausewitz died before his work was completed and his works were edited and achieved most 
fame some years after his death in 1831. 
61 This a whole area of debate, i.e. about how conflicts have changed in character (the role of non-
state actors, mass-media to name a few areas) but the fact that war itself (the actual fundamentals) 
have changed little, see Gray (2005). 
62 Hill’s work on Foreign Policy processes, a good overall analysis by a UK academic, makes only 
the most passing of comments on Clausewitz (2003, p.143) in the context of policy. 
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Spain, where, with very few exceptions, his work has been barely touched upon 
by writers on Spain’s military relations or security policy.63 
 
The Benefits of Identifying a Nation-State’s Culture of Security 
 
By identifying the key components of a country’s security, the approach provides 
ways of identifying a number of fundamental issues in the policy-making by a 
nation-state or political system. These might be sorted into a number of 
categories. 
 
First, this offers insight into the policy-making process in a nation-state’s political 
system such as that of Spain. In this case much of the traditional analysis is 
focussed on purely state-led models; for example a lot of FPA64 was based on 
this model.  The contribution from constructivists however, directs attention 
towards society and the input of its norms and values in the process, thereby 
offering the probability of more certainty in anticipating outcomes involving civil 
groups, interests and society. 
 
Second, policy responses are more predictable if there is greater understanding 
of the nation-state’s culture of security — hence Spain’s reaction to the conflicts 
since 2013 around the MENA have generally been predictable and consistent to 
those familiar with Spain.  In turn, the evolution and development of ministries 
has reflected this broader stance on the part of the nation-state. 
 
Furthermore, this offers the opportunity to anticipate and test the reaction and/or 
response to events within the political system. In this regard, one aspect of 
Spain’s economic crisis examined in Chapter 4 is that the response of state 
institutions became so difficult to anticipate and articulate given the open-ended 
nature of the crisis.  Another example one could cite would be the near collapse 
of Spain’s monarchy in 2013, which itself was unexpected, reflected the pace 
and speed of events, and served up the unintended consequences it did. 
Finally, a nation-state’s vulnerabilities are better understood through the prism 
and structure offered by aspects of the culture of security.  Spain’s difficulty over 
                                                   
63 As the literature review revealed, a cursory examination of Spain’s historic and contemporary 
writers reveals little or no recourse to Clausewitz or his concepts.   
64 Foreign Policy Analysis, in the 1960s Snyder, among others, developed a deeply empirical 
method for analysing decisions made by the US government. 
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Perejil, tensions over the disputed state of Western Sahara and relations with 
North African states in general illustrates Spain’s long-standing frustrations with 
what it perceives as NATO’s disproportionate preoccupation with Russia. 
 
Possible Caveats 
 
Cultures by their nature are not static, nor fixed concepts. A substantial  part of 
this thesis has evaluated changes in Spain’s culture of security, yet what can be 
seen is that particular ‘givens’ have endured and indeed the presidentialism, the 
securitisation of ETA, and the fact of a radicalised segment of the population 
exhibiting the Clausewitzean primordial passion all illustrate the depth of the 
challenge in this study.   
 
The thesis will not examine threats in a broad sense.  Literature on the evolution 
of threats reflects a different tradition. Research will instead focus on two case 
studies based on security: Spain’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq 
and then also the impact of the economic collapse of 2008 on Spain.  The 
approach offers a method that draws on how non-IR theory approaches relate to 
study of Spain’s security and foreign policy.  Buzan’s sectors, now established 
and overlooked by academic commentators on Spain, can augment a 
constructivist approach in analysing Spain and the evolution of its foreign and 
security policy.  This is not to say that the traditional IR models of realism and the 
liberal approach are irrelevant as, for instance, it is perfectly possible to conduct 
a study of Spain’s security policy from a realist perspective (focussing on state to 
state activity for example), but in order to capture change, constructed securities, 
opinion and interests, then the constructivist approach seems to position itself 
neatly within a theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 3 
Spain and the Invasion of Iraq – A Security Case Study. 
Spain’s integration and entry to the European mainstream has been well 
discussed and hailed as a successful process and example to the rest of the 
world (Gillespie, 2005, Heywood, 1995 and Pollack, 1987).  Spain’s global 
outlook at the end of the millennium had been so keenly pursued during and 
immediately after the democratic transition.  This chapter will analyse the 
decision taken by the Partido Popular government under Spain’s Prime Minister, 
José María Aznar, to implement a significant shift in Spanish security policy, that 
of supporting the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.  This initially delivered 
some prestige for Spain65, with Aznar as PM briefly garnering the adulation of the 
Bush Presidency and some tangible support from other allies, yet it culminated in 
the Madrid train bombing of 2004.  Subsequently voters widely identified the PP 
administration’s foreign and security policy with the motive for the attack. To this 
day, the events of 2001-4 still touch a raw nerve in Spain, and perhaps for the 
first time in democratic Spain’s history they demonstrate that security and foreign 
policy can prove transformational in a country where traditionally elections have 
been won and lost on domestic political issues. 
Several aspects of the constructivist approach inform the analysis in this case 
study.  The chapter’s approach draws upon `norms’66 regarding the idea that 
Spain’s foreign and security policy would not countenance military action in the 
absence of a legal framework (namely the UN Charter).  Also the impact of the 
cultural context of Spain’s support for military force is addressed with significant 
parts of civil society, certain political elites and parties being uncomfortable with 
the notion of backing US military intervention or posturing against states.  
Madrid’s condemnation of the invasion of Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the 
bombing of Libya (1986) and on aspects of US policy towards Cuba had left an 
indelible mark on Spanish perceptions and reactions to US power.     
                                                   
65 In interview with Bardají, (who was an advisor to Aznar at the time) the US made unexpected 
and positive overtures towards Spain shortly after Bush’s election which gave an added 
momentum to the relationship. 
66 Norms are described as “the concept of norms to describe collective expectations for the proper 
behaviour of actors with a given identity…in some situations norms operate like rules that define the 
identity of an actor, thus having “constitutive effects” that specify what actions will cause relevant 
others to recognize that a particular identity”.  Also, “norms operate as standards that specify the 
proper enactment of an already defined identity.  In such instances norms have “regulative” effects 
that specify standards of proper behaviour”…  Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or 
prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, or they do both”  (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5) 
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The foreign and security policy of the 20th century still features prominently in 
contemporary Spain’s security architecture, Spain is a full member of NATO, 
participates very actively in the EU and plays a significant role in the Maghreb 
within (and outside) the Mediterranean Partnership.67  Much of this now 
constitutes `rules’ within the Spanish conception of security, as constructivists 
argue, these effectively establish situations and explain behaviours.  Prime 
Minister Aznar (1996-2004) is discussed at some length, with a study of his 
decision to bypass traditional rules through his decisions.  The chapter argues 
that various motivations led to decisions that were motivated by a rejection of 
certain `rules’68, which in the opinion of the PP had undermined Spain’s 
international standing.  This approach leads to a broad analysis of the stance 
taken by the Partido Popular (PP) government in supporting the invasion of Iraq 
to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, as it has some roots in the attacks on 
9/11 (Chislett, 2013, p.131).  That said, a number of events and indications 
suggest that even before 2001, both the PP and Prime Minister Aznar were more 
willing to support US intervention than any preceding Spanish government had 
been and therefore, 2001 is perhaps less ground-breaking than some assume.69 
In 1995, a failed assassination attempt on Aznar, leader of the Partido Popular 
opposition at that time, by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna70 (ETA) can be held up as a 
formative experience in moulding his decisions as a future leader.  Consistent 
with Hill’s remarks that “leaders make a difference in foreign policy” (Hill, 2003, 
p.69), the attack could be seen as a determinant of Aznar’s intransigent attitude 
towards ETA once in power (Aznar, 2005 p.134).  The fact that 22 years prior to 
the 1995 attempt ETA had successfully killed Franco’s Prime Minister Carrero 
Blanco71 using a similar modus operandi starkly illustrated the threat faced by 
Spain’s elites.  ETA’s attempt on Aznar’s life may have failed, but it provided a 
reminder of the persistence of the terrorist challenge in modern Spain.   
                                                   
67 Spain’s economic activity is of crucial importance to Morocco, migrant workers from across the 
region work in agriculture and services, whilst the EU imports significant amounts of food via ports 
and Spanish infrastructure. 
68 According to Onuf (1989) `rules regulate aspects of the world but, from a constructivist point of 
view, they also constitute situations in the first place’.   
69 A parallel can be made with the UK’s Tony Blair who conducted a series of military campaigns 
prior to Iraq and leading to the `Blair’s wars’ analysis that hubris was the eventual cause of the 
`failure’ of Iraq. 
70 As at the time of writing no settlement has been reached although ETA has been on a ceasefire 
since 2011. 
71 Carrero Blanco’s assassination in 1973 illustrated the threat posed by ETA in the final months of 
the Franco regime and compounded the difficulties faced during the transition.  The fact that ETA 
could mount an audacious and spectacular attack in the heart of Madrid added to the aura of 
paranoia and uncertainty at this critical time. 
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Democracy may have been successfully established but, as Heywood argued in 
1995, the failure to resolve ETA’s campaign reflected a long-standing threat to 
Spain’s democracy (Heywood, 1995, p.298).  It is moreover the assertion of this 
thesis that security postures against global terrorism (such a distinctive feature of 
the Aznar government) impacted so significantly on Spain’s domestic and 
international security as to undermine Spain’s standing in the world following the 
2004 Madrid bombing.72 
The PP election victory in 1996 after 14 years of PSOE dominance presented a 
chance to review security policy.  In effect this became an area that now allowed 
for greater ideological input after a long period of broad democratic consensus 
regarding European integration and wider foreign policy.  Enthusiasm for the EU 
had been buoyed by the clear economic benefits, infrastructure improvement 
and access to jobs and commerce across the bloc, yet it offered only minimal 
latitude for distinct ideology within Spain’s domestic political system.  Even so, a 
repositioning of security and statements offered an arena where the Aznar-led 
PP could deliver a programme that marked a contrast to that of the PSOE.  The 
overall question of NATO membership, Atlantic integration and command within 
the Eastern Mediterranean offered scope for a policy position that could 
demonstrate a different approach to foreign affairs with potential gains to be had 
for national security and party prestige. 
Within months of assuming power, the Aznar government had identified that the 
generally dormant issue of NATO membership would be a priority of his 
government (Lachmann, 2006, p.182).  Whilst there was no clamour by Spain’s 
voters to integrate into the Alliance’s command and control structures, this 
offered a simple achievement that could demonstrate policy success for little cost 
in terms of political capital.73  France was also undergoing assimilation into 
NATO’s Integrated Military Command at a similar time, which could not have 
been more opportune for Spain as the PP could argue that any such move 
merely represented normalisation. 
                                                   
72 In interview, Bardají, believed that avoiding a terrorist attack by Islamic extremists became an 
overriding concern of the PSOE government to the extent that a broader security policy was 
significantly undermined. 
73 The lack of a majority in the Cortes meant that opposition from the PSOE and IU (Izquierda 
Unida) required that the minor parties from the Canaries and Galicia (in addition to the Basque and 
Catalan parties) had to be accommodated.  Although not a significantly controversial vote this 
issue demonstrated something of a departure from the policy of the PSOE administration that had 
preceded the PP government. 
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NATO integration did not offer immediate status, as defence budgets at this time 
did not enable any significant boost but, as argued later, some organisational 
change was noted as being beneficial to Madrid.  NATO integration and 
command restructuring in the region saw little immediate impact, as the main 
NATO structure command in Naples was generally unchanged.  As it witnessed 
NATO flexing its power in the former Yugoslavia, Spain could see that its new-
found commitment to integration meant that it could contribute to peace support 
operations, although its exclusion from bodies such as the Contact Group74 
implied that its influence was proving harder to cultivate and press home, for 
which reason the 1997 Madrid NATO conference was at best cosmetic in the 
short term. 
Securitisation and Spain 
The decision by Spain to support the US-led invasion of Iraq is a good case 
study in securitisation. Coined by the Copenhagen school, securitisation explains 
the decision taken by governments to use a particular issue as a justification for 
extraordinary measures.  Originally used to explain draconian political steps, it 
has a long established record. Even in the case of Nazi Germany, the enabling 
law of 1933 was used by the Nazi party to impose increasingly harsh measures 
that culminated in Hitler’s dictatorship, or in the US the perceived Communist 
threat led to a raft of hostile activities by the House of Representatives against 
suspected individuals.  Spain’s situation at the start of the 21st century cannot be 
directly compared to such excess however, although the process that took place 
there does offer an insight into the political environment that provided the setting 
for Madrid’s security policy in this period. 
In the particular context of Spain, this chapter argues that there were three main 
drivers behind the decision to securitise the US-led Global War on Terror.  These 
originated from both domestic and international factors and came in the form of 
Spain’s experience of ETA terrorism, the security and defence vacuum within the 
western Mediterranean and, ultimately, the desire of the Partido Popular to 
develop a distinct posture from the centre left within the Spanish political system.  
An opportunity to do exactly this presented itself in the tense atmosphere of 2002 
                                                   
74 In spite of enthusiastic participation in Balkans peacekeeping, Spain was not granted 
membership of the Contact Group, a body of influential states who coordinated policy.  This was 
perceived as an insult to Spain by both the PSOE and PP, Bardaji an advisor to Aznar and later 
Rajoy, argued in interview that Spain was not given any command and control functions in spite of 
significant participation which irritated Spanish policy makers. 
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immediately following the 9/11 attacks, when the United States was pursuing a 
unilateral approach to self-defence as espoused in the Bush doctrine75 and was 
actively looking for credible European allies. This was seized upon by the 
Spanish PM, who decided to use the occasion to implement a major shift in 
foreign and security policy. 
ETA Terrorism 
Within Spain, the 60-year history of ETA’s campaign (with a toll of more than 800 
deaths) provided fertile ground for rhetoric regarding the matter of anti-terrorism 
strategy.  Decades of anti-terrorist policies had produced a population that was 
genuinely divided over how to solve the problem of terrorism.  By the mid-1990s, 
20 years after the transition to democracy, the ETA question had genuinely left 
the political system under considerable strain. All attempts to undermine the 
political expression of Basque nationalism in the form of legal (and in some 
cases illegal) methods76 had created a febrile climate that smacked of 
desperation and even led to state terror on the part of the national government 
(which only served to fuel support for ETA).  The failed assassination against 
Prime Minister Aznar in 1995 and a foiled plot against the monarchy in 1996 
clearly demonstrated the very real danger to Spain’s elites and a sense of 
ongoing insecurity within the democratic system. 
Subsequently, the election of the Partido Popular government in 1996, who 
promised a new way of delivering security (among other issues), showed that a 
publicly hard-line approach towards ETA could be pursued. While popular with 
the PP’s constituency, this failed to deliver success though and, if anything, 
generated sympathy for the Basque nationalist movement.77  ETA’s 
                                                   
75 The Bush Doctrine was articulated in a right to pre-emptive military action and drew upon 
aspects of International Law (Article 51 of the UN Charter), while seeking to address emotions 
aroused by the terror attacks in 2001.  Coupled with the “axis of evil” designation of certain states, 
there emerged a sense that states and groups could be exposed to a military response on even 
the slightest of pretexts. 
76 Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación (GAL) shook the Spanish political establishment with 
revelations in the mid- 1990s that political direction at the highest levels had authorised and 
coordinated illegal death squads to assassinate suspected ETA activists in Spain and France.  
Although, never proved, this challenged the legitimacy of the PSOE’s security policy, with PM 
González implicated in the scheme.  See Wordsworth, 2003. 
77 In informal discussion with the President (Lehendakari) Juan José Ibarretxe Markuart of the 
Basque autonomous community in 2009, a contrast was made with Northern Ireland, whereby the 
Madrid position was clear in that there was to be no open negotiation with ETA during his time in 
office in spite of promises of ceasefire.  Whilst this may not have been wholly true, in public the 
authorities took a hard-line stance and were generally supported by the centre-right’s voters on this 
matter. 
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intractability78 soon pressured the newly-elected PP into feeling the need for 
some sort of visible success that could not be brought about by conventional 
means yet, following the GAL case, had to remain within legal boundaries. 
Regarding Basque terrorism, the PP government was under significant pressure 
to resolve this insecurity during its first term.  A robust policing response had 
aggravated renewed attacks, and a frustration in dealing with terrorism on the 
part of EU institutions had also come to light.79  The end of the first ceasefire in 
2000 coincided with the PP’s second term in power, and a sense of frustration 
was evident.  Javier Rupérez (at the time the chair of the Foreign Affairs 
committee in the Cortes) emphasised in strong terms that Spain’s security (in the 
broadest sense) could not be guaranteed by the European Union alone and that 
other states and/or institutions should be considered.80 
In sum, ETA underlined the problems faced by successive Spanish governments 
in achieving domestic security.  Efforts and initiatives had consistently failed, 
while the stubbornness of the Basque problem persisted.  Taking the maxim that 
security is the “absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers, 1999, p.171), 
ETA’s threat to Spanish democratic values and institutions lingered menacingly 
at a time of relative prosperity and success in the EU, in some ways undermining 
claims of Spain’s success. 
Security and Defence Policy 
Given the achievements of Spain’s democratisation and the relative consensus 
that became apparent over the impact and benefits of European integration, it is 
not surprising that the issue of NATO and more military-centred security was not 
at the forefront of politics following Spain’s entry into the EU (1986).  Although 
NATO membership was a divisive issue for Spain, the wider issue of security did 
not become politicised.  ETA was universally accepted as a threat to the cross-
                                                   
78 ETA’s ability to endure was in part due to its cellular structure, the entrenched nature of the 
nationalist aspiration to independence and this overcame the impact of a conveyor-belt effect of 
leader arrests, deaths and shifting support.  A ceasefire at the end of 1999 lasted only a few 
months after which attacks resumed against politicians and security personnel.  Currently ETA is 
still on a cease-fire but dialogue with the central government is non-existent. 
79 The European Arrest warrant was a cause espoused by Spain and other EU members, although 
attempts to promote it had foundered on issues of shared intelligence and judicial concerns.  Its 
lack of progress in adoption was a source of frustration to many in Spain’s security community. 
80  A strong relationship with the United States was necessary according to what emerged in 
interview, and evidence from Northern Ireland was cited, where Clinton’s efforts were seen as 
pivotal in delivering a successful settlement.  Interviewed May 2000. This was further reinforced in 
interviews with defence officials in 2011 and also Rafael Bardají and Felix Arteaga (in 2015) who 
all made the case that Spain’s `security’ depended on a good relationship with the United States. 
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party consensus and therefore generated some unity at the national level, 
although some point-scoring did take place. 
Following 14 years of PSOE hegemony linked to its social-democratic model, the 
issue of NATO membership, which had been only partly resolved, was one of the 
only places where differentiation in policy could be asserted.  After 15 years at 
the margins of power, the PP’s decision to promote full and active participation in 
the NATO Alliance was perhaps one of the few areas where it could strike out on 
a new course in policy. Therefore there was an argument (Holman, 2006, p.210) 
that Spain’s role in Europe remained incomplete at the end of the 1990s and 
incorporating Spain (but also France) into NATO’s military command structure 
could eventually strengthen the EU’s hand in defence and security.81 
“In the short term the integration of Spain into NATO would strengthen the 
`European pillar’ as a first step to the creation of a genuine European 
defence…from 1986 onwards issues of foreign policy and security coordination 
were subordinated to issues of economic and monetary integration” (Holman, 
1996, p.210). 
Prime Minister Aznar himself remarked that the decision to support the US in its 
war on terror had no shortage of precedents: 
“la decisión española de apoyar a Estados Unidos en su lucha contra el 
terrorismo no supone un cambio en nuestra situación” (2005, p.191).82 
Although much had been made of the Francoist roots of the PP, the fact is that 
once elected in 1996, they were well-placed to tap into a new emphasis of 
Atlantic-thinking that was entering Europe’s security architecture.  The EU’s early 
failure in the former Yugoslavia had exposed a security vacuum that could only 
be filled by a credible military body such as the NATO Alliance.  This was 
demonstrated following a settlement (the Dayton Accords) brought about by 
powerful military action by NATO in response to the outrage over the Srebrenica 
massacre of 1995. 
Victory by the PP in 1996 happened at a time when the European project was 
focussed on the economic and political sphere.  Security and Defence, a pillar 
`sketched over’ by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and outside the main EU process, 
                                                   
81 The same arguments could be extended to aspiring members of the EU from the East, although 
in most cases, NATO membership preceded EU accession. 
82 “Spain’s decision to back the United States in its struggle against terrorism does not represent 
any change in our position”. 
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remained subject to national caveats.   Other events, Blair’s victory in the UK 
(offering a  positive shift in the EU’s third largest member), and in the UN, a 
proactive Security Council on Yugoslavia, coupled with an assertive NATO in the 
mid-1990s, meant that for Spain, it was appropriate to address the matter of its 
wider security beyond that of a simple EU model.83     
Experiencing an incoherence (Buchan, 1993) in EU-led security (in contrast to 
the US-led NATO campaign which produced the Dayton peace process in 
Bosnia), the Aznar government took the perhaps rational step of affirming its 
commitment to a full participation in the Atlantic Alliance.  This was matched by a 
confidence in Spain’s ability to meet its military commitments following some 
years of defence expansion, modernisation and operational success in the 
Balkans and UN duty.   By 1999, some 3,500 Spanish personnel were serving on 
various missions around the world with aircraft, ships and troops deploying in 
theatres such as Bosnia, Central America and Cambodia.  For much of the 
1990s defence expenditure was historically high by Spanish standards, 
averaging around 1.2% of GDP, whereas since 2000 this figure has fallen back 
to closer to 0.9%.84 
Within Spain, NATO membership had been a divisive topic.  Whilst linking NATO 
to European security, as was borne out by the success in enforcing peace in the 
Balkans, for many on Spain’s left and inclined toward radical tradition, full 
integration into NATO represented a step away from their dyed-in-the-wool 
position (Barbé 1995, p.117).  Nuclear weapons, US policy in Central America, 
and militarisation of the western Mediterranean were all issues that significant 
swathes of voters opposed. Yet few of these issues resonated with the traditional 
support base of the PP government, so they did not pose a challenge to full 
integration into NATO’s military command, which was confirmed at the 1997 
Madrid NATO summit. 
Spain’s status in NATO remained incomplete following the divisive referendum of 
1986 (Heywood, 1995, Preston & Smyth, 1994).  In order to satisfy both anti-US 
sentiments in Spain and also maintain the confidence of Washington a number 
of topics remained open that increasingly undermined Spain’s options to be 
                                                   
83 The EU was reluctant to address issues that touched national sensitivities.  Whilst agreement 
could be achieved on climate change (Kyoto in 1997) and energy security, topics such as post–
colonial issues and contested borders were issues where it was hard to make any headway at EU 
level.   
84 GDP and Defence expenditure is notoriously hard to interpret, however, the figure from the 
1990s is higher than the period since 2003.  Source www.nato.int [accessed 03 Jan 2017]. 
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proactive as a power in the area of security and military affairs.  In some ways, 
the status of the maritime boundaries off Gibraltar and the peninsula (known as 
GIBMED and IBERLANT) remained under NATO multinational control with 
limited Spanish oversight. Until 1997, Spanish forces remained outside NATO’s 
integrated military command, which situation had become an anachronism by the 
late 1990s, as by then Spain possessed a modernised command and control 
system that was capable of maintaining sovereignty.  For a government drawing 
its support from the Spanish conservative centre right there was a pressing 
electoral and political need to remove this historical embarrassment, which would 
ceteris paribus provide political kudos for the new government. 
Full integration into NATO held few risks for the PP government.  After decades 
defending Europe from the USSR, NATO had successfully redefined itself by the 
end of the 20th century with a New Strategic Concept based around 
peacekeeping and a broader geographic focus.85  The humiliating status of the 
Canary Islands and Gibraltar as non-Spanish command mandates could now be 
reversed and brought under Spanish military control, with only limited loss of 
sovereignty, whilst giving Aznar credibility within international circles as a 
deliverer of change, ably assisted by Javier Solana, a former socialist foreign 
minister with impeccable international credibility.86 
A new defence and security posture offered the PP a new role in that area that 
did not exist in other policy fields.  Although the Aznar government’s victory in 
1996 promised change, the main domestic imperative for the new government 
was to prepare Spain for the Single European currency, which dominated much 
of Spain’s domestic political agenda at the end of the century.  Viewed in this 
context, it is understandable that it was security and foreign policy that provided 
an outlet for a high profile policy shift.  In effect, Aznar’s administration was 
constructing a new Spanish identity, framed not just in European Union affairs, 
but one what would see Spain gain a place in the world of international 
diplomacy and military power, something aspired to 15 years earlier under 
Morán. 
                                                   
85 The new geographic zone for operations became known as a non-Article V area and permitted 
NATO to act outside the “North Atlantic area”. This meant that the Mediterranean, Middle East and 
Asia could be considered a region of operations so, with its territories in North Africa, Spain could 
evidently view this as a positive development when it emerged in 1999 with the New Strategic 
Concept. 
86 Solana, who as Socialist Foreign Minister had developed Spain’s role in the González years, 
became NATO’s Secretary General under the PP and subsequently EU chief for foreign and 
security policy.   
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The Kosovo crisis in 1998/9 further epitomised the impasse in EU security and 
whilst a conflict unfolded in the Balkans, NATO effectively determined its 
response with active participation by the Atlantic-leaning states.  Aznar’s 
government was quick to provide support, in spite of the significant awkwardness 
of backing separatism with overtones of the Basque country’s own claim to 
autonomy: even eight years after the declaration of independence by Kosovo, 
Spain refuses to recognise it as a self-determining state.  Although not 
securitised, the intervention was a prelude to the decision to back US 
intervention in Iraq some four years later.87 
Thus, by the start of the 21st century, having gained a second election victory 
and an overall Parliamentary majority, the PP government was able to be more 
active in creating and promoting a distinct security policy on its own terms.  The 
`European project’, which had been invigorated by expanding membership, the 
single currency and the expansion of trade, meant that the PP could look to the 
start of the new millennium with some enthusiasm and its reinforced mandate in 
2000 was matched by a new assertiveness.  NATO membership had been 
resolved nominally in Spain’s favour and, most importantly for it, membership of 
the single currency was on the way to being ratified, perhaps demonstrating to 
Spaniards that they were finally among those at the core of the European Union 
(Salmon, 2000, p.40). 
The political setting was favourable for the PP and Aznar to pursue a more 
ambitious programme upon entering power for a second term in 2000.  The 
decision to support the war was not inevitable, but Aznar felt he had greater 
licence to pursue a more politicised and ambitious approach to Spain’s security.  
European Monetary Union was set on a course suitable to Spain’s national 
interest, and therefore foreign and security policy was the only avenue where the 
PP could act freely and in clearly in the party interest. 
The Events of 9/11: Spanish US Precedents. 
Aznar’s pursuit of Atlanticism had several roots and reflected a range of 
interests, the first of which lay in his party’s leanings in that direction and its 
clearer support for US military action in direct contrast to the PSOE.  Indeed, the 
late 1980s had seen a number of key actions by the PSOE that ran contrary to 
                                                   
87 Although the PSOE did not oppose the mission, there were heated exchanges in the Cortes from 
the left wing Izquierda Unida grouping.  The PP’s decision to support the action was emboldened 
by the repressive nature of the Belgrade regime. 
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Washington’s posture, as the González government refused to support Reagan’s 
bombing of Libya in 1986 and also condemned the US invasion of Panama in 
1989.  On the other hand, the PP was eager to reflect closer support for US 
political and, where necessary, military action.  When President Clinton ordered 
military strikes against targets in Iraq over breaches of UN resolutions in 1998, 
this was again openly supported by the Aznar regime, which offered material 
support for such action, in spite of deep reservations by the Socialists and 
parties of the Left. 
At the EU level, attempts by Spain to move ahead with arrest warrants and a 
counter-terrorist strategy had been thwarted by certain EU interests in the late 
1990s.  One of the few areas of success against terrorism had been in the form 
of cooperation with France in dealing with ETA activists outside Spain. An 
extension of this protocol across the European Union would have notched up a 
success for the Madrid government and PP in building on resolving the issue of 
ETA movement, but by the summer of 2000 this proved elusive as debate was 
stymied over the issue of judicial and human rights concerns.88 
George W. Bush taking office in 2001 as US President implied further 
cooperation in the direction of Atlantic security was anticipated.  Whilst 
domestically the attention of Spanish governments had been firmly pinned on the 
issue of Euro membership, wider Atlantic issues still offered an area for policy 
development.  By early 2001, it was evident that the US was already looking to 
Spain for support.  In what proved to be a major coup for the Aznar government, 
the first country visited by Bush’s in his five-day tour of Europe was Spain.  
During the visit, Bush and Aznar echoed a message of close support for Israel’s 
response to the renewed Intifada.  More importantly, Spain openly endorsed the 
missile defence system that EU states generally opposed, and to quote Bush as 
he linked Spain’s support to an anti-terrorist struggle: 
“Part of the missile defence dialogue is about fighting terrorism. If someone is 
able to blackmail free countries, it could prevent countries like Spain and the 
United States from being forward-thinking about terrorism…our government is 
committed to stand side by side with the Spanish government as it battles 
terrorism here in Spain.” (CNNonline.com, 2011). 
                                                   
88 Bardají, an advisor to Aznar stated that French support for Spain’s anti-terror agenda had 
dwindled, in part due to personal factors between the French President and Spain’s PM, but also 
French suspicion of Aznar’s ambitions (interview February 2017).  
 
71 
 
To which Bush went on to add “I appreciate so very much our close cooperation 
and security arrangements with Spain.”89 
What is notable from the declaration is that Spain, and Aznar in particular, were 
reaping `benefits’ of the PP’s Atlantic posture.  The decision by the Aznar 
government to support the US ballistic missile defence system now appears 
perplexing, but the fact that the Germans, French and the UK were hesitant 
about supporting the programme demonstrates quite how far the PP government 
was willing to go in supporting Washington even if this meant being at odds with 
EU partners. 
At the same time, the emergence of a proactive UK government seeking 
European allies to coalesce support for the US at a time of deepening European 
ties offered an opportunity for Aznar to build closer ties with the UK and US. In 
spite of the long-running issue of Gibraltar, Blair, the UK Prime Minister, began to 
cultivate a useful relationship with Aznar90 that empowered his Spanish 
counterpart to adopt positions at odds with those of France and Germany91. This 
closer relationship was further cemented by the leaders (including the then 
Italian PM) even holidaying together. 
The Effect of 9/11 on Spain’s Security Outlook 
The September 11 attacks, by their very nature, remain almost unprecedented to 
this day.  The fact that on daytime global television lightly armed terrorists were 
able to temporarily overcome the World’s superpower to such great effect has 
been seen as marking a shift in the validity of military power and a challenge to 
the nation-state.  Huntington’s Clash of Civilisation model92 was given a renewed 
discussion, as commentators came to view the event as heralding a 
reawakening of religiously inspired terrorism as a security threat. 
                                                   
89 www.cnn.com, [accessed 23 Jul 2011]. 
90 Blair’s optimistic posture to Europe was multifaceted with good relations with virtually all 
European powers in his first term. Although the PP was distinct from the British Labour party, 
Blair’s Atlantic tendency appealed and offered Aznar a posture that appeared to balance the poles.  
As both Madrid and London viewed the Berlin-Paris axis with similar sentiments, a consensus of 
sorts could be achieved, in addition both leaders appeared at ease with each other. 
91 Anecdotally Aznar was reported to feel patronised by Germany’s Chancellor Kohl following his 
first meeting after coming to power.  (Elordi, 2003 p.108) 
92 Huntington proposed in 1992 that the world would come to see conflict rise above that between 
states and instead this would be based around civilizational cleavages (i.e. Islam and Christianity).  
In the immediate light of 9/11, with a US-led coalition seeking to attack Islamic terrorist groups, this 
gained some renewed currency.  Even so, it is not considered to be an adequate explanation of the 
complexity of modern conflict. 
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For Spain, horrific though the attack was, the effect of terrorism is well known to 
the political system and, although ETA was never able (nor wanted) to mount a 
challenge on a par with that of Al Qaida, Spaniards were fully conversant with 
the threat and impact of violent extremism both on and outside Spain’s mainland. 
As early as 1995, the Barcelona Mediterranean Process had featured as one of 
its key pillars an initiative to reduce some of the harsher effects of free trade, 
population pressures and subsequent migration in and across the Arab world 
(such themes drove a sense of injustice among radicalised groups).  Although 
unfashionable, the `thirdworld’ or tercermundismo movement within the Spanish 
Foreign Ministry and Cooperation Agency, had been anticipating rising security 
issues within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and so for Spain, 
shocking although the attacks of 9/11 were, Islamic terrorism and conflict 
involving the West and MENA were not altogether unexpected.93  
Aznar’s immediate and wholehearted support for the US response to 9/11 was 
matched by allies in NATO and the world alike, although for Spain the timing 
could be considered as somewhat propitious since the renewed focus on global 
terrorism by the US and NATO complemented the PP’s renewed efforts against 
ETA, it was of clear interest for Spain to align itself with the rhetoric and actions 
of Bush. 
It was almost inevitable that Europe’s powers would rally to the support the US’s 
efforts to reduce terrorist activity and related criminal projects in the aftermath of 
September 11.  Thousands of casualties included nationals from nearly all EU 
states and the impact was felt across NATO.  European nation states had 
virtually all endured terrorism in various forms after 1945, yet a clear-cut solution 
to such threats remained elusive.  The US drive to hinder fund-raising and choke 
off support for terrorism was not difficult to cooperate with.  As a result of the 
globalised nature of banking, stopping transactions and movement of money was 
a low-risk, effective way of halting the spread and activities of groups.  This also 
hit ETA where it hurt as, although the Basque country is relatively small, reported 
assistance and financing from France, Colombia and Ireland showed that 
                                                   
93 CIDOB, the Barcelona think tank focussed a lot of work on the new threats to Spain from these 
topics.  Although nominally publicly funded, it enjoyed a high profile due to its unusually strong 
relationships with external organisations, NGOs and patronage from certain elements of the 
Spanish Socialists. 
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international links were crucial to its survival, even though evidence of the extent 
of the setback it suffered is scant.94 
Perhaps the most vivid example of securitisation in the 21st century came 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks, when George Bush described his proposed 
response as a “War on Terror”.95  Coupled with the axis of evil designation of 
certain nation-states, some even uninvolved in the 9/11 attacks, the jingoistic 
atmosphere of the winter of 2001/2 was notable for generating a sense of global 
insecurity.  For Spain, having already offered unconditional support for Bush 
prior to 9/11, the benefit to its own terrorist strategy was timely and offered a 
genuine fillip to its efforts to overcome ETA, in spite of misgivings among 
commentators regarding the US’s jingoistic tone. 
In December 2001, US Attorney General John Ashcroft and Spain’s then 
Minister of Interior, Mariano Rajoy, declared “We will stand shoulder to shoulder 
in this fight against international terrorism and together our nations will prevail”96 
this reflected the close ties being pursued by Spain.  Later to become Prime 
Minister in 2011, Rajoy was echoing what Aznar had said in a speech prior to 
Spain’s assumption of the Presidency of the European Union (in 2002) when he 
stated: 
“Spain counts on three anchorages in its politics of security and defence.  The 
first one is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the second is the bilateral 
relation with Washington; the third, the emerging dimension of security and 
defence of the European Union, the Common Foreign Security Policy”97 
Aznar’s indication was that any actions arising out of the Global War on Terror 
would be in accordance with this stated posture.  Whilst not quite the Aznar 
`doctrine’, such a statement would have been unthinkable under the PSOE and 
reflected a presidential style that was not typical in Spain (although in foreign and 
security policy, as will be argued in later chapters, a clear `presidentialism’ has 
since emerged in the policy process). 
The time from 11 September 2001 up until the end of the Spanish Presidency of 
the EU in June 2002 was one of significant allying with US policy by Spain.  This 
                                                   
94 Roller (2002) mentions the impact of 9/11 on ETA’s support and financial networks, although she 
argues the conflict was more an impasse at that moment in time. 
95 Unattributed sources believe it was first used nine days after the 9/11 attacks.  Fox news several 
months after the event displayed the “America at War” screenbanner in its broadcasting. 
96 Speech of 13 December 2001 by Mariano Rajoy and J Ashcroft www.embusa.es [accessed 23 
Jul 11]. 
97 España y la lucha contra el terrorismo global GEES 6 Nov 2001. [www.gees.org accessed 23 Jul 
11]. 
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choice was not unique to Spain, and the Blair government in the UK as well as 
the countries identified in Rumsfeld’s `New Europe’ quip98 showed that others 
had been willing to ally with the US in the build up to the war with Iraq (Australia 
and Canada, two close allies of the US, also went beyond what significant 
elements of their domestic audiences were comfortable with).  Where Spain 
differed from other countries was that the period coincided with significant 
institutional opportunities for Spain, not only in the European Union Presidency 
but also the United Nations, where it took up a rotating seat on the Security 
Council at the end of 2002, providing almost unprecedented platform for Spain to 
assert a role.99 
The strategic distance travelled by Spain at the start of the 21st century is 
significant.  From seeking Bush’s support in dealing with ETA in the spring of 
2001 through to supporting the US invasion of Iraq in February 2003 represented 
a giant stride.   
As result Spain’s standing in the Atlantic community was considerably enhanced, 
with notable gains in both the EU and NATO, where two achievements in 
particular can be cited.  The first was the approval of the European arrest 
warrant in 2002, which has been a long-standing tool in combatting transnational 
crime and terrorism.  Then the second and perhaps more significant of these 
was the forging of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States in 
April 2002.   
This built a significant element of cooperation into the Spanish military.  For 
decades, Spain’s relationship with the US had centred on the use of facilities and 
territory by the United States, but under this new arrangement Spain was now 
able to share intelligence and technology, with the AEGIS missile defence 
system being a part of the arrangement.100  Not only was Aznar able to bask in 
                                                   
98 Rumsfeld argued that a `new Europe’ represented an innovation in international security of 
nation-states willing to act militarily in joint interests, the `old Europe’ (essentially France and 
Germany) represented nation-states unwilling to uphold values and interests of benefit to the 
developed world.  
99 Spain has always seen membership of the United Nations Security Council as an opportunity for 
influence and credibility and thus in many ways a prize.  For UNSC membership to be so tainted by 
the political proximity to the US push for the invasion of Iraq was reportedly met with deep unease 
in the Foreign Ministry.  Bardaji (in interview 2017) argued that Spain’s UNSC seat was a pure 
coincidence, and in some ways forced Spain’s hand prematurely to support the US position. 
100 AEGIS was a US area defence weapon that provided a response to the threat of missiles.  
Spain provided the use of Rota naval base and in return purchased AEGIS for its ships.  Possibly 
for defence against Libya’s Gaddafi regime, AEGIS represents a traditional hard security weapons 
system and one with significant economic benefits for arms manufacturers both in Spain and the 
US. 
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the respect and gratitude of the US,101 but he had also managed to deliver 
tangible progress in terms of both Spain’s own campaign against ETA terrorism 
and the country’s regional military standing. 
Perejil: Spain’s `Almost War’. 
Spain’s sense of insecurity in the summer of 2002 was further heightened when 
in July that year a surprise gambit by Morocco saw a diplomatic crisis blow up.  
Perejil (Parsley) Island, a small uninhabited rock under Spanish sovereignty off 
the coast of Morocco was unexpectedly occupied by Moroccan troops.   
Although only a token piece of territory, politically this represented a significant 
crisis for the Aznar government, since it posed two threats to Spain’s foreign 
policy, in the form of firstly a deterioration of relations with Morocco (potentially 
its most difficult neighbour) and secondly a traditional hard security crisis 
whereby a foreign military force occupies national territory, something which had 
not been seen in decades in western Europe. 
A war or military conflict over Perejil was never a likely outcome, but an 
unsatisfactory ending for Spain would have been a protracted negotiation and an 
image of colonialism in North African media with echoes of the loss of Spanish 
Sahara in 1975.  Spain’s wariness was exacerbated by the fact that France 
appeared sympathetic to the Moroccan cause (Alonso Marcos, 2013, p.70). 
putting its own interests over European unity on the issue.  Fortunately, for 
Spain, another benefit of tightening links with the US was that Colin Powell 
lobbied actively for a peaceful end to the crisis, with an outcome that not only 
saved face for Spain, but appeared to downplay Moroccan claims.  To quote PM 
Aznar 
“In view of the failure of the EU, we requested assistance from the US, and 
thanks to their intervention the affair could appropriately be dealt with.  This 
crisis was a small one, but the lesson learned as to who helps when we need 
it will not be easily forgotten”102 
Blair’s now infamous Crawford ranch meeting with Bush in 2002 has been much 
replayed throughout academia in the United Kingdom as the starting point for the 
latter’s involvement in the war in Iraq.  From Spain’s standpoint, perhaps 
conscious of the less friendly media (at the time), Aznar made visits similar to 
                                                   
101 A bill was presented in the US to offer Aznar a Congressional Medal in 2004, which was 
greeted with scorn by Spanish public opinion and the matter was quietly shelved. 
102 Aznar, quoted in Portero F “Address to the sub–committee on transatlantic economic relations 
of the NATO Parliamentary assembly” June 2003 www.nato.int, [accessed 23 Jan 11]  
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those of Blair but kept away from the cameras and it could even be speculated 
that a parallel personal agreement might have been made between the two 
leaders (Elordi, 2003, p.165) and this is backed up in interviews (Bardaji, 2017).  
Meanwhile, the lead up to the invasion of Iraq was dominated by the UN’s 
machinations over a mandate for the invasion.  As a rotating UNSC member, 
Spain was part of the diplomatic effort to secure a vote authorising military action 
and the role it took up in supporting the US was zealously championed by the 
PM, in spite of a party and a media that remained to be convinced. 
Historically, there appears to be no clear `speech act’103 with regard to Aznar’s 
government putting the case for war.  Whereas the UK Parliament can point to a 
clear vote (18 March 2003) and a dossier provided by the government (with the 
now infamous 40 minute claim of an Iraqi weapon of mass destruction being 
activated against UK interests), in the case of Spain it is more appropriate to talk 
of a creeping securitisation.  Initially this arose during the summer of 2001, when 
Bush visited Spain on his first European tour as President, at a time when ETA 
had reactivated its terrorist campaign in Madrid.104 But later, as the 9/11 
response took shape within NATO, the language from the Aznar government 
became increasingly suggestive of an imperative to support the US, which 
appeared to fly in the face of figures that indicated that a mere 24% of Spaniards 
felt that the US was actively assisting against ETA in the aftermath of 9/11 
(Alonso Marcos, 2013, p.38). 
The issue of terrorism has long been politicised within the Spanish political 
system.105  In fact the Aznar government’s experience of ETA could even be 
argued to have become personalised as a result of the assassination attempt.  
Whatever the case, the atmosphere engendered by 9/11 meant that Spain’s 
security had become firmly framed by high-profile open alliance with the US.   
In the specific instance of the interplay between NATO members and the fall-out 
from 9/11, the activation of Article V (the mechanism of response to an attack or 
threat in a collective manner) represented no great departure from the norm in 
the case of most NATO member states.  But for Spain this signified a far greater 
                                                   
103 The speech act is best described by Emmers’s `Securitization’ piece in Collins Contemporary 
Security Studies (2007, p.112).   
104 During the period immediately preceding Bush’s arrival, there were a number of killings by ETA, 
creating an atmosphere that Madrid was unsafe and adding to the sense in creating a common 
front with the US.   
105 Ever since its organisation in the early years of the Franco regime, the response to dealing with 
terrorism and separatism has been politicised within Spain, with the Interior Ministry and Police 
forces adopting a consistently robust position with regards to dissent from Basque nationalists. 
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step as, Spain had only entered NATO’s integrated military command four years 
previously and had already experienced real division at home over military 
participation in the US-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. 
Buzan’s model (Buzan, 1998, p.23) refers to three policy outcomes in response 
to a security issue such as the decision to support the invasion of Iraq.  It can be 
non-politicised (not of any significance to the political system, it can be politicised 
(dealt with by normal behaviours of the political system, such as the campaign 
against ETA) or, in the event of securitisation, it can be identified as an 
existential threat and acted upon accordingly.   
The UK’s Blair government identified the Iraq regime as posing an existential 
threat in a Parliamentary vote and in a dossier claimed to contain intelligence of 
a military capability, but in the case of Aznar and the PP this contention was 
questionable.  It was certainly true that Aznar’s government framed the Iraq crisis 
as an existential threat to Spain, but only indirectly, pledging its support for the 
US and for a global commitment to “join forces to confront together the 
dangerous threats and challenges that humanity will face in the twenty-first 
century.” (Ambrosio, 2003, p.2). 
The key analytical debate here is how this question was to be approached in 
Spain given the extent of public antipathy towards taking action. On the day of 
the outbreak of conflict more than 600,000 protestors took to Madrid’s streets to 
condemn it,106 being supported across Spain by a broad coalition of trade unions, 
political groupings, NGOs and religious groups.  Evidently, the existential threat 
was not perceived the same way across Spain’s political spectrum.  Whilst Aznar 
may have had the backing of his party (a secret party vote was held prior to the 
event), it was a considerably greater challenge to sell his choice of policy to 
Spanish voters, which is something that it could never be claimed he succeeded 
in doing. 
Some (Del Arenal, 2011, p.372) see this period of `Atlanticisation’ of Spanish 
foreign policy (una vocación atlántica) as representing the emergence of a 
critical fault-line in any consensus over Spain’s external security relations.  It 
could also be interpreted that the period and events of 2001/2 reflected the real 
end of the Cold War paradigm for Spain and, as the EU had systematically 
struggled to assert a foreign and security policy throughout the 1990s, the 
                                                   
106 www.cbsnews.com/news/massive-anti-war-outpouring/ 16 Feb 2003, [accessed 11 Dec 16]. 
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decision by Aznar and the PP to adopt a more pro-US stance was perhaps a 
rational outcome (Hill, 2003, p.102).   
There is little doubt that the decision to integrate fully into NATO bolstered the 
confidence of Spain’s military, and in the case of the Perejil Island incident may 
have helped secure its contested territories in North Africa, although the decision 
to wholeheartedly support the US in its invasion of Iraq, both politically (in the 
UNSC and the Azores summit) and practically, with the deployment of Spanish 
troops107 in the summer of 2003, can surely not be viewed as entirely warranted. 
Buzan’s model of securitisation (1997) may not square completely with the 
timescale behind Aznar’s decision to securitise the US War on Terror (a matter 
of 24 months from the summer of 2001 through to the decision to deploy military 
troops to Iraq in August 2003), but the politicisation and subsequent 
securitisation could be seen in Spain’s unstinting support for the US at a time 
when it traditionally ought to have aligned its posture with that of the EU.  
According to the model promoted by the Copenhagen school, securitisation 
enables policy-makers to imply that a specific danger to the state exists.  Waever 
refers to the speech act: 
“by uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development 
into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means 
are necessary to block it” (Weaver in Lipschutz, 1995, p.54). 
It is contended here that the PP’s decision to support the US Global War on 
Terror so unreservedly (very few countries openly questioned the US posture) 
reflected a shift in security as this was perceived by Spain’s elites on the political 
centre-right.  Whilst Aznar and the PP may have benefited from and possessed 
an ideological need to pursue una vocación atlántica, the fact remained that the 
incorporation of Spain into NATO in the late 1990s did not fully meet Spain’s 
defence needs.   
European Security Institutions 
In interviews with Spanish Defence officials, a consistent theme has centred on 
the fact that NATO focuses a disproportionate amount of resources (from a 
                                                   
107 Spanish troops made up the bulk of a Brigade of troops from Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua as part of a Polish multinational division. Their role was ostensibly humanitarian and the 
UN had authorised such deployments subsequent to the invasion but, as events escalated during 
the year, both troops and Intelligence personnel (from the CNI) were to become casualties.  
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Spanish perspective)108 on Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet 
Union.  By 2000 (the second Aznar term) there was little evidence that Spain felt 
more secure as a NATO member and, if anything, ETA’s resumption of attacks 
pointed to no progress having been made at all in countering terrorism.  There 
had certainly been a degree of recuperation of national sovereignty with NATO 
integration, but NATO’s preoccupation with the Balkans benefited Spain in very 
few tangible ways.109  Hence the significant diplomatic investment in the 
Mediterranean process, including organisations such as the 5 plus 5 process,110 
only serve to illustrate how complicated institutional arrangements can sit 
uncomfortably outside the EU and NATO. 
Europe’s integration and expansion, often focussed towards the East in the last 
20 years, has not made Spain more secure in a traditional hard military sense.  
The decision to incorporate East European states into the EU, though supported 
by Spain, has implied some tangible threats to Spain’s economy, most notably 
via the increased competition for subsidies from the Cohesion Fund that their 
accession supposes.  The fund, which has been one of Spain’s most significant 
`wins’ from the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992), has made Spain 
the largest recipient of EU financial assistance to date (200,000 million Euros) 
and as recently as 2016 Spain received 8% of resources paid out from it in spite 
of accession of far poorer member states.111   
The restructure of EU financing, along with reluctant anti-terrorist support, 
fisheries disputes and accession by the poorer and less developed countries of 
Eastern Europe, have all shown that in a number of cases, the EU was not 
helping to boost Spain’s perception of broader security. Monetary Union and the 
single currency in 2001 may have been a `win’ for Spain domestically, but 
whether in a wider sense Europe was set to make Spain more `secure’ was 
more doubtful.  The Atlantic vocation may have had its roots in a strategy that 
sought to make Spain more secure, but as the events of March 2004 proved, it 
                                                   
108 This has been consistently alluded to in the literature and repeated in interviews by Spain’s 
defence ministry officials in 2011, 2015 and informally in 2017. This is also supported in interviews 
with Felix Arteaga and Rafael Bardají in 2015. 
109 In 2011, the new headquarters near Madrid (Retamares) was closed following a restructuring 
within the Alliance, which may have related to the poor relationship between Madrid and 
Washington at the time. 
110 The 5 plus 5 programme brings together the Maghreb countries with the South European 
Mediterranean countries of NATO along with Malta with the aim of improving dialogue. 
111 According to the European Commission, almost 27% of public investment in Spain at the height 
of the economic crisis came from the Cohesion Fund.  Source European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2016/04/04-04-2016-european-cohesion-
policy-a-key-factor-for-spain-s-development-and-integration-in-europe, [accessed 05 Jan 17]. 
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ultimately set Spain on a path towards dangerous ideological division over 
security policy. 
The events of 11 September 2001 tend to be mirrored in Spain by the Madrid 
train bombings of 2004.  In those attacks, a series of bombs killed 191, injured 
more than 1,900 and generated a wave of fear across Spain and Europe.   
Coming some 72 hours before a General Election, the impact was incendiary on 
the outcome, with attempts to prematurely implicate ETA in the attacks in last-
ditch crisis management by the PP being rebutted by well-placed media sources.  
In the ensuing heated public debate the PP were widely discredited for their 
stance, as it transpired that the attacks may have been linked to Spain’s support 
for the US in Iraq. 
The election result, which had always seemed likely to favour the PP, swung 
sharply away from them, and as a result the PSOE won.  To the dismay of the 
Bush presidency, the PSOE, now backed by an array of smaller parties, 
immediately went about the business of withdrawing troops from Iraq (a long-
standing election pledge). 
The attack remains shrouded in national sensitivity to this day.  The PP decision 
to lend its support for the US remains divisive even in interviews, with some 
claiming that Spain had little choice but to ally itself with the US.  What has 
tended to polarise the situation even more has been the PSOE’s arguable 
overcompensation for Aznar’s posture by adopting a radically anti-US stance.  
The PSOE’s time in government was marked by division with the PP in matters 
of security policy that almost exaggeratedly underlined their ideological split. 
Summary  
The diagram shows the main issues behind the decision to invade Iraq 
undertaken by the government of Aznar.  Five key issues are discussed. 
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Figure 3: The Environment Behind Spain’s Support for the Iraq War 
 
 
Spain underwent a profound securitisation in 2001-3 with ramifications that 
continued beyond the Iraq war period.  Aznar’s decision to support the US war 
on terror still raises contemporary questions.  Interviews with key advisors 
admitted it was a significant, almost lone act on Aznar’s part, substantial aspects 
of his own party were not convinced by the decision, and it is subsequently been 
determined as an irrational act on Aznar’s part.  However, constructivism 
enables an alternative view to be discussed, as what was perhaps the defining 
decision of Aznar, reflected a logical continuation of his view of Spain’s 
(unfulfilled) place in the world, which itself was a product of the norm of 
subordinating Spain to European interests.  2001 was a period where a counter 
terrorist posture was being constructed based on alternative ideas about 
collective action. 
The three factors behind the Partido Popular’s shift reflect a set of circumstances 
that produced an opportunity for activism and engagement with a US that, since 
the Francoist period, had been somewhat cool in its relationship with Spain on 
the military stage.  Whether the 2001-4 period represents an exceptional time, or 
is an indicator of a more nuanced relationship that has been more receptive to 
change remains to be debated and the Spanish Security Strategies discussed in 
a later chapter will examine this issue. 
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The PP’s conduct as regards both its military support in Iraq and its immediate 
response to the terrorism of March 2004 had left it tainted in the eyes of many 
voters.  While perceptions by their very nature can be difficult to gauge, Spain’s 
profile in the world changed in this period, while both parties can probably be 
held accountable over this matter for very different reasons.  Although the 
repercussions of 2004 remain under discussion, those working on the policy of 
the PP government remain steadfastly loyal to the decision to side with the US.  
Bardaji, along with Aznar, points to this construct as the real driver behind the 
decision and issues in 2002 and 2003.   What drove the relationship however, 
was more than `hard’ security as viewed by Spain’s centre right, and even 
involved an interplay with economic sectors, with energy problems and an 
ongoing security concern with the south (namely the Maghreb) an issue that still 
concerns Spain to this day.  How these concepts are interwoven can be seen in 
the next section on Spain’s economic crisis of the Socialist years where the 
collapse of Spain’s financial sector, huge rise in unemployment and near fall out 
of European Monetary Union represented as significant a security threat as 
terrorism and war to Spain. 
Aznar had endeavoured a securitisation based on a nexus between the 
Spanish state and nation.  From the outset, the government’s support for the 
US War on Terror reflected an ideological aspiration to frame `Atlanticism’ 
through the prism of national security, and that the Spanish state’s pre-
eminence would develop this focus.  By framing security in this way, Aznar’s 
government favoured a referent object that was based on a traditional model 
of the Spanish nation supported by a romanticised, albeit vague idea of 
restoring Spain’s place in the world.   
 
This aspiration was undeliverable, not only did ETA’s terrorism endure, 
despite international pressure, but the Atocha attack of 2004, launched by 
North African extremists demolished the credibility of the PP in providing 
security, particularly through military or traditional means, but furthermore, 
events demonstrated that the government and particularly the executive’s 
framing of security was flawed.  
 
83 
 
Chapter 4. 
The Broader Security Challenges Faced By Spain – The Economic Crisis. 
It [Spain] had joined the European Economic Community in 1986 and was a 
founder member of the euro zone in 1999. It seemed that nothing could go 
wrong.  (Chislett, 2016, p.2) 
This chapter introduces a newer aspect in looking at Spain’s security – that of an 
economy in crisis, based not only on national challenges, but one that was felt at 
the micro level and disproportionately, by certain groups in society.  Traditionally, 
the social dimensions of economic hardship have been little discussed in security 
theory, it has traditionally looked at human security on these matters (Dent, 
2007).  However, addressing the impact of the crisis on Spain’s economy but 
also more specifically on the human cost to Spaniards offers a different 
perspective to understanding to Spain’s security. 
The rise of the Indignados (the indignant, or outraged) is discussed using a 
constructivist framework offered by Katzenstein (1996), and in particular this 
chapter looks at how these disparate group of interests articulated a challenge to 
the Spanish state with implications that continue to this day.  The chapter goes 
on to analyse the impact not only of the crisis, but in terms of how it impacts on a 
culture of security in Spain. 
The success “story” of Spain’s economy in the period of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s needs little introduction and in some ways now obscures the depth of 
Spain’s current travails.  Spain’s opening up to the European and then world 
economy in the 1960s under the Franco regime saw the national economy 
undertake a transformation that culminated in Spain joining first the Single 
European Market as an EC member state, and later the ambitious Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) programme outlined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.  
Until then growth rates in Spain from the 1960s had been impressive, and in 
1959-1974 Spain’s economy grew faster than any other OECD economy except 
Japan’s. (Powell, 2015, p.11).  Rising incomes also contributed to significant 
social change with improvements in economic participation, urbanisation and a 
more outward looking society (Preston 1993, p.279).  The political and social 
changes in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate the impact that 
economics and wealth can have on a modern society and it is perhaps significant 
that Spain’s successful decision to modernise and liberalise was partly due to the 
economic boom before and after Franco’s death. 
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Buzan identifies economic security as `highly political debates about international 
political economy concerning the nature of the relationship between the political 
structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market’ (Buzan, 1998, 
p95 and 1991 p.230). However a constructivist approach would also draw on 
Spain’s cultural context – reflecting on the impact of previous economic crises 
such as that of the global financial crisis of the 1930s which was one of the 
drivers to Civil War,112 and that in contemporary Spanish culture youth 
unemployment and economic insecurity has been endemic in cities and regions 
for decades.113  This in turn has produced an environment that although 
accustomed to economic downturns, has the capacity to quickly politicise 
austerity measures and fiscal policy.114  Furthermore, another aspect of Spain is 
the persistence of a traditional corporatist model of active state intervention in 
national policy (Heywood, 1999), but also an additional level through the 
devolved model of Autonomous Communities. Therefore, a norm exists in Spain 
of active government intervention at both regional and national level that goes 
beyond North European or Atlantic economies.  
It is the contention of this chapter that the economic slump (la crisis económica) 
arguably made a greater impact on far more Spaniards (both in real terms and 
perceptions) than the widespread fear following the terrorist attacks of 2004.  
That is not to say that ETA and international terrorism were minimal to the 
understanding of the Spanish people and their security in 2000-2013, but the 
depth of the economic crisis that began in 2008 shook Spain’s strategy and 
security thinking more than the Iraq war and bombing of Atocha rail station in 
2004.  In essence, Spain’s `political security’ and perceptions of stability were far 
more threatened existentially by the economic collapse than from the quarter of 
the traditional model of terrorism or military threat to the Spanish state in 2008-
13. 
                                                   
112 Economic crisis, unemployment and poverty was one of the causes of the polarisation in 1930s 
Spain that created the conditions for the Civil War of 1936-9 (Graham 2005, p.14). 
113 Spain regularly tops the EU for unemployment rates and youth economic non-participation rate 
(Chislett 2013). 
114 Although not the main topic under discussion, Spain’s relatively strong trade union movements 
wield influence and in conjunction with parties to the left of the Socialists Izquierda Unida – (United 
Left), provided a voice for the radical left prior to the economic crisis.  Whilst the Socialists may 
have occupied a centre Social Democratic space, Spain’s left has always been heard whilst not 
enjoying significant power. 
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In addition, the issue of corruption115 and appropriate behaviour by elites would 
also become politicised in a country where groups would increasingly reject 
ostentatious wealth and excess.  This sensitivity (real or imagined) would have a 
significant impact on Spain’s most visible elite institution, the monarchy, as the 
crisis evolved. 
From traditional theory, the impact of a growing economy and social 
improvements are not well understood in conventional security terms. The 
Franco regime’s staunchest defenders (the Army) were considered to be among 
democratic Spain’s biggest threats for the first years after the transition.  A coup 
attempt of February 1981 was supported at very high levels and only failed due 
to both the King’s firm rejection and a lack of widespread support from the 
broader Armed Forces (Serra, 2010, p.143).   
 
After his harsh remarks on Spanish separatists in 2006, the sacking of 
Lieutenant-General José Mena Aguado exemplified the sensitivity of politicians 
towards military figures116 and the role played by the media in articulating 
tensions between political elites and those tasked with defending the nation 
state.  Whilst Aguado may have been a lone voice, the incident touched on an 
aspect of Spain’s culture, one where politics and the military remain delicate.  A 
recurring theme in this thesis is the less than clear relationship between the 
Defence Ministry, its personnel and broader notions of security, at a time of 
economic success, as this chapter will examine, the situation is even harder to 
comprehend at a time of economic downturn. 
 
When the PP government came to power in 1996, certain indicators revealed 
that Spain was becoming arguably more secure than at any time in its recent 
history.  It had undergone significant economic development (Salmon, 2010), 
had transformed its tricky state-military relationship into a `consolidated 
democracy’ (Serra, 2010, p. 244) and stood among those at the inner core of EU 
member-states.117   Elections had enabled a smooth transfer of power from the 
                                                   
115 In 2011, a Eurobarometer poll saw 88% of Spaniards cite that corruption was a major problem.  
This had risen from 83% in Dec 2007 (the equivalent EU rate was 74% (2011) and 73% 2007.  
Chislett (2016, p.11) charts the effect of media reporting of corruption on public perceptions.  
116 Guardian 13 January 2006 `Spain's old guard defiant as general sacked’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/14/spain.gilestremlett, [accessed 24 Feb 17] 
117 In interview with a confidante of Felipe González, it was argued that the former Spanish 
Socialist PM was considered to be one of the modern architects of EU integration among the bloc’s 
member states. One anecdote has him turning up unannounced at a dinner of the EU’s four 
biggest member states (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) to successfully fight a Spanish 
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centre-left PSOE, and by the summer of 1997, Spain was fully integrated into the 
NATO military alliance.  Although it was true that ETA terrorism still posed a 
danger and Aznar’s experience (a close run attempt on his life), left Spain’s elites 
in no doubt that as individuals they lived under the shadow of a genuine threat, 
by the late 1990s separatist terrorism could not be seen as an existential threat 
to Spain’s integrity.  At the same time, the Spanish economy was growing 
strongly and would continue to do so until the PP’s mandate had run its course in 
2004.  Spain was receiving significant economic transfers from the EU and had 
entered the full integration programme of the EMU, while the Mediterranean 
Agreement of 1995 (now known as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership) had 
created a region-wide arrangement that embraced security, human rights and 
economic development (Gillespie, 1997). 
As it entered the 21st century, democratic Spain’s original fear of a military-
backed anti-democratic insurrection now appeared inconceivable, whilst the 
concept of a marginalised economy with stagnating sectors also looked remote.  
Latin America, which had traditionally only been considered for its potential, was 
now a fully-fledged economic market open to expansion by Spanish multi-
nationals.  This process was further reinforced by a region that was opening up 
to global trade and investment118 underpinned by US free trade deals and an EU 
that encouraged the development of trading opportunities.  Against this backdrop 
at the start of the millennium, by either measure of the traditional realist 
paradigm, or for that matter, approaches such as constructivism, Spain was 
perhaps at its most secure in that it was freer from threats than it had been for 
the previous century. 
The analysis is divided into three parts, initially offering a short explanation of the 
collapse of Spain’s economy, then going on to examine the impact this had upon 
Spain’s security in terms of both the state and human factors (the so-called new 
securities) and concludes by assessing the response of Spanish policy-makers 
and society to these new challenges.  In sum, I hypothesise that Spain has not 
reacted effectively to these new threats and, although the National Security 
Strategies (2011 & 2013) do go some way towards addressing these issues (to 
be discussed in the next chapter), Spain has not yet attended to such 
                                                   
position during pre-Summit discussions in the mid-1990s (interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, 
2015). 
118 Latin America was quickly transforming into a region dominated by Spanish multinationals, so 
much so that in this period these behemoths had made Spain the world’s 10th largest international 
investor, a large proportion of their activities taking place across the Spanish-speaking world. 
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vulnerabilities with any great success, which has exposed it to both further 
economic crisis and a disintegrating party system, while this has also spawned 
alienation from significant segments of the population. 
Constructing Broader Security in 21st Century Spain 
This shift from a “secure” Spain at the end of the 1990s, to one challenged by 
securitisation of foreign threats (Iraq, Morocco), an Islamic terrorist threat and 
near-collapse of the economy tends to be viewed in literature as an ongoing 
linear process (Chislett 2013).  In reality the shift reflects two forms (or sectors) 
of security, one of hard, state-focussed security with speech acts and 
statements, and then subsequently one of economic security at a micro level, 
that of individual or personal financial well-being perceived as being under threat.  
The concept has been little used when looking at Spain in this period, and yet 
offers some understanding of the shift in political participation under the PSOE.  
It is useful to examine Dent’s definition: 
“micro-level economic security concentrates on `localized’ agents such as 
individuals, households and communities and is primarily concerned with 
safeguarding their livelihoods” (Dent, 2007, p.205)  
In Spain’s case the micro-level security consists of households, individuals and 
even communities and is little discussed in Spanish academia on security.  
Levels of analysis below the nation-state tend to focus on autonomous 
communities and perhaps provinces. However, as a nation-state Spain is a 
society where villages and rural communities still hold influence (Navarro in 
Sellers, 2013, p.267) over many people’s lives and therefore represent closer-
knit communities that traditional Anglo-Saxon models would overlook are 
relevant.  These create a community environment (or culture) by which citizens 
would judge and perceive their security.  In effect it security perceptions are 
constructed by individuals, those about them and their sources of information in 
the media 
Economic realities, benefits and `offers’ at the individual or micro level are part of 
the electoral package debated by parties to gain votes during elections, 
particularly on the Left, although generally speaking this `micro-level’ security 
has never been included as a national defence or security need, with neither 
recent Defence Directives nor the National Security Strategy of 2011 identifying 
it.  A broader notion of security is still debated by academics around the world, 
an argument which also applies to Spain, where the development agenda and 
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dependency analysis have now been accepted with regard to human security 
outside Spain (by the Cooperación development arm of the Foreign Affairs 
ministry for example).  However, as the chapter will show, until the crisis of 2008, 
in terms of the domestic political agenda however, broader notions or 
constructions of security had yet to gain traction in contemporary Spain and by 
considering the shifts under the PSOE in particular, this is evident by 2013.   
Broadening the definition of security raises an alternative way of considering the 
context of Spain’s well-being in this period.  To cite one source, “human security 
is concerned with the protection of people from critical life-threatening dangers 
…”   (Thakur, referred to in Collins 2007, p.95).   
In the context of Spain’s economy `life-threatening’ does not capture the impact 
of the crisis effectively.  Alkirii however, takes the view that human security’s role 
“is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human 
freedoms and human fulfilment” (Collins, 2007, p.95).  The collapse of Spanish 
incomes, wealth, employment119 and property ownership has seen some 
analysis in terms of the impact on `human freedoms and human fulfilment’ in 
discussion of Spain’s security, but the emergence of mass protests, collapses in 
electoral support for conventional political parties and the persistence of a 
significant black economy would challenge this narrative or construction of what 
constitutes the nation’s security.120 
An initial deduction is that some scope does exist for drawing on the human 
security narrative and a microsecurity approach when considering Spain’s 
position and direction during la crisis económica, which will in turn be considered 
in the context of Spain’s national strategies in chapter seven. 
Returning to the PP’s decision to make a sea-change in the nature of Spain’s 
relationship with Washington and with respect to involvement in the US’s War on 
Terror, this followed a process of securitisation that demonstrated that without a 
shared perception of insecurity, nor an environment that appeared existentially 
                                                   
119 By a range of indicators, the effect was drastic, the economy shrank 8.6% between 2008 and 
2013 (Chislett, 2016, p.25).  Whilst the OECD saw a fall in average incomes of 6% in Spain, but 
this was even worse among the poorest 10% of Spaniards who saw a drop of 13% (Velasco, 
2015).  Even in the latter days of the crisis according to figures from the Bank of Spain, among 
young households (under 35 years) annual household incomes had fallen by 9200Euros, whilst the 
over 65s had not changed (El País, 2017, p.37).  Anecdotally the level of youth unemployment 
reached more than 50% in certain provinces (Chislett, 2016, p.25). 
120 In interview with the UK military attaché based in Madrid at the start of the crisis, he commented 
that a barter economy (small but growing at the time) indicated one impact of the crisis among 
poorer groups as access to cash dried up (interview with Colonel Rabbit). 
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threatened, ultimately Spain’s state elites would fail to carry a consensus of 
national support. 
Although Aznar’s decision to align with US interests had been endorsed by the 
PP as an organisation, there existed elements that remained unconvinced.  The 
election defeat of 2004 was attributable to not only the PP’s handling of the 
terrorist bombing, but also wide-ranging opposition from other parties, former 
coalition allies and most of Spain’s media.  On top of this was the fact that Aznar 
never carried more than a small clique outside his own political party,121 which 
was eventually his downfall and had consequences that are still playing out 
today in terms of Spain’s international standing.  
“The Socialists inherited from the previous Popular Party (PP) administration 
a fast-growing economy whose fundamentals — inflation, the public deficit, 
and the level of public debt — were in good shape thanks to the PP’s success 
in meeting the macroeconomic conditions for Spain to be a founder member 
of the euro zone as of 1999.” (Chislett, 2013, p.17) 
The 2004 PSOE government may have come to power under difficult 
circumstances (the Atocha bombing)122 but economic indicators were very 
favourable.  However, from an international security perspective, Spain still had 
to contend with a challenging region to its South with the problems of North 
Africa’s Maghreb confronting it daily in the form of refugees, economic 
migrants,123 brutal conflicts such as Algeria’s civil war, and the policies of 
Gaddafi’s Libya also occupying security strategists and undermining a perception 
of peace.  
However, while the regional issues tended not to worry most other EU member 
states, some allies appeared receptive and sympathetic to some of Madrid’s 
concern at this point.   Whilst NATO maintained a posture more focussed 
towards the Russian federation and ex-Soviet republics, the Alliance’s New 
Strategic Agenda of 1999 made it clear that operations by the WEU, NATO or 
other allies of Spain could assist in solving Spain’s security needs through its 
non-Article V operations.124  Therefore, the turn of the century could be seen as a 
                                                   
121 Bardaji in interview, argued that 95% of Spain was opposed to the war in Iraq, including 
significant parts of the Popular Party, he believes that this case was never successfully made to 
either the party or the nation. 
122 Atocha refers to the Atocha central train station in Madrid.  It is used to describe the attack in 
2004 and is recognised as such across Spain as a site of remembrance. 
123 According to Ross (2016, p.186) 40,000 North Africans were estimated to have crossed into 
Spain illegally from North Africa between 1999 and 2010. 
124 Article V refers to the North Atlantic security area, which effectively protected NATO during the 
Cold War.  A `non-Article V’ operation could extend outside NATO’s operations area into North 
Africa and elsewhere. 
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relative period of security for Spain with the Mediterranean Initiative among 
others helping to span some of the gap between North Africa and the EU, in 
addition to an economy, that although troubled by unemployment was seen as a 
European success story. 
As previously argued, Aznar’s decision to adopt a more proactive US stance 
against terrorism and to long-standing US concerns did much to undermine the 
region’s unity that became ever more fragile after 9/11, but this chapter will 
discuss the economic “abyss” which opened up before Spain during the 
Zapatero governments of 2004-11 and which, for most of the PP government’s 
term in office afterwards, seemed stubbornly unbridgeable. 
The Near-Collapse of Spain’s Economy – A New Insecurity. 
Chislett (2013), Ross (2016) and Eklundh (2015) among many, all argue that 
Spain’s economy was initially shielded from the US sub-prime mortgage slump in 
2007 before it spread to Europe.  When it crossed the Atlantic, some of the UK’s 
biggest banks teetered on the brink of failure and Iceland’s outsized banking 
sector collapsed.  Meanwhile in Spain, the unsustainable boom in housing came 
to an abrupt end.  This bubble had attracted large numbers of migrants, 
generated a false perception of wealth and had been spurred on by low interest 
rates and cheap credit as a result of Spain’s adoption of the single currency (the 
Euro) which was reinforced by political elites and sections of the media 
congratulating themselves on Spain’s `success’.125 
The economy had grown 30% in the decade preceding 2008, a rate significantly 
higher than the OECD’s average of 20%.  Much of this expansion was in 
construction, a highly visible sign of growth, where 2006 saw 865,000 new 
home-starts, a figure higher than France, Germany and Italy combined.  Eight 
million jobs were created between 1995 and 2007 in a country of 40 million.  
At the start of the 21st century, Spain had enjoyed a boom similar to that of the 
final years of the Franco regime (which also heralded social and eventually, 
political change), this was accompanied by a rapid expansion of small savings 
banks (cajas de ahorros) governed by the Autonomous Communities (CCAAs).   
What went undisclosed the time was that these CCAAs were themselves guilty 
of significant overspending that ran up high levels of debt often pumped into 
white elephant projects, with at least two large airport construction schemes 
                                                   
125 Chislett (2016) writes a thorough insightful account of the onset and impact of the crisis. 
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epitomising the wild optimism of the era.126  Much of this was however based on 
cheap, plentiful credit that was to prove unsustainable and very damaging as 
Spain’s banks began to fail. 
Spain had generated a bubble originating from its entry into the European single 
currency, which was exaggerated by low interest rates and fuelled by an 
expanding consumer sector, propped up by messages of success and wealth.  
Between 1996 and 2012 its population had increased from 39.6 million to 46.8 
million, a rise of more than seven million.  Combined with one of the lowest birth 
rates in Europe, virtually all of the population increase was due to immigration 
from within and outside the European Union.127  As unemployment rose, wages 
fell quickly due to an over-supply of labour, with homeless East European and 
North African migrants quickly becoming more and more visible.  In a pan-
European context this phenomenon was not confined to Spain, with nearly all EU 
member states witnessing a proliferation of parties standing on anti-immigration 
platforms and early signs of populist rhetoric.128 
Until 2007 Spain had enjoyed a decade of virtually uninterrupted economic 
expansion, a booming construction sector, and high levels of social expenditure 
that were heavily subsidised by the European Union to fund a cohesion and 
regional development programme worth billions of Euros.  Whilst the previous 
part of the chapter has identified a frustrated securitisation initiative as regards 
terrorism and military action against Iraq, there were now to be profoundly 
different challenges for Spain as the 2008 slump took hold.  Other sectors 
according to Buzan’s model (1998) were undergoing an unprecedented 
expansion in an economy already transformed by the paradox of Europe being 
centralised under a single currency, yet having a destiny simultaneously bound 
up with Latin America, the UK and other neighbours.  It is my assertion that the 
impact of this sudden and dramatic decline was to be as profound on Spain’s 
national psyche and political culture as the Atocha bombing of 2004. 
                                                   
126 Both airports (Castellón and La Mancha) were found to be surplus to requirements once 
completed.  Flights were not sustainable in practice and although the projects have now been 
mothballed, they are a political embarrassment and have come to symbolise the excessive 
exuberance of the decade 2000-2010. 
127 Even the Spanish Military was forced to significantly increase its recruitment of Latin Americans 
and North Africans to fill unfilled military posts, offering a short-cut to citizenship for successful 
applicants. 
128 Paradoxically, Spain has yet to see significant political momentum behind parties standing on 
immigration control platforms in spite of the huge number of arrivals over the last 20 years.  
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This thesis argues that the biggest challenges in the 21st century to Spain’s 
structural, political, social and economic well-being have stemmed from la crisis 
económica.  By most indicators and standards (Eurostat/INE) Spain’s national 
economy and society suffered a major shock that not only affected the personal 
well-being of citizens, but also gave rise to huge second-round effects that will 
impact on Spaniards more than the Madrid train bombing of 2004 did and will 
extend well into the next decade.  Such fall-out is most noticeably apparent in a 
significantly altered party system, a `damaged’ political sector, a fragmented 
opposition, and a Spain that is significantly less secure than it has been at any 
time since the democratic transition began. 
Spelling and Kirchner (Collins, 2007, p.209) identify two key issues as “(1) 
concerns of the state to protect the social and economic fabric of society and (2) 
the ability of the state to act as an effective gatekeeper and to maintain societal 
integrity” when discussing economic security.  For Spain, protecting the social 
and economic fabric of society were ever present during the democratic 
transition129, even as the matter of Basque self-determination in particular raised 
significant questions about the identity of historic nationalities (Heywood, 1995).  
But, in the years following the democratic transition, issues such as 
unemployment and social integration were occasionally subordinated to the 
programme of modernisation130 under the European project as the narrative of 
Spain in Europe linked to the Ortega y Gasset mantra `Europe is the solution’ to 
be discussed in chapter 7. 
A good example of this separation could be seen in the perennial issue of 
unemployment in Spain where, in spite of good growth rates since 1982, this has 
always stood at one of the highest rates in Europe.  Its lowest rate was actually 
7.9% in the late 1990s, a figure considered high by north European standards. 
But by 2010 it had risen to 19.9%, reaching a figure of 40% among young people 
(Salmon, 2010, p.49). By 2013 it had hit 26.9% (INE, the National Statistics 
                                                   
129 See Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1986) for a definitive account of the process 
by which Spain’s democratic transition was brought about, in particular consensus and cooperation 
were seen as fundamental to the success of the transition. 
130 The PSOE government in particular disappointed much of its core base on numerous 
occasions, leading to overlooked, national strikes and frustration over employment rights and 
public sector issues.  
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Institute), a figure never seen in the post war economies of Germany, France or 
the UK.131  
Economic security needs, particularly those described by Spelling and Kirchner, 
had never been wholly satisfied (or delivered) under Spain’s democratic model, 
at best, these were glossed over, particularly as regards the phenomenon of 
endemic unemployment (Holman, 1996, p.212).  Approval and support for 
national policies was generally consensual in what was an accepted facet of the 
political transition, and election results generally reflected this, with party political 
power tending to alternate after every two terms in government since the mid-
1990s.  It has to be said though, that individually, many Spaniards have not 
enjoyed being economically secure in terms of employment nor income.  
Perhaps cushioned by generous EU funding and free movement, by the late 
1990s Spain’s society appeared extremely tolerant of the persistence of 
joblessness and inequality. In many cases the political system acted as a shock-
absorber, where the pre-dominant PSOE was constantly under pressure from 
parties to the left (namely the legacy groupings from the Spanish Communist 
party) to serve as a go-to safe haven for the protest vote on issues of the 
environment and joblessness, among other matters.  In effect, the issue of 
unemployment even above 10% was tolerated by a society and political system 
who based security on traditional norms of states and terrorism.  
Madrid was not alone among EU governments in being slow to identify the model 
of human security.  The UK Security Strategy of 2008132 did not address it within 
the UK, nor did the EU Security Strategy of 2003 (which was essentially created 
under ex-Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana).  In the context of academic 
study human security’s is difficult to identify conceptually at the national level, 
and although academically it has a credible presence among a number of writers 
and analysts, it does not feature at a pan-European level, being more the 
preserve of the international development community, which has also embraced 
the female rights, peace and security agenda over other forms.133  Therefore, 
                                                   
131 Spain’s unemployment has dominated the political system since the transition to democracy.  
Numerous sources have discussed the issue.  See Perez-Diaz (1999), Heywood (1995) and Ross 
(2010). 
132 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-security-strategy-of-the-united-
kingdom-security-in-an-interdependent-world,  [accessed 28 Feb 17] 
133 In particular, Spanish governments have championed women’s rights, and a peace and security 
agenda for more than a decade, where, in relation to the UN in particular, notable achievements 
were made and trumpeted by both PP and PSOE governments.  See 
http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/rajoy-announces-more-spanish-funds-in-favour-of-women-at-the-
un/ dated 14 Oct 2015 [accessed 15 Feb 17]. 
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although human security may be accepted and adopted nationally by academics, 
think-tanks and even elements within governments, a pan-governmental 
approach has remained improbably fanciful.  An initial attempt by Moratinos (a 
PSOE Minister) to articulate a pan-EU approach to development (Cinco Días, 
2009) in the run-up to the 2010 Spanish Presidency of the EU turned out to be 
little more than a gesture in higher diplomatic circles, as later analysis will show. 
In spite of the severity of the crisis in retrospect, it appears that politicians in 
power were unwilling to acknowledge or articulate the scale of the problem.  This 
perhaps was due to an inability to sense the scale of the problem, or, more likely, 
fear of admitting failure where being in power was dependent on reinforcing 
messages and narratives of success. 
Another explanation that explains the disconnect between high politics 
(diplomacy and inter-governmental activity) and grass-roots (or domestic) politics 
is Puttnam’s two-level model134.  Puttnam explains that higher level international 
politics (EU, UN, WTO level) are kept separate from an equally important 
domestic audience (whom governments may depend on at election time) where 
key issues of most concern may centre more on micro or human security 
aspects than state level decisions regarding strategy and this disparity exists in 
many attempts to explain states and security.  
In Spain, the PP’s decision to offer unconditional support to the US over the 
issue of Iraq in 2003 against the wishes of around 90% of the population could 
be (and has been) explained in classical securitisation terminology according to 
which the rapid, practically unprecedented economic decline of 2007-13 defies 
the traditional models wherein a non-military or non-traditional security crisis 
generates a wave of anger, frustration and mobilisation against the political order 
hitherto unseen in democratic Spain’s history.  This could explain the indifference 
to the growing threat to the domestic matter of political security, whilst the PM 
and executive actors pursued a traditional security policy based on UN, EU, 
NATO structures. 
Economic Security and the Spanish Nation-State. 
The economic slump at the start of 2008 represented a threat to the political 
system that now appears almost inevitable with the benefit of hindsight.  Lying at 
                                                   
134 https://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Putnam88Diplomacy.pdf [accessed 17 Feb 17].  
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the heart of the issue in Spain’s experience was the concept of political security, 
q.v.: 
“political security is about the organizational stability of social order” (Buzan 
1998, p.141)  
In the case of Spain, over the 2008-13 period this `organizational stability’ of 
Buzan’s was perhaps the most significant vulnerability of both the PSOE and PP 
governments.  The weakness that afflicted the Spanish economy and the impact 
on society of an almost unprecedented rise in unemployment and sharp drop in 
incomes perhaps constituted the greatest perceived threat to Spain’s democracy 
(in this case, the democratic system being the referent object for political 
security) since the 1981 coup attempt (which for younger Spaniards represented 
a previous generation’s era and was no longer a viable matter to concern them). 
At the time of the PP’s election victory in December 2011, unemployment stood 
at 22.5%. It would continue to rise and there were very real concerns that Spain 
would be forced to withdraw from the Euro,135 or else seek a bailout similar to 
those seen in Greece or Ireland, which had been virtually inconceivable even a 
year or two before.  Indicators, such as declining incomes and rising 
unemployment and repossessions represented a near complete absence of 
economic security for millions of Spaniards and here the debate surrounding how 
Spain’s economy and financial well-being could be described as a `referent 
object’ can shed some light, in effect, this was the biggest crisis to face Spain 
since its shift to democracy in the late 1970s and the language of crisis has 
taken hold. 
It is useful to look at Spain’s economy as a referent object in two cases; the first 
in the context of the 1980’s and 1990s European project and then in that of the 
financial crisis of 2008-2013. This implies considering security within the 
framework of Buzan’s economic security (1998, p.95) and also how a nation-
state examines its political security at a time of deep economic instability.  As 
events across the Mediterranean have demonstrated, EU nation-states have 
increasingly interpreted economic challenges as threats to the nation-state, with 
Cypriot President Anastasiades even describing the Cypriot banking crisis as 
constituting “the greatest threat to the nation since the Turkish invasion of 
                                                   
135 Interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca (December 2011). 
 
96 
 
1974”.136  Across the EU Mediterranean states137 the economic slump that 
followed the US crisis marked the start of a prolonged downturn that, in the case 
of Greece and Cyprus among others, devastated the banking sector and led to 
huge unemployment. 
As Cyprus and Greece showed, certain Mediterranean political elites have 
increasingly identified and articulated economic recession as either a threat to 
the security of the nation state or the regime’s own political security.138 In the 
case of Spain, its transition to democracy, which had in many ways been held up 
as the model for success across the EU and the world, meant that its economic 
crisis represented a real threat to the stability of the Spanish nation-state and its 
capacity to meet its citizens’ basic needs with respect to employment, well-being 
and housing.  In essence, the state could no longer ‘secure’ its people. 
Leaving the debate over nation and state within the Spanish constitution139 to 
one side, the actual `referent object’ is difficult to articulate and measure in 
Spain’s economy (although Buzan’s model does generate 3 such ideas – see 
chapter 2).  Whilst nominal statistics such as GDP, incomes and unemployment 
figures exist, these are merely indicators of a process and do not reflect the 
tangible impact on individual human security.  Just as with other elements of 
security, the referent object is dependent upon the levels of analysis applied.  
For example, an individual’s conceptualisation of economic security may hinge 
upon their employment status or even whether they have been paid or not.  The 
mismatch between an individual’s perception of security and the state’s situation 
perhaps lies at the heart of the problem of analysis, since national statistics do 
not relate to an individual’s situation when determining well-being.  Buzan makes 
great play of the challenge of societal security (1998, p.119) and this generates 
further discussion.140  
Spain’s pluralist political system leads to a multi-layered approach with 
individuals, municipalities, provinces, autonomous communities and the nation-
                                                   
136 Cyprus Mail 17 Mar 2013 p.1. 
137 Greece and Cyprus were among the two most negatively affected but significant problems have 
been encountered in Italy and Portugal. 
138 The Greek statesman Yanis Varoufakis represents a number of cross-national commentators 
articulating a position that sees Northern European economies pursuing an agenda that ignores 
the damaging impact in EU southern states.  
139 According to Spain’s constitution the nation or the state are loosely worded with regard to the 
historic nationalities and for the purpose of analysing la crisis it is considered a single referent 
object. 
140 See Theiller for a discussion of the merits of Buzan’s societal security in `Societal security and 
social psychology` 2003. 
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state all candidates as a possible level of analysis.  However, levels aside, for 
the purposes of discussing Spain the analysis straddles the nation-state (the 
national economy) and the sub-national (i.e. autonomous community), as a 
consequence of the historical ambiguity surrounding the funding of the CCAAs. 
What was clear though, was that insecurity in the broadest sense worsened as 
rising debt obligations and unemployment numbers appeared unsustainable. 
The Effects of the Economic Crisis 
Spain’s crisis erupted between 2009-13, when its economy experienced sharp 
falls in GDP, a spike in unemployment and huge austerity cuts, the corrosive 
effect of these on families, communities and individuals led to gathering 
momentum behind the swings in public support in 2011.  The concept of 
economic security for individuals may be difficult to see at a national level, but 
this was most visibly expressed by the emergence of the Indignados141  
movement of “outraged and disgruntled” citizens in May 2011 which led to the 
eventual fragmentation of the traditional Spanish bipartisan system as a direct 
result. 
“Clearly, many people came to the view that existing channels of 
communication and influence were closed, or provided little help, and they 
were therefore looking for alternative ways of expressing their opinion.”  
(Eklundh, 2015, p164). 
Events thus took a rapid turn in May 2011, when mass movements took to the 
streets using both traditional methods of protest (basing themselves in the 
Madrid’s main square, known as the Puerta del Sol) and also using the internet 
and social media to promote people’s assemblies articulating the need for radical 
change.  Whilst the Arab Spring was the bigger focus of global events at this 
point, a movement with certain undeniable similarities was developing into a 
groundswell in Spanish cities was not lost on commentators.  Former PM Aznar 
himself inadvertently hinted at the parallel by asserting “Madrid is not Cairo” 
when responding to questions on the theme.  Assisted by large numbers of 
politically mobilised, socially connected younger people, the very demographic 
worst hit by austerity,142 various movements  meshed into a global “Occupy” 
phenomenon that spread across North American and European cities, with 
                                                   
141 This refers to those `outraged’ at the austerity programme of the PSOE government but with ire 
also directed at the political elites of all parties.  It reflected a sense of injustice at bank bailouts.  
See Eklundh (2015) for further discussion on how this was articulated. 
142 Figures point to a 26% fall in household incomes among the under-35s, while those above 35 
and pensioners were seen to be far less affected.  El País 26 Feb 2017. 
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Madrid acknowledged as the incubator for a campaign of protest that would 
spread across the industrialised world.  
Constructing a message of anger, and rejecting traditional neo-market solutions 
social media and technology were a significant factor in the dissemination of the 
protest but also a source of frustration, as in 2011 controversial legislative 
measures had been put in place to control file-sharing and protect copyright on 
software and intellectual property.143  In other states (Sweden in particular) 
responses emerged in the form of legitimate political protest with the formation of 
the Pirate Party Piratpartiet, who won more than 7% of the vote in Euro elections 
in 2009 and, with 50,000 members, became the 3rd largest party in Sweden.  
Evidently, the reaction in Spain was different, but the capacity to mobilise 
activists over an issue such as internet freedoms demonstrated how febrile the 
atmosphere had become and how diverse messages about freedoms and 
insecurity could be adopted at speed by previously diverse unconnected groups.   
Pablo Iglesias, the young founder and party leader of Podemos (We Can), the 
left wing party that emerged from the indignados movement, narrated that 
austerity was attacking individuals’ lives.  
“The emergency policies to ‘save the euro’, imposed — and soon normalized 
— by the German-led bloc, have had disastrous effects in Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain, where millions have lost their jobs, tens of thousands 
have been evicted from their homes and the dismantling and privatization of 
public-health and education systems has sharply accelerated, as the debt-
burden has been shifted from banks to citizens” (Iglesias, 2015, p.17)   
As the 2011 initial protest movement snowballed (to more than 80 cities and 
towns in Spain) few concessions appeared forthcoming from either of the two 
main parties.  The pre-eminence of Frankfurt’s European Central Bank over 
national fiscal policy, meant that virtually no major shifts in policy could be 
undertaken using that particular toolbox, but this also was a convenient `body’ to 
cite as a threat, an outside organisation making decisions to the detriment of 
citizens in Spain. 
Another factor in building the claim of the indignados was the impression that 
politically mainstream political parties were indifferent to the concerns of the 
                                                   
143 US media corporations, concerned at the loss of revenue from file-sharing pressured European 
regulators to limit the activities of illegal and unauthorised downloading of music, films and 
software.  The PSOE government had acquiesced due to US pressure, a move not welcomed by 
web-users, who argued that costs were prohibitive.  The Sinde Act (as part of a set of general 
intellectual property measures) has remained divisive. 
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protesters.  The PP, whose voter base was less inclined to support such 
movements, was somewhat still discredited by its military and security strategy in 
2003-4, along with a string of high-level corruption scandals, themselves a 
challenge to their legitimacy144  On the other hand, the PSOE, traditionally the 
institutional party of democratic Spain, was identified as part of the problem too, 
with prominent party figures under scrutiny over spiralling public debt, over-
ambitious infrastructure schemes and corrupt practices that made them no better 
than their PP counterparts in the eyes of the nascent movement. 
Interpreting the Indignados Movement.  
“the indignados challenge deliberative democracy by virtue of both their 
emotional character and their dispersed nature” (Eklundh, 2015, p.25) 
The idea of national security and the indignados do not immediately co-exist 
when looking at Spain in this period.  However Katzenstein (1996, p.2) makes 
the case that “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural 
factors’’.  The cultural phenomenon of protest articulated that unemployment, 
austerity and economic hardship were a matter for security. Castaneda (2012) 
charted the indignado’s rise attributing it to spreading a broader movement of 
activism that swept major financial centres.  New Social Movements are not new 
in social theory, and in Spain’s case, where NGOs and lobby groups have 
traditionally been under-researched (Hughes, in Cantalapiedra, 2014), this 
powerful phenomenon represented an area that has only now started to be 
discussed and analysed.  Whilst not the focus of this thesis, these global 
movements, nurtured in Spain epitomised a division between those who 
accepted (or could tolerate) the programme of austerity in response to the 
financial crisis of 2008, and others who could not, or sought to respond to the 
imposition of strict economic measures.  Katzenstein et al.’s model 
demonstrates how norms, which derive from the environmental structure (this 
being in effect the national culture), shape national security interests and 
Spain’s identity, which in turn influence policy.  In the case of the indignados 
movement this can be represented below. 
 
                                                   
144 Rato, the former Spanish Deputy PM and IMF Managing Director, was embroiled in corruption 
charges both in Spain and overseas.  His high-profile arrest at the height of the crisis reflected 
badly on the PP adding to a sense that elites had somehow stolen or benefited from the state 
before the crisis.  The monarchy was similarly embroiled in accusations of cronyism with the 
husband of Princess Cristina facing serious corruption charges. 
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Figure 4:  Katzenstein’s approach to Security 
Taken from Katzenstein et al. (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  The Economic Crisis and Spain’s Security – a constructivist 
approach(amended from p.99). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the model above the indignados (among others) articulated that the crisis and 
its origins (the global financial system) constituted an elevated threat to the 
Spanish people (Ekhlundh, 2015, p.164), in effect drawing on the exceptional 
impact of the crisis to an identity in pursuit of radical measures.  Katzenstein also 
identifies the impact of norms, he makes the case that: 
 “norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already 
defined identity.  In such instances norms have “regulative” effects that 
specify standards of proper behaviour” (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5). 
Ekhlundh’s doctoral thesis `Indignation as dissent?  The affective components of 
protest and Democracy (2015, University of Manchester) provides a detailed and 
thorough analysis of indignados movement.  Basing her approach on Laclau’s 
theory of hegemony,145 she details the emergence of an identity among the 
movements that composed the indignados in the light of Spain’s environment (to 
                                                   
145 Laclau, E., and Mouffe. C. 2001, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. 
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draw on Katzenstein’s model) that enabled this identity to be created (along with 
the impact of social media). 
Returning to constructivism, Katzenstein’s approach where norms, culture and 
institutions drive interests and security policies, this combination of outrage from 
the indignados in forming an identity in pursuit of redefining the response to the 
economic crisis is captured effectively by Ekhlundh in her work.  Castells (2012) 
and Castañeda (2012) are among others in classifying the challenges posed by 
this meteoric phenomenon but needless to say, along with the collapsing 
Spanish economy in the period 2010-12, it was one of a number of threats to 
Spain’s security, but was barely noted let alone, addressed in the strategies of 
this period.  What it did produce though, was an identity as Katzenstein et al 
argue 
“Cultural or institutional elements of state’s environments – in this volume, 
most often norms- shape the national security interests or (directly) the 
security policies” (Katzenstein 1996, p.23) 
Returning to Eklundh’s argument, the PSOE’s shift towards neoliberal austerity 
(Kennedy, 2013), with only nominal TU opposition represented an abandonment 
of voters and “created a space for new organisations and groups” (Eklundh, 
2015, p.15) with the assistance of online activism that in turn established an 
identity of opposition to the austerity programme. 
In this period of heightened political atmosphere the attitudes and behaviours of 
elites was subject to intense scrutiny, assisted by Spanish social media and 
more conventional outlets sympathetic to the Indignados message.  As has 
already been discussed, this led to a sharp fall in party alignment by voters (see 
table on following page), but more visibly the monarchy (already embroiled in a 
corruption scandal) became subject to mounting criticism of their wealth and 
lifestyle eventually leading to King Juan Carlos’s resignation in an act to save the 
institution. 
Returning to the model, in this period economic policies and fiscal shocks had a 
sudden, unexpected impact on Katzenstein’s `environmental structure’ in effect 
Spain’s cultural context, leading to policies and new structures which in turn 
impacted upon Spain’s norms regarding the state, public sector jobs, 
government support and a host of other aspects of the relationship between the 
citizen and the state.  The indignados became a political voice of interests 
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responding to this process forming an identity of rejection to the economic 
measures and articulating a range of interests of austerity in Spain. 
Economic security as a concept or message, is a product of the environmental 
(cultural) structure and this has implications on the environment (national 
culture).  Thus continuities exist in national security policy and institutions that 
reflect policies, institutions and, of course, national identity.  In the case of the 
economic crisis of 2008 new perceived threats that threatened the well-being of 
millions of Spaniards in turn challenged the Spanish state through a mass 
mobilisation of Spaniards whose interests no longer coincided with Spanish 
elites, in effect threatening aspects of Spain’s democratic consolidation. 
What the indignados movement represented to the Spanish state was that it 
articulated a range of interests that could constitute an existential threat to the 
political security of the Spanish state.  Granted,  there had consistently been 
economic cycles of downturns and bouts of high unemployment, but the only 
ownership of these taken by the political parties had been as material to use as 
barbs to blame each other.  Yet by 2011 the parties’ traditional ability to use such 
a ploy appeared unsustainable.  Spain’s government was still trying to project 
credibility (in the face of fears over the country’s credit-rating and international 
confidence) and engaged in supporting more conventional security acts such as 
the international efforts to unseat Gaddafi in Libya,146 but the truth was that it was 
found wanting and unconvincing, and totally lacked the direction to offer a 
solution. 
As the depth of Spain’s travails became clearer by 2011, the PSOE was 
increasingly hampered by credibility questions overseas and at home and could 
not respond to the dynamic messages calling for radical change that appealed to 
its traditional young and urban electoral base.  The 2004 election pledge to 
withdraw from Iraq had been implemented but in a manner insensitive to 
Washington,147 which was seen as detrimental to Spain’s standing.  Therefore, 
by the start of the financial crisis in 2008, Spain was already struggling to assert 
itself internationally (Joyce, 2007), and with a potential all-out collapse of the 
                                                   
146 The Cortes overwhelmingly voted to approve military action against Gaddafi’s regime at a time 
when critics from outside conventional politics claimed it to be a distraction from domestic issues. 
147 Interview with (Bardají) a senior security official from the PP during its term in office.  That the 
PSOE also openly endorsed Kerry in the 2004 US presidential election also worsened the 
relationship with financial and political issues impact being felt in Spain (Interview with Arteaga Oct 
2015). 
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economy, the gravest of damage was as good as done and no messages or 
visions could compete with the demands of the protest movement. 
It could be anticipated that Spain’s economic woes would have produced a shift 
of loyalties back to the PP but, with the emergence of the Indignados and 
support for bipartisan politics in total free-fall, the net result would be potentially 
terminal for the established order. 
The Threat Posed to Spain’s Political Security 
As has been articulated through the Katzenstein model, the indignados 
movement, with its anti-system messages and bringing together of interests, 
reflected a growing and fundamental dissatisfaction with the system of 
government.  Coupled with brinkmanship by Catalan nationalists demanding 
referenda, there were a range of unprecedented threats to the survival of the 
existing party system and allegiances.  This included the monarchy, and after a 
crescendo of criticism the abdication of King Juan Carlos in 2014 only served to 
underline the general uncertainty within Spain.   The King, once hugely popular 
and synonymous with the democratic transition, had come to epitomise the 
impending threat of uncontrolled change, and a new norm of a `Republic’ was 
seen as a very real possibility.148  This was further complicated by hostile social 
media and accounts of corruption and profligacy within the Royal Household. 
Chislett quantified the significant fall in votes for the two main parties during the 
previous two decades. 
Figure 6: Declining Shares of Votes Obtained by Spain’s Two Main Parties 
1996-2015.  (Chislett, 2016, p.7) 
Party 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2015 
PSOE 37.6% 34.2% 42.6% 43.9% 28.8% 22.0% 
PP 38.8% 44.5% 37.7% 39.9% 44.6% 28.7% 
Total in % 76.4% 78.7% 80.3% 83.3% 73.4% 50.7% 
 
Comparison of the falling shares of votes for both main parties between the 1996 
and 2015 elections is stark.  The Socialist party’s share had fallen from 42.6% of 
                                                   
148 The possibility of a divisive referendum was averted only through political will by the PP 
government.  In interview, more than one analyst (Torreblanca) said that Spain came close to a 
dangerously  irreconcilable split on this issue, with young people (those most affected by the crisis) 
making up a body that countenanced abolition of the monarchy. This was echoed by Chislett (in 
interview in February 2017). 
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the vote in 2004 (their victory following the Atocha train bombing) to 22% only 11 
years later, just a little over half of their earlier percentage.  Although slightly 
better, at 28.7% of the vote in 2015 for the PP, this had fallen from 44.6% only 
four years earlier, a decline of the best part of 40%.  With a vote of only 28.7% 
for the victorious party there was no clear endorsement for a government, and in 
a system not well-equipped for coalitions this is still a developing situation. 
It is perhaps most appropriate to consider the combined vote of the two main 
parties.  Since the early 1980s the two main parties had achieved approximately 
70-75% of the national vote, effectively offering voters a binary choice.  By 2015, 
with the comparable combined figure hovering at almost exactly half the national 
vote, the Socialist PSOE in particular was in danger of becoming marginalised 
which, given its role as the institutional party of Spain’s democratic system, 
illustrates the decline in institutions of the state. 
The emergence of new parties, particularly characterised by the emergence of 
anti-Capitalist Podemos (The Guardian, 2015)149, and the pro-Business, anti-
corruption (originally Catalan) Ciudadanos or Cs (citizens’ party) constituted the 
new threat to the bipartisan structure, although it is true to say that new parties 
are in some ways to be welcomed and point to a healthy democracy (Gunther et 
al. 2002, p.23). Yet in the case of Spain, one where the parties and the state are 
intertwined, this represented a fundamental shift towards new ground, where 
established parties, elites and institutions found themselves undermined by fast 
moving events, social media campaigns and a sense of anger fuelled by 
economic insecurity.   
Constructing `Insecurity’ and the Economic Crisis 
The emergence of the indignados movement, supported by significant swathes 
of Spanish public opinion, illustrated the declining capacity of the PSOE and later 
PP governments to address deepening economic and social divides within 
Spain’s civil society.  Not only was the state unable to resolve long-term 
structural unemployment (this remains the case today), but to Spanish voters the 
widespread collapse of the Cajas de Ahorros (Spanish savings banks) illustrated 
a profound vulnerability of the Spanish economy’s finance sector.150  The threat 
                                                   
149 Originally Podemos articulated its economic message as anti-capitalist, nowadays its language 
has moderated slightly to a more traditional left posture. 
150 In interview with Felix Arteaga (Oct 2015) this it was confirmed that the finance sector was 
informally identified as a major new vulnerability by the National Security Council.  No formal policy 
has been published in the light of this. 
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this posed to the state’s stability, and in turn to living standards security, was 
further compounded by the ECB’s criticism of Spanish fiscal policy.  In effect, 
national policy faced criticism from influential banking interests, the EU, and also 
mobilised street protests highlighting the human cost of the crisis.   
Spain’s identity as a successful global trading economy, underpinned by a large 
corporate banking sector was at odds with a near failure of its banking system 
and haemorrhage of support and confidence in its political system by the 
spectacle of mass-protest. 
Although Spain’s economic decline may not have been as precipitous as 
Greece’s, the vulnerabilities exposed such as the construction industry’s huge 
bubble, and the subsequent leap in unemployment highlighted the weakness and 
the viability its economy within the European Union’s EMU programme.  This has 
been a long-term concern in Spain, and members of the European Commission 
speculated that Spain’s longstanding unemployment issue was incompatible with 
monetary union long before Spain’s integration into EMU at the end of the 
1990s.151 
Whilst the security impact of a declining economy usually relies on outputs such 
as defence infrastructure, equipment and the forces to maintain security,152  the 
relationship between economic resilience and a political system’s soundness is 
well understood, but in the case of Spain the unprecedented economic decline 
eroded national stability. This threatened not only the crafted and presented 
`success’ of the 1980s, 1990s and the early years of the 21st century, but the 
electoral balance between the political parties, and also constructed a very real 
social threat to the supposed permanence of the agreement around Spain’s 
democratic transition.   
The perceived collapse in economic security created the conditions for a 
possible state failure in terms of maintaining political security.153  While this study 
                                                   
151 Jacques Delors had as early as 1993 identified that a 20% unemployment rate in Spain was 
generally incompatible with entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) programme.  The 
issue of high unemployment was never a make or break deciding factor but the sensitivities 
regarding the persistence of the matter still exist to this day.  See Holman Integrating Southern 
Europe (p.212). 
152 Arteaga, one of Spain’s leading analysts, cites the impact of the crisis as being couched almost 
wholly in traditional hard security terms, stating that “the economic crisis has worsened the chronic 
mismatch between the desirable military capabilities and the budgetary resources that are 
earmarked for them” Arteaga (2013, p.7). 
153 The near fall of the monarchy at a time of economic crisis was cited as having a potential 
`domino-effect’ on an already battered political system.  Interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca 
(Sep 2015). 
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ends in the period of 2013 (with the second Spanish Security Strategy), the 
political uncertainly still reigns, although in somewhat abated form.  Socially 
constructed notions of wealth, national economic success and regional growth 
were quickly and effectively undermined by counter-messages of state failure, 
corruption154 and elite profligacy which lead to a narrative for change. 
Paradoxically it was the fluidity and resilience of Spain’s popular culture that 
facilitated the anti-system desires to be channelled into new political movements 
such as the Catalan Left movement and the Ciudadanos or “Citizens” party, but 
perhaps the best known of these was Podemos (literally “We can”), the party 
who effectively threatened to supplant the PSOE’s electoral appeal with that of 
an anti-system power base.   
Although this may demonstrate resilience on the part of the party system, it also 
showed how vulnerable governing institutions were.  On the eve of the 2015 
elections, only 12% of Spaniards expressed trust in national institutions (The 
Economist, 2015, p.78), demonstrating that political security in Spain remained 
at a low point. Fortunately (and here the concept of political resilience may be 
worth considering) it could be argued that Spain’s political security was saved by 
the ability of its civil society.  It was this that generated or engendered the new 
movements and political parties and reached out to dissatisfied citizens.  
However, the political parties would not guarantee the security of the political 
system at a time of profound change.  In this regard, the 2011 and 2013 National 
Security Strategies approach to the political system will be more closely 
examined later. 
The election defeat of the PSOE in 2011 could be seen as a routine reaction by 
voters to austerity, since the phenomenon of a government losing support from 
its electoral base after seven years in power following an adjustment programme 
is likely in any democratic system.  This chapter has argued however, that in the 
case of Spain, the economic threat to political security was so significant that, 
when considered in conjunction with the human and individual challenges of low 
wages, unemployment and the banking crisis, the very survival of the party 
system and certain institutions was put at stake.  While it may have been 
possible to lay the blame at the feet of the Indignados for stoking anti-system 
feeling, in reality their emergence was purely a manifestation of a release or 
                                                   
154 78% of Spaniards believed that corruption extended to national institutions.  Eurobarometer 
(2011)  http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_374_fact_es_es.pdf 
[accessed 12 Jun 2019]. 
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pressure valve effect on political behaviour that may actually have helped secure 
the democratic structure by developing new forms of participation. 
Buzan argues that: 
“all security is political.  All threats and defences are constituted and defined 
politically…the idea of the state, particularly its national identity and 
organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal target 
of political threats.  Since the state is an essentially political entity, political 
threats may be as much feared as military ones” (Buzan, 1998, p.142) 
During Spain’s economic crisis when the economy shrank by 8.5% between 
2008 and 2013 (Chislett 2016, p.25), the subsequent rise of the youth-dominated 
indignados movement, buoyed by disillusioned voters and fuelled by a media 
that increasingly focussed on reporting corruption155, mismanagement and 
cronyism, saw a de-legitimisation of Spain’s more tried and tested institutions 
that could have potentially had a huge impact on state or political security.   
Drawing on Katzenstein’s model, these political issues constituted a clear and 
direct threat to the political security and stability of Spain and should be 
considered as such.  This was not a security challenge that could be deterred, 
prevented or defended against in the traditional sense, but instead by appealing 
to the concept of political security, itself erected upon on a European model of 
financial well-being (linked to the social democratic model). Meanwhile the 
prevailing instability and an immobile political elite meant that declining personal 
living standards had questioned the ability of the state to endure and survive.  In 
circumstances such as these the final outcome would then turn on how resilient 
the Spanish political system proved. 
Spain’s ability to identify and remedy the significant vulnerability brought about 
by the economic model of the late 1990s (reliant on construction sustained by 
cheap credit and flows of migrant labour) has clear echoes across the European 
Union.  What made Spain different was that the economy was even more 
vulnerable as a result of structural unemployment, a reliance on funding from 
small savings banks (cajas de ahorros) and a system of cronyism at the local 
level.  The crash was not confined to Spain, nor the Mediterranean economies, 
but what made Spain’s situation so much more precarious was the impact that 
the crash had on an economy already blighted by underemployment, which was 
                                                   
155  See Eurobarometer (2012) for figures on Spaniards perceptions of corruption with state 
institutions. http://ec.europa.eu/ commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs 
n_374_fact_es_es.pdf  [accessed 12 Jun 2019]. 
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then aggravated by the inability of the political system to deliver acceptable 
solutions to the millions that were affected, essentially the security of Spain `as a 
state’ was threatened to use Buzan’s analysis.   
Spain’s `Culture of Security’ and the Economic Crisis 
This chapter has argued that there has been a fundamental redefinition and 
understanding of security in Spain as a consequence of the events of the 21st 
century.  As this thesis has argued, traditional notions of security appear 
increasingly dated.  The notion of Spain developing a culture of security as a 
consequence of the economic crisis is best explained through the model of 
Katzenstein where the environment is utterly integrated with identity, interests 
and policy.  In the case of the economy and individual well-being, Spanish norms 
implied that the state’s relationship with its population depended on a social-
democratic relationship.  As the crisis deepened, these norms and expectations 
were challenged as cuts, income falls and austerity hit home to such an extent 
that some sort of expression was inevitable as the state failed to articulate its 
approach.  In some case, the emergence of the indignados represented the 
mobilisation of interests in defence of their `security’ and interests, traditionally 
this had been on issues of foreign policy and terrorism but in this case, the 
actions of the government were seen at fault in a domestic sense. 
The economy and its relationship to individuals had become the referent object 
to many Spaniards, threats from the global financial system and large corporate 
interests were interpreted by social groups as forming the threat.  As in the case 
of the protests over supporting the Iraq War, and even the mass protests during 
the NATO membership referendum of 1986, Spanish society showed a 
remarkable capacity to mobilise in defence of norms and interests.  Also 
demonstrable was the inability of Spanish institutions to respond to these 
pressures, in a sense, Spain was perilously insecure as a state, nation and 
perhaps even the European vocation. 
This chapter has focussed on the unclear relationship between economic 
security and that of the political system.  Economic security has proved elusive 
as a tool in analysing contemporary European societies and much of the 
literature has focussed on national levels of security.  Dent (2007, p. 219) 
describes it as “increasingly discussed but still much under –theorized”, and this 
accurately captures its contribution when no understanding of the events of 
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2008-13 are possible without appreciating the impact of the slump.  It is because 
of this that the aspects of constructivism have been used to inform the debate.    
In Spain, constructivist notions about norms, the cultural context of the state’s 
relationship with unemployment, and the relationship between identity and 
interests come together in explaining the volatile rise of the indignados.  Norms 
about the role of the state at various levels of government, the ability and 
capacity of the state to protect individuals well-being all undermined the PSOE 
government and the state with significant consequences for the political system.  
Spain’s society, politics and security in the period 2008-13 can only be 
understood through the social impact and reaction to the economic challenges 
millions of Spaniards faced.  What has emerged is a political system ravaged by 
la crisis económica, a significant reordering of Spain’s economy and renewed 
thinking about what a secure Spain means to different interests or groups.  
Younger voters in particular, were hit disproportionately more by the measures 
undertaken by the Spanish state and it is not surprising that the indignados 
movement reflected this, and demonstrated the impact of new technologies and 
methods to communicate their message. 
Whilst the crisis was unfolding in Spain, the next chapter looks at the response of 
the Spanish state to the changing security panorama with a study and discussion 
of two key documents published by both the PSOE and PP governments at the 
time, the National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013.  
Throughout la crisis económica Spanish policy makers and elites had failed to 
frame security in a way that was relevant to Spain’s citizens with drastic 
consequences.  The `framing’ of an alternative narrative grew exponentially at 
the hands of the indignados which in turn, highlighted the shortfall of the state 
to provide or deliver meaningful security to many Spaniards.  An alternative 
model offered by the indignados was never fully framed (or delivered), but the 
message was clear: traditional models were found wanting, and that many 
citizens did not see an outcome where their own economic and personal 
notions of security were being delivered. 
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Chapter 5. 
Spain’s National Security Strategies 
 
Whilst the previous chapters have been focussed on events, policies and actions 
in their relationship to Spanish security, this chapter is concerned with 
accounting for changes in policy through the process by which the state 
produced two National Security Strategies in 2011 and 2013. 
`National security is the state action aimed at protecting the freedom and well-
being of its citizens; guaranteeing the defence of Spain and its constitutional 
principles and values; and contributing together with our partners and allies to 
international security in compliance with the commitments undertaken’ 
(Government of Spain, 2013, p.8). 
The constructivist approach in the context of Spain states that interests, norms, 
identity and culture have all had an impact on Spain’s security during the period. 
The National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013 represent the culmination of a 
number of the years’ analysis and input from a range of state and non-state 
actors and offer a snapshot of what constituted strategy under two different 
governments.  This chapter will address the impact on the framing of national 
policy (in the form of the two Strategies) of identity, interests and norms.   
Traditional literature has suggested that during democratisation, Spain has 
played a `catch-up’ or normalisation of its relations. (Heywood: 1995, Smyth & 
Preston, 1987; Gillespie, 2001) and, by 2011, Spain could be considered to have 
been tardy in the process of developing a National Security Strategy.156  But, in 
the case of this study, I argue that Spain was well-placed to adopt a new posture 
at the start of the 21st century, as much of its external relations had been 
`normalised’ during the previous decade as a result of the Europeanization 
strategy (Torreblanca, 2004). 
By the mid to late 1990s Spain was essentially a mainstream European nation-
state, with a defence and security institution that resembled those of its 
European neighbours and NATO partners (in effect reflecting its European 
vocation). Through the system of National Defence Directives (DDNs in Spanish) 
it demonstrated that during the consolidation of democracy it had put in place 
some capacity for generating strategy and national response to a changing 
global security picture.  The challenge at this stage is to look at the idea of 
                                                   
156 Arteaga (2003), also interview with Bardaji (2017). 
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national security as a cultural phenomenon, and in particular, the impact of shifts 
in identity and perceptions have had on the process. 
The analysis draws heavily on Katzenstein’s model from his 1996 work which 
synthesises the impact interests, identity and the cultural environment have all 
had on Spain’s attempts at building a strategy.  Examination of the National 
Defence Directives that were introduced following the transition from the Franco 
dictatorship after his death in 1975 offers evidence to suggest, albeit in  
piecemeal fashion, Spain had already adopted `new’ and innovative thinking 
during the post-Cold War period, and whilst the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the 
US did come as a shock to the Spanish political system, combatting and 
enduring terrorism was already ingrained within Spain’s national culture (Roller 
2002).  The fact that the military’s role was restricted in the struggle against ETA 
(it was essentially an Interior Ministry-led strategy) showed that a broader 
concept of security was already evident in Spain, with non-military institutions 
taking a lead, albeit in the case of terrorism reflecting a relatively hardline 
response at times. 
As discussed later, the then Prime Minister Rajoy made an audacious claim in 
2015 that Spain was now one of the safest countries in the European Union.  His 
methodology was unclear,157 but was essentially aimed at a domestic audience 
(the Cortes and Spanish opinion).  By examining the concept behind the 
emergence of a security strategy in Spain, in particular how a national strategy 
has been created at a moment when many European and western powers have 
undergone significant and far-reaching changes, it will examine the changing 
narratives in the field of security and defence policy (issues which have often 
been contested concepts158) by looking at the impact of the two Security 
Strategies launched in 2011 and 2013.  The strategy process is a culmination of 
an approach begun more than 20 years earlier, reflects earlier documents and 
offers a useful insight into the process of change, the role of institutions and also 
interests. 
In comparing Spain’s experience with that of other nation states, such as the 
United Kingdom (a country facing similar challenges), I argue that Spain’s 
                                                   
157 Spain at that point had enjoyed falling crime rates which were referred to in the same 
announcement. 
158 In a number of interviews with policy-makers (Bardají, Artega, Torreblanca) it has been 
expressed that foreign and security policy has been one of the areas where there has been a 
distinct difference between the main political parties. 
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process in security policy has not been that different from that of other nation 
states and that successive governments achieved significant progress in 
furthering Spain’s own national understanding by elites in a wider security sense 
in a number of policy areas.   The two countries’ strategies occurred following 
similar controversies over their military adventures in Iraq, both experienced 
major terrorist attacks, and finally, these took place in the context of major 
economic recession.  The intention is not to overstate the similarities between 
the countries however, instead it concludes that Spain has some distance to go 
in creating an effective security policy, not least in its ability to identify the means 
(resources) and the process (ways) of delivering physical security. 
A short discussion of strategy draws on Clausewitzean theory159 and, in 
conjunction with the Copenhagen school’s sectors the thesis will analyse the key 
issues in the shift from a defence policy-led process to security strategy within 
Spain, and conclude that, although the 2013 Strategy went some way to 
remedying some of the shortcomings of the original effort in 2011, there remain 
areas of inconsistency in the creation of a security policy.  As is ever the case 
when analysing defence and security matters, analogously to many other 
western countries, military and security policy have been deeply entwined, with a 
loosely interpreted security policy being traditionally the remit of national military 
forces and, by implication, defence ministries and the usual state actors such as 
Armed Forces chiefs, Defence Ministers and senior civil servants.  This said, one 
area that has been little examined to date has been the input of non-
governmental organisations and think tanks in the security policy process and 
this will also be considered. 
Traditional Security Policy in Spain 
Spain’s programme of Defence Directives (DDNs) introduced under the 
democratic government in the early years of the transition, were and remain, the 
best barometers of issues facing the traditional defence sector.  Issued by the 
Ministry of Defence at four-yearly intervals under the direction of the executive 
(signed by the Prime Minister), a comparison of directives from the end of 1990s 
to the 2011 Security Strategy show a clear continuity, with issues such as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), international terrorism and 
                                                   
159 Paret’s Makers of Modern Strategy is used to provide the main reference to Clausewitz and this 
offers a new focus on the topic of security policy-making in Spain. 
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even the impact of climate change appearing in the narrative of threats to the 
nation-state.   
Defence Directives are useful in identifying relevant activity and output, but have 
also had the additional effect of directing the modernisation of Spain’s military 
and contributed to transforming the institution itself.  For example, the 
momentum towards engaging in peace support operations in the 1990s heralded 
a new model for military activity in an institution that had historically been prone 
to political interference.  (Serra, 2008).  In sum, although not exhaustive, as an 
indication of security thinking directives offer useful policy outputs for academic 
research and depict Spain’s national response to international and domestic 
changes.  
By their very nature, directives aim to direct responses to threats and risks 
through defined military activity, specifically through using and adapting military 
resources capable of responding to challenges to the state’s territorial and 
political integrity.  In this case the key military threats to Europe at the end of the 
1990s of terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, accompanied by weak and failing states and then resource 
conflicts160 perhaps explain the emerging security architecture that was evident 
in the first years of the millennium.  However, where Defence Directives provide 
guidance is in identifying or providing security in a defence or military context.  In 
sum, the programme and role of Defence Directives, still extant to the present, 
remain fundamental for the military security in Spain as the main source of policy 
direction and guidance.161  As will be discussed later in the chapter, this poses 
another challenge for the strategy at lower policy levels where DDNs and the 
National Strategy are at risk of collision and even fail to offer security. 
The EU, Member States and NATO Security Strategy  
The process of redefining and delivering security has not been unique to 
contemporary Spain.  The institutional reordering of defence and security across 
the world can be dated back to the end of the Cold War in 1990, however that is 
                                                   
160 These were the main issues outlined in the 1996 Defence Directive, a pivotal moment in Spain 
as it heralded the end of the PSOE’s 14 years in office and the start of the Popular Party’s eight 
years that would culminate in the Madrid train bombing and shock election defeat. 
161 When researching the impact of the 2011 and 2013 security strategies within the Spanish 
military, it is apparent that in the initial years of 2011-2014 there is little evidence of engagement 
down the line in the single services, for example the Chief of Staff of the Spanish Army in 2015 
referred to the National Defence Directive when outlining their main mission, not the National 
Security Strategy. 
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not to say that the process was a precise science or at all even.  The experience 
of many nation-states of the European Union and UN’s early failures at 
peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated that an ad hoc and 
multinational peacekeeping approach to delivering regional security by national 
armed forces was inadequate.   
NATO, the EU (and WEU as it was then known) had to go through a number of 
processes to arrive at the point today where they are able to engage in 
humanitarian and interventionist roles, which is something that had been barely 
envisaged only a decade earlier and learnt through a step process of operational 
experience and failure.  In Europe’s sphere it was the 1992 Petersberg Tasks 
(undertaken by the WEU) that began transforming military activity to meet 
international security changes.  In NATO’s case, after a period of adjustment and 
expansion to include some previous members of the disbanded Warsaw Pact, it 
was the launch of the 1999 New Strategic Concept, which only became 
formalised by the Atlantic Alliance at the end of the 1990s that saw a post-Cold 
war strategy finally emerge. 
"The risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-
directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess." (NATO, 1999). 
Within the EU, somewhat focussed on its economic drive with the Single Market 
as its centrepiece at the start of the 1990s, change appeared with the aspiration 
of a Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) as part of the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty.  After more than a decade of negotiation and further treaties, the 
European Union meanwhile established its own security strategy in late 2003, in 
spite of being somewhat embattled by divisions over Iraq.  It is noteworthy 
however, that this was driven in large part by the efforts of former Spanish 
foreign minister Javier Solana as EU High Representative (and former NATO 
Secretary General).  Solana, perhaps after González, remains to this day one of 
the highest profile Spanish figures in EU circles and, as will be discussed, played 
a fundamental role in the creation of the 2011 Strategy.   
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• Organised crime. 
Whilst creation of strategy was relatively quick by Brussels’ standards, EU 
strategy was not clear about how it would deliver security with regard to these 
threats.  This is identified as a recurring theme as regards both Spain and the 
UK’s own attempts at security strategies later in this chapter: threats are easy to 
identify, and in some cases to quantify, but the response and measurement of 
success remain unclear.162  It was apparent that, even by the late 1990s within 
policy circles, a process was being undertaken that saw comprehension of 
threats to states and international organisations significantly broaden.163 
The general response to the EU’s security strategy was muted (Cornish, 2005; 
Kaldor, 2007) it had virtually no policy impact on member states or the 
international environment.  One factor here may be that the launch of the 
strategy coincided with the divisions over the invasion of Iraq by the US-led 
coalition.  From the perspective of Spain, or even the UK, the EU’s first foray into 
a broad security strategy was not a significant moment. This is perhaps due in 
part to the fast-moving turn of events and national responses, all of which 
differed at this time, and this is a recurring theme in the sense that the 
importance of establishing a security strategy is often undermined by 
international or domestic events, which require more attention than a document 
of (in the eyes of some actors) questionable utility to an elected politician.164  
This issue is discussed with regard to the 2011 Strategy. 
                                                   
162 https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world 
[accessed 17 Aug 14]. 
163 Tickner‘s Gender in International Relations marked a significant shift in understanding a broader 
shift in the definition of security at a time when a whole new sector was being redefined.   
164 According to the Spanish MOD’s Strategic Studies Institute the EU Strategy lacked political will 
and resources from the outset (2011, p.8). 
The EU Security Strategy (2003) – main threats  
In response to the events of 9/11, approaching expansion of membership and 
treaty developments, the EU adopted a Strategy in 2003 that centred on five 
strands:  
• Terrorism 
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
• Regional conflicts 
• State failure 
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Whereas the US had begun a process of developing a security strategy some 
decades before European states and the EU,165 the events of 9/11 drove a new 
urgency over how western nation-states could respond to the changing strategic 
environment.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 may have marked the most obvious 
spur to action, but actually the ending of the Cold War was perhaps the initial 
driver in galvanising a shift in national security postures.  The new era witnessed 
a transformation in the role of the UN Security Council, a sudden rise in 
peacekeeping and, for Europe, the emergence of problems from the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and break-up of the Soviet Union.  In spite of significant deployments 
by UN and EU missions involving many EU and NATO states, prior to the 9/11 
attacks in 2001 only the US had adopted a formal security strategy process 
(Ballesteros, 2016, p.14). 
Reflecting on NATO, EU Security and Spain’s `National Strategy’ 
At this point, change had taken place in how security was being perceived, 
paradoxically this had occurred in two organisations somewhat more distant from 
national cultures than members or national institutions.  These shifts in language 
and threat perceptions on the part of NATO and the EU showed little evidence of 
this being driven upwards from civil society, but reflected hard operational 
experience from the Balkan conflicts and the compromises over terrorism and 
Iraq (in the EU’s case).  Therefore it is difficult to detect more than a change of 
emphasis or language on the part of these institutions.   
Following 9/11, the first decade of the 21st century led to the EU, UK, France, 
and the Netherlands, among others, formally undertaking a structural appraisal 
of the precise nature of the security environment that their societies faced a 
decade after the end of the Cold War in the light of the rise in global terrorism.  
For states such as the UK and France this was effectively their first attempt at 
articulating what their strategy and its security requirements were away from a 
purely Defence-led model.  As outlined earlier, Spain was part of a trend that 
was followed by not only the EU but also the NATO alliance members and even 
Chile (although Chile never formally adopted its own strategy).   Most nation-
states have never undertaken this transparent process.  According to Ballesteros 
(2016), this development: 
                                                   
165 The US has a model of quadrennial security reviews, with a long standing National Security 
Council role within the Executive.  This combined with the Separation of Powers where Congress 
has significant input into expenditure, military deployment and procurement means that a more 
formal process is well established. 
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“Es fruto de la evolución lógica que pretende proteger a sus ciudadanos y los 
intereses nacionales sin olvidar el compromiso solidario de contribuir a la paz 
y estabilidad internacional”  (Ballesteros, 2016, p.15)166 
Spain’s undertaking may (according to Ballesteros) have sounded progressive, 
but generally mirrored that of the UK.  This could be attributed to the experience 
after decisions by both Prime Ministers in 2003 (Aznar and Blair) and was 
intrinsically marked by intervention in Iraq with the notorious implications for 
policy and debate in each political system soon after the events of 2003/4.  Both 
Aznar and Blair articulated the need for a broader documented security strategy, 
although in Aznar’s case electoral defeat following the Madrid terror attacks in 
2004 saw the project postponed, Spain’s political class did not appear ready for 
the political implications at that point of documenting and engaging with wider 
society in establishing a national strategy. 
The eventual timing of both the UK and Spain’s security strategies indicates that 
the process was undertaken in a similar scenario.  It was not until 2007 that the 
UK took on its first formal security strategy and even this was in the context of 
Blair having stepped down as Prime Minister.  In Spain’s case the process was 
underpinned by the decision outlined previously by the PP Prime Minister to 
conduct, though not commence, a security review.  At this stage it is worth 
recalling the polemic surrounding foreign and defence policy that had marked 
Spain’s relationship with NATO and the west, with Spain’s membership of NATO 
taking almost 15 years to resolve following accession in 1982 (accompanied by 
the divisive referendum in 1986) and it was only settled by the Popular Party 
(PP) government in 1997. 
It is useful to focus on the concept of a national strategy in a security context.  
The actual term strategy is unclear, and the word features in a broad gamut of 
policy contexts, as in economic strategy, through to industrial strategy and 
more.167 This all points to the fact that the term is either misused or has evolved 
to make it almost meaningless in a longer term or broader study.  Leaving the 
vagaries of Francoist foreign policy to one side, more contemporary writers 
(Simón, 2013, Colom, 2016) appear pessimistic regarding the capacity of to 
                                                   
166 “is the product of a logical process where the intention is to protect their citizens and national 
interests without losing sight of engaging with world peace and stability out of solidarity.” 
167 A simple google search of Francoist strategy, for example, throws up references to the Civil 
War, internal repression, industrialisation and relations with the US when referring to Spanish 
strategy, which shows the ambiguity of the term and, though commonly used, this may not 
accurately capture the nature of the outcome.  The Longman dictionary defines Strategy as `the 
science of planning and directing large-scale military operations’ or `skills of managing and 
planning’, neither of which offer much insight. 
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create a strategy able to horizon-spot, prioritise and respond to change and this 
supports the idea of importing a strategy as a solution. 
Arteaga (2007, p.4) writes “national security strategies are a new process’, going 
on to describe Spain as having “no strategic culture.  Ballesteros meanwhile, 
argues that strategies: 
“resulta imprescindible definir el concepto de seguridad nacional, teniendo en 
cuenta que no existe una definición universalmente aceptada”168(Ballesteros, 
2016, p.14).  
 This was accompanied by the fact that by the time of the period leading up to 
the creation of 2011 Strategy there were few positive portents that Spain was 
entering a period of improved international standing, and this at a time when the 
PSOE was still recovering from a difficult relationship with the Bush presidency in 
the highly charged atmosphere that ensued after Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq.169 
In spite of Spain’s difficult international situation in agreeing policy at a national 
level, let alone engaging with civil society on the topic, influential commentators 
(Bardaji 2003, Arteaga 2005, and Ballesteros, 2016) pointed to a clear need for 
an outcome in Spain where “que se inspiren y encuadren las estrategias de cada 
ministerio, de forma que todas ellas estén alineadas para alcanzar los objetivos 
fijados por aquella.”170  This represented a move shared by nation-states after 
9/11 to understand and construct what security meant in the changed security 
environment.  In the immediate aftermath, these outcomes tended to be knee-
jerk reactions, and some pointed to the fact171 that little actually changed for 
Spain’s security. 
From the perspective of vocabulary and rhetoric Bardaji & Cosido (2003) 
identified a repositioning of national priorities, using language and terminology 
that implied change, but on the whole literature and evidence from the time is 
scant.  Given the position of both sets of writers (both of whom have contributed 
to government policy in the past) it is subsequently clear that there existed some 
capacity to deliver a strategy beyond a single defence view almost a decade 
                                                   
168 “appears essential to crystallise the concept of national security, bearing in mind that there is no 
universally accepted definition”. 
169 In interviews with policy advisors it was stated that Zapatero was personally blamed by the US 
administration for the rhetoric and nature of the withdrawal from Iraq. 
170 “…the strategies of every ministry are inspired and framed in such a way that they are in step 
on the way to achieving the goals marked out by them” (Ballesteros 2016, p.15).  
171 Comments made in a seminar on Spain’s foreign and security policy held at the University of 
Liverpool 2002, attended by the author and led by Spain’s Foreign Minister Dastis (2012-17). 
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earlier, yet in interview (Bardaji) the delay was identified as being the result of 
bureaucratic politics that have been a perennial feature of the modern Spanish 
state (Heywood, 1999). 
The Sanedrín Process – a Possible Forerunner to Strategy? 
Another little known predecessor from the 1990s was an ad hoc coordination 
arrangement between the Defence and Foreign Ministries (Cosido & Bardají and 
Pitarch)172, cited as the “Sanedrín” process, whereby policy-makers, military 
personnel and ministers would coordinate matters of defence, security and 
foreign policy, although this was seen to collapse and stop at the end of the 
PSOE government in 2011.  There is little reference to the Sanedrín in formal 
publications or analysis, but Pitarch argues it was a useful and functional way of 
resolving policy differences in an informal manner.  It is difficult to read much into 
the rise and fall of the Sanedrín process, but overcoming the bureaucratic stove-
piping173 that exists in defence and security is easy to discern.  Further (very 
recent) developments in relations between the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
ministries seem to indicate reduced cooperation between these two significant 
actors in Spain’s national security policy, which may be in part a product of the 
shifts currently ongoing in Spain.174  In spite of the divisions over Iraq, there were 
grounds within ministries to believe progress could be made. 
Effectively, the period after 9/11 witnessed a surge in militarised activity in 
response to perceived threats from global terrorism and on the part of the US, 
the main protagonist in the struggle, symbols of military power, securitisation of 
borders and a media message of America at War.  Across the Atlantic, there was 
inevitably a different impact as although sympathetic and affected by the events 
of 9/11, European societies, which were affected in a different way by the attacks 
responded in similar ways (with securitised borders, identity policy and 
immigration controls) but the shift in security is less apparent in national policy. In 
effect, whilst citizens may have felt less secure, in Spain’s case, apart from the 
                                                   
172 Internet discussion groups such as el blog de Pitarch offer a useful Spanish forum for debating 
and understanding policy in the area of defence, security and foreign affairs. 
173 Stove-piping refers to the vertical nature of information flows in security and intelligence where 
material and analysis is not shared effectively leading to fragmented and ineffective decisions. 
174 At the end of 2016, the re-election of the PP government was accompanied by a closing of the 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries to external researchers such as myself.  This included the 
ending of inter-ministry exchange posts between the two Ministries.  This was discussed in 
interview and was seen as a domestic political concern rather than a strategic necessity and would 
lead to less sharing of information. 
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push to war in Iraq by the Aznar government, national security policy did 
promptly change its general language and purpose in the immediate term.   
National Defence Directives: the Predecessors to Security Strategy 
As has been the case in other states (such as the UK and France), it is in 
defence policy that the antecedent to broader national security strategies can be 
traced. These offer useful insights into the changing perceptions, language and 
content of defence and security prior to the research period under study. 
Instituted back in the early 1980s, the oversight of Spain’s Defence through 
National Defence Directives (Directivas de Defensa Nacional DDNs) was a 
product of the prevailing political situation, in that civilian control was 
incrementally exerted over what had been a Francoist military institution.175  In 
this model, which was reliant on a strong executive (in this case the PM), and 
with a relatively constrained civilian defence minister, Spain established a 
programme of quadrennial Defence statements.   
Distributed openly, DDNs marked a gradual democratisation and reform of 
defence policy, some aspects reflecting Spain’s long history of isolation and 
neutrality, as well as its geography.  In many ways, this meant that traditionally, 
and to some extent today, Spain’s international posture reflects domestic political 
and practical concerns.  This situation is not so unusual with regard to foreign 
policy in many nations, where foreign policy is normally driven by domestic 
concerns (Hill, 2003, p. 219).  In this case, DDNs chart a programme of gradual 
liberalisation, capability enhancement and improvement from a base of 
significant political and military uncertainty. 
Defence Directives follow a routine process, a focus on an identification of 
threats and possible risks, with the subsequent response by the organisations of 
the Ministry of Defence, endorsed by the executive.  Whilst there may have been 
little of a far-reaching security strategy within this model, as previous sources 
have indicated, Spain has never favoured strategies, and outputs such as the 
Libro Blanco176 (White Book) and the DDN of 2000, 2004 and 2008 all set the 
scene of what I argue is a gradual process towards a national strategy.  The 
                                                   
175 Even subordinating the Armed Forces to a civilian was seen as controversial in the early days 
of the transition.  This created a legacy where subsequent defence ministers have tended to be 
subordinated to the executive within the political system (Bardají, 2003, p.2). 
176 The Libro Blanco (White Book, published 2000) was an interim publication produced by the 
Defence Ministry in the light of the re-election of the PP (with a majority) that year, it sits somewhat 
uneasily alongside the DDN that same year. 
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quadrennial DDNs offer a snapshot into Spain’s emerging postures.  A summary 
evaluation identifies a similar structure to DDNs as an identification of the main 
changes or events in the world, a summary of any extant threats, and the policy 
outcome for Spain’s Armed Forces and Defence Ministry.  Examining DDNs 
since the 1990s, there has been an emerging picture of threats, risks and 
national interests over the last 20 years that chart aspects of Spain’s particular 
experience of security which clearly reflect aspects of the constructivist 
interpretation. 
Defence Policy Publications on Strategy and Security 2000-2008 
“La concepción estratégica española, en la que se inscriben la acción 
exterior y la defensa de los intereses nacionales, representa la manera global 
que los españoles tenemos de entender nuestro papel en el mundo, de 
afirmarnos como nación en el tablero internacional y de definir nuestra 
vocación a partir de nuestros condicionantes geográficos, razones históricas, 
realidad política y proyectos de futuro”.  Libro Blanco de Defensa (2000)177 
  
                                                   
177  “The Spanish strategic viewpoint, which embraces action abroad and the defence of national 
interests, represents the global way we Spaniards have of understanding our role in the world, of 
asserting ourselves as a nation in the international arena and defining our outlook based on our 
geographical influences, historical reasons, political facts and future projects”.   Spanish Ministry of 
Defence, Defence White Paper 2000 http://www.resdal.org/ Archivo/d0000128.htm, [accessed 17 
Feb 17]. 
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Figure 7: Defence Themes from National Publications 2000-2008 
(Compiled by author) 
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178 Under the PP, the decision was taken to end compulsory military service. La mili,as it was 
known, was universally disliked by participants and the decision that was taken to end it 
prematurely as part of cost savings and a modernisation programme and was popular with young 
voters.  The changing role and official language behind conscription can be charted and 
appreciated in official publications such as the Revista Española de Defensa. 
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An immediate impression of timeframe is that there was no shortage of initiatives 
to reform Spain’s defence and security posture.  One aspect is the aspiration to 
assist international security in this period.  Even as far back as the 1990s, the 
requirement for international missions was evident.  For example, in 1996, some 
months before the election of the PP government, the Directive that year 
identified new issues in the form of the emergence of non-state actors, the 
requirement for a formalised peacekeeping role for Spain’s Armed Forces, and 
the ability to provide: 
“…a deterrence, readiness and response in order to permanently guarantee 
its sovereignty and independence, its territorial integrity and its constitutional 
order, as well as to protect lives, peace, liberty, and the prosperity of 
Spaniards and national interests wherever they are found.”  (Government of 
Spain, National Defence Directive, 1996). 
As early as 1996’s Directive there is evidence of a process that broadened 
beyond a military strategy, where there is a focus on liberty, prosperity and 
national interests among others.  Therefore, with Defence Directives, security in 
its broadest guise was already being discussed at the national policy level, albeit 
within the confines of a traditional defence model.  This was not unique to Spain, 
but in effect reflected that a capacity to transform Spain’s security perspective 
was not new and demonstrates some ability by national institutions to adopt a 
more pre-emptive approach than a simple defence-based model, in effect, 
paving the way for a broader more nuanced approach to security. 
The observations to be drawn from DDNs (and other initiatives) is that a short 
analysis identifies the significant broadening of security at the end of the Cold 
War.  In effect, the capacity of Spain’s defence policy-makers to appreciate and 
construct broader security norms is greater than some would imagine.  The 
process, may have remained an internal process (with plans, directives and 
reforms) but, as the table shows, the state’s comprehension of security had 
undergone change.  It is unclear however and a topic for possible future 
research as to the input of groups, interests and norms at this time.  
The Impact of 9/11 
Formal Spanish strategy in the 21st century remained weak or opaque at the start 
of the millennium, what can be drawn at this point is that the relationship 
between strategy and Katzenstein’s environment (the cultural context) is 
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uncertain, there is little evidence of engagement on the part of Defence interests 
with non-state actors or non-traditional interests. 
For Spain, having endured decades of ETA terrorism, a traditional threat of 
domestic terrorism was now supplanted by international terrorism following a 
low-tech, highly visible attack on one of the world’s most powerful nation-states.  
Islamic terrorism until then, was little known in Spain’s popular perceptions, but 
one considered relevant since the end of the Cold War by elements within the 
Spanish security community.179  With the emergence of Al Qaida and related 
groups from the mid-1990s, the threat from terrorism had become more 
nebulous, with a message, not about a specific political change but instead one 
that aimed to terrorise western audiences and paradoxically, would benefit from 
the globalisation of finance and the movement of people in this period. (Burke 
2004).  As the 2011 Strategy states: 
`International terrorist organisations, especially Al Qaeda-type Jihadist 
movements, benefit from certain features of the new global society’ 
(Government of Spain, 2011, p. 41) 
The Strategy offers little insight into the global society identified, in particular 
what the `certain features’ were.  How this then relates to changes from the 
previous decade which supported the invasion of Iraq, or even the evolution from 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is unclear.180  Yet it is worth noting that Rajoy (the 
Partido Popular’s PM 2011-8) was Interior Minister at the time of the 9/11 attacks 
and had in fact found himself at the forefront of Spain’s domestic response to the 
unexpected new developments. 
Al Qaida’s propaganda message had had a significant impact on popular 
perceptions in Spain, where hostile narratives by terrorist groups had not been 
either pre-empted or considered in DDNs, or in any other security policy for that 
matter.  The group’s concept of the `Caliphate’181 referenced a historic Islamic 
empire which had actually taken in Spain, and was well-understood in a 
country’s education system which celebrated its greatness with the rule of 
                                                   
179  Defence Directives since the mid-1990s have referred to international terrorism, while in addition 
publications such as the Revista Española de Defensa among others have documented national 
efforts by Spain’s security forces to support multi-national efforts since the early 1990s. 
180 The 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force divided many European societies. For Spain, with 
echoes of the demands of Basque separatists, a US-led mission that appeared to support Albanian 
Kosovars’ demands for separation from Serbia was domestically difficult for Madrid. The fact that it 
also lacked clear UNSC authority concerned policy-makers and would serve to create the 
precedent for supporting the US over Iraq. 
181 Burke’s Al Qaida (2003) explains the emergence of this concept and the rise of the Al Qa’ida 
group. 
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Ferdinand and Isabella of Castille, the monarchs who oversaw Imperial Spain, 
the recapture of significant tracts of territory from the Moors, and the 
recuperation of Christian Spain. 
Domestic events also played an impact, in 2000 a large scale outbreak of racial 
tensions and violence in El Ejido (in the South’s Almería province) had generated 
national debate over the treatment and status of migrant African workers.  
Coupled with a series of terrorist attacks against western visitors in Tunisia and 
Morocco (two countries with which Spain has very close ties), the threat of terror 
and the reference to Caliphates were increasingly taken up by Spain’s media 
who, in the early part of the decade, had proved pivotal in developing narratives 
regarding the Bush Presidency, Perejil Island, and of course the invasion of Iraq.  
Therefore, the events of 9/11 were a huge shock to Spain’s polity, the assertion 
of this chapter is that Spain was vulnerable to shocks of this kind182, it had a 
history of tension with unstable southern neighbours, in popular culture Islam 
was not well understood and the Al Qaida message of Caliphates touched upon 
a national psyche with cultural associations. 
By the time of the infamous Azores summit (March 2003), where Aznar joined 
Blair in committing his country to supporting the US invasion of Iraq, events such 
as 9/11 and a number of developments (terrorist and other) had rendered the 
assumptions of the 2000 DDN and the Libro Blanco antiquated.  As chapter 3 
outlines, what was most pertinent in this period in the wake of the Madrid bomb 
attack of March 2004 was that security as a policy goal in itself had become 
contested.  Whilst the EU convergence programme and NATO integration policy 
of the PP had delivered some institutional change, in reality, Spain perhaps 
appeared less secure from violence at the level of the individual citizen than at 
any point in its modern democratic history as a result of the decisions of the PP 
government to pursue domestic security through foreign policy decisions.  This 
was further complicated by a disconnect between the culture and policy as 
outlined in the Katzenstein model. 
The 2011 National Security Strategy – la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 
In retrospect, the publication of a strategy offers an opportunity to identify the key 
narratives, interests and norms in Spain’s security thinking.  Prior to the launch of 
                                                   
182 Interviews with Defence officials (Juan Moliner, Dec 2011, Enrique Fojon Sep 2015) and also 
the events of the Atocha bomb in 2004 demonstrated that Spain was both unprepared and 
vulnerable to a mass-casualty terrorist attack. 
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the 2011 Strategy there already existed a system of National Defence Directives 
that had identified vital and strategic interests, while also acknowledging threats 
to the Spanish nation-state.  The 2011 National Security Strategy was an attempt 
at broadening security through the above approach but by tackling this based on 
the risk posed by threats.  This section will address the approach taken by this 
strategy with a look at the structure and methodology, which incorporate a 
number of shortfalls that appear to have been addressed following analysis of 
the 2013 Strategy.  It must be made clear that the Strategy was an internally 
generated document with only limited input by aspects of civil society. 
Some eight years after the first attempt under the Aznar government to frame a 
national security strategy, the creation of the 2011 Strategy was the culmination 
of eight years of uneven, and at times ponderous, activity.183  Aznar’s aspiration 
of a bipartisan and enduring approach had succumbed to the damaging divisions 
following the Madrid terrorist bombings and impact of the election defeat a few 
days later in 2004.  Highlighted as a future requirement in the 2008 Defence 
Directive, along with commentaries by advisors to both the Socialist and Popular 
Party, the Strategy’s emergence in 2011 not only represented the shift in thinking 
that had happened some 10 years earlier (if not before) with the Sanedrín 
process, but also reversed a decades-long trend of the gradually declining 
influence of Defence ministers. 
When looking back on events and Madrid’s diplomacy, many celebrate the 
achievements of Spain’s insertion into the world (Gillespie, 2000; Story, 1996; 
and Ross, 2007) and frame it as a normalisation of relations, but the fact remains 
that Spain approached the process only tentatively, with a government in later 
years under siege from protest movements and the depths of the worst 
recession seen in modern Spain.  Furthermore, the later period was marked by a 
difficult relationship between the PSOE government and Washington.  The 
election of Barack Obama at the end of 2008 enabled some progress for Spain 
but in essence, as the strategy began to be formed, the ties to the US remained 
poor and in some ways still remain a work in progress.  Published in the summer 
of 2011, in the last few months of the PSOE administration and during a period 
of significant upheaval, the Strategy opened with a confident tone: 
                                                   
183 Interviewees on this topic (Bardají, Arteaga and within the Defence Ministry) refer to the PSOE 
government as not making the Strategy a policy priority, and ultimate events were attributed as 
occupying more of policy-makers’ time and attention than writing a strategy. 
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“This strategy has been conceived with a national, European, international 
and global perspective, and from the standpoint of Spain’s standing as a 
medium-sized power with a specific profile and important comparative 
advantages”. National Security Strategy (2011, p.1) 
Consisting of 81 pages, 21,000 words addressed through six concepts, the 
document was published simultaneously in both Spanish and English and is 
structured in a methodical, functionalist manner.  It outlines the aim of the 
Strategy in a brief executive summary and then devotes a significant proportion 
to the challenges and issues facing the Spanish nation-state.  The response 
(strategic lines of operation) relates directly to an identified threat or risk.  The 
most appropriate way to highlight some key aspects of the Strategy is by 
condensing the contents into the tabular format below. 
Analysis of the 2011 Strategy is divided into two parts; a look at policy or 
strategic outcomes followed by a discussion of risks, threats and `multipliers’.  It 
is worth considering that Spain’s was the last in a line of strategies articulated by 
the US, the UN, the EU, NATO’s strategic concept, the UK, France and the 
Netherlands.   
Figure 8: Overview of the 2011 National Security Strategy 
(compiled by author) 
 
(a) Product or feature (b) Outcome (c) Remarks 
Naming of vital 
interests 
Vital interests — 
fundamental rights of life, 
liberty and democracy.  
Welfare and development 
of Spanish people and 
state 
Sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, constitutional 
order and economic 
security 
 
It is unclear as to the 
difference between the 
`vital’ and `strategic’ 
interests. These are also 
drawn from DDNs. 
Naming of strategic 
interests 
Strategic interests — 
Peaceful and safe 
environment 
Consolidation and 
functioning of EU 
International order 
Freedom of exchange and 
communication 
Constructive relations with 
neighbours 
See above 
`Six concepts of 
security policy’ 
• Comprehensive 
approach 
 The UK adopted a 
`comprehensive approach’ 
back in the late 1990s 
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• Coordination of 
state/public & private 
entities 
• Efficient use of 
resources 
• Anticipation & 
prevention 
• Resilience 
• Responsible 
interdependence 
 
 
There are some issues 
with the translation of 
terms referring to 
resilience in the context of 
interviewing in Feb. 2017; 
no suitable word exists for 
the meaning of resilient in 
Spanish – see conclusion 
for further discussion. 
Identification of 
response 
Instruments —  
Diplomacy 
Armed Forces 
State security forces 
Intelligence services 
Civil protection 
Development cooperation 
Economic and trade 
relations 
(also emphasis on 
information and 
communication policy) 
Also refers to Principles of 
International Action  
• European 
framework 
• Multilateralism, 
legitimacy and 
international legality 
• Peace-building 
• Civil protection and 
`Responsibility to Protect’ 
• Alliance of 
Civilisations Project (led 
with Turkey) 
Organisational 
reform 
“Integrated Institutional 
Model” 
• Establishment of 
PM-led Spanish Security 
council 
• PM’s office to 
oversee “Spanish Security 
Council support unit” 
• Inter-ministerial 
committees 
• Social Forum 
• Economic 
intelligence System 
• Integrated External 
Response Unit (URIE) 
The 2011 Strategy 
intended to establish a 
significant organisational 
shift towards cross-
ministerial competition.   
 
The role of the PM (the 
executive) is strengthened 
through the establishment 
of the Spanish Security 
Council support unit 
 
The social forum also 
offers an opportunity for 
NGO & academic input 
 
Encapsulating the content is not straightforward, yet there is an evident attempt 
by the Strategy to meet national interests, responses and organisational 
outcomes through a structure similar to that of the UK and other western nation-
states.  The use of `vital’ and `strategic’ interests demonstrates a continuation of 
concepts from the Defence Directives and whilst much of the language appears 
to be from the hard security school of analysis, there is evidence of broadened 
conceptualisation as the next section shows. 
 
The definition of interest in the Strategy document, although not clarified, differs 
from Katzenstein’s model,184 however the content of vital interests (column b) 
                                                   
184 See chapter 7 of the thesis for a discussion of Katzenstein’s discussion of interests. 
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names certain issues.  These point to a broadening of security such as `welfare 
and development’, `economic security’ and liberty and democracy.  When 
considered in the context of Spain’s cultural context of austerity, huge jumps in 
unemployment, continuing terrorism then there is evidently a flow between the 
context and the Strategy. 
 
The Identification of Threats, Risks and Responses 
 
By its very nature, a Strategy is a response or policy towards a situation or 
problem (whether military or not).  Spain’s approach identifies 10 categories of 
risk and threats, although how they split out from each other is not immediately 
apparent.  In conventional terms, a risk relates to the possibility or likelihood of a 
threat occurring, whereas the threat is the actual event or act in question.  As the 
Strategy then outlines each threat and risk, these are then accompanied or 
reacted to by a response or line of operation.  The very term “line of operation” is 
a NATO mission word to describe an activity or response, showing again the 
idea that Spain has imported aspects of its security Strategy from other military-
related themes both inside and outside Spain and this a key to interpreting the 
Strategy approach, although there is clear evidence of broadened security, the 
main approach is still, largely military themed, in spite of the political context of 
the Zapatero government. 
  
 
Figure 9:  Threats and Risks in the 2011 Strategy 
(compiled by author) 
 
Threat and Risk 
[strategy fails to 
explain how 
these relate to 
interests] 
Response or Strategic Line of 
Operation [these are 
inconsistent in their response] 
Risk Multipliers  
 [this relationship is unclear] 
Armed conflict Peace-building with conflict 
anticipation, prevention and 
management  
1. Globalisation’s 
`drawbacks’ Demographic 
imbalances 
2. Poverty & inequality 
3. Climate change 
4. Perils of technology 
5. Radical & non-
democratic ideologies 
Terrorism185 Institutional and organisational 
reform as part of counter-terrorism 
strategy 
Organised crime Organisational reform and 
coordination 
Financial & 
economic 
insecurity 
Promoting economic development 
Mitigating market imbalances 
Combating criminal activities 
Financial Stability Committee 
                                                   
185 The 2011 strategy claims “neither ETA nor Jihadist terrorism has the capability to destabilize 
the rule of law or democracy in our country”, which could be construed as a statement of hope 
rather than fact, and also recognises that terrorism does have some limits. 
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Energy 
vulnerability 
Reducing dependence on fossil 
fuels, promoting efficiency, 
guaranteeing supplies 
Proliferation of 
WMDs 
Support for treaties and controls on 
technologies, missile defence 
Cyber-threats Legislation, infrastructure and 
awareness, National Cryptologic 
Centre & CERT (computer 
emergency response) 
Uncontrolled 
migration 
Cooperation, surveillance, social 
integration, human rights agenda 
Emergency & 
disaster 
Civil protection, Military Emergency 
Unit (UME) 
Critical 
infrastructure 
National Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Centre (CNPIC) 
 
The briefest analysis of the threat-risk approach identifies a response that offers 
what appears to be a rational, achievable policy reaction.  No threat or risk 
appears insurmountable, perhaps reflecting the need to reassure Spanish 
society, in that the state has a need to be seen as able to guarantee security.   
Another element, which offers some confusion is the impact of risk multipliers. 
According to the Strategy these have an effect on the threats and risks that exist, 
but lack an adequate explanation as to how they directly impact on that threat (or 
risk) to Spain.  In summary, certain aspects of the Strategy are not explicit. 
The impact of the threat from a cyber-attack or failure is a useful example of how 
the Strategy has delivered in innovative areas.  Although dating back to the 
1990s, the impact of a cyber-threat (as it is known in the document) is a clear 
example of a non-military response to a non-traditional security threat.  In this 
case, a range of solutions are proffered through legal, judicial and institutional 
means, and to the benefit of measurement, a method of quantification is 
provided. 
Observations of the 2011 Strategy 
The 21,000 words of the 2011 Security Strategy, coming in the dying months of 
the PSOE administration and at a time of social challenge from the Indignados, 
persistent economic problems and fragmentation of political support for the 
governing party, meant its launch was not heralded with significant fanfare or 
much publicity.  The document was promulgated in the mid-summer (always a 
quiet time in Spain’s political culture and policy administration) and was not 
covered extensively or analysed in depth.186  Spain’s Cortes, the key instrument 
                                                   
186 Some output was disseminated routinely by think-tanks and there were also some column 
inches in the national media, but generally the coverage was restricted, one theory could be that 
the lack of interest was intentional. 
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for scrutinising the executive, only addressed the Strategy’s publication some 
months later, and this in turn largely went unnoticed in the ferment of the election 
campaign that autumn which heralded the fall of the PSOE. 
According to Katzenstein’s model, a policy (or strategy) reflects interests, 
identities and the cultural environment.  As outlined in chapter 7, Spain’s 
Constitution does not facilitate clear institutional accountability in any clear 
approach to defence (or security), and, as will be discussed later, the relative 
weakness of Spain’s legislature in the security policy process makes the input of 
elected representatives on behalf civil society, or interests less effective. 
The Strategy’s risks and threats model, similar in scope to the UK approach, 
bears out a continuity in policy, with the traditional or hard security threats being 
most prominent.  In a number of ways there appears to be a continuous thread 
that runs from the DDN structure where vital/strategic interests, the risk/threat 
approach and the underlying military theme are discussed.  These constitute the 
state-led threats that a national security policy would address, such as terrorism 
and armed conflict.   
Where there is a shift towards a re-think is with respect to natural disasters and 
catastrophes.  Whilst these are nothing new, they are embodied in the 
experience of the 2004 Christmas Tsunami in Asia, Hurricane Katrina’s impact in 
New Orleans in 2005 and, closer to home, the 2011 earthquake in Spain (Lorca), 
all of which demonstrated the vulnerability of human security and in some cases 
called for significant state (military and non-military) assistance, and the impact 
that these can have on particular communities or groups in a society. 
Perhaps of most significance is the suggestion that economic insecurity is a 
threat worthy of consideration in a national strategy.  In Spain’s case this is a 
reflection of the times (see the previous chapter) and the awareness of the 
impact of recession perhaps articulates the new thinking that has emerged, with 
national security and economic well-being being seen in the same context for the 
first time. As the 2011 Strategy states: 
“Economic security is integral and essential to national security.  A 
sustainable economic model is the basis of social stability and provides the 
resources necessary for security” (Government of Spain 2011, p.48) 
The creation of a financial intelligence organisation is another reflects changing 
attitudes and responsiveness to new securities, with a body whose remit is to 
 
132 
 
“…analyse and provide relevant timely and useful economic, financial and 
business information to support the actions of the State and enable better 
decision making… it will contribute to State security tasks by helping to 
identify and prevent actions that are contrary to Spain’s economic, financial, 
technological and commercial interests in strategic sectors” (Government of 
Spain, 2011, p.51).   
However, as will be discussed later in the chapter, this capacity to `prevent 
actions’ was unclear and in some ways remains politicised as an issue, the 
impact of the economy on people’s individual livelihoods, essentially being 
securitised by the indignados movement demanded more than a state led 
response to actions contrary to the state’s interest. One of the arguments about 
the indignados (Ekhlund, 2015) was that the state was too responsive to the 
interests of bank and finance groups in contrast to the needs of its individual 
citizens. 
Factors in the Strategy that exacerbated the threats to Spain are less innovative, 
or have been previously anticipated in DDNs.  Globalisation, wealth distribution 
and technological proliferation are more long-standing, having roots in Spain’s 
agenda of the 1990s or even earlier, as works broadening the definitions of 
security have demonstrated, and so on initial impression the 2011 Strategy has 
an incomplete or rushed feel to it. There are similarities to the UK’s first 
attempted NSS of 2008 which coincided with the transfer of power from Blair’s 
resignation to Brown’s assumption of office in 2007.  That document itself only 
lasted a little over two years, whereupon a more rounded and considered 
product was launched following a change of government in 2010. 
Whilst a thread can be seen to continue from DDNs (and there were certainly 
new topics in terms of threats and risks), the empiricism behind the threats is 
unclear (see Fig. 3).  For example, there is little consistency behind the 
assumptions of the relationship between risks, threats, lines of action and risk 
multipliers.187  Although a technical observation, the questions raised by such 
categorisation imply that there is a lack of completeness to the analysis.     
Strategy tends to be driven by a balancing of accepted risks and associated 
costs, and according to Gardner (2009, p.74), who made a study of risks and 
fear in policy-making: 
                                                   
187 Conceptually a passing reference is made that risk multipliers can influence and transform risks 
and threats (but to what end remains uncertain).   
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“If it costs little to protect against a low probability/high consequence event, 
it’s worth paying up.  But if it costs a lot, we may be better off putting the 
money into other priorities — reducing other risks, for example — and taking 
our chances.” (Gardner, 2009, p.74). 
The lack of a measurable assessment of probability or consequences makes the 
process appear less transparent.  Such attempts at empiricism are admittedly 
difficult but do highlight a route to arriving at certain decisions.  The 2010 UK 
Strategy has a very clear, unambiguous model that is easy to interpret and 
assists in understanding why cyber-threats, for example, are prioritised. 
The 2011 Spanish Strategy does not offer an explanation or prioritisation of 
threats that could have been expected of a national document.  Strategies, by 
their very nature require informed analysis, and this would aid national policy in 
choosing among competing options with finite resources.   According to 
Edmunds (2012, p.272), in this process Spain was not alone in taking on 
`increased use of risk assessment and management methodologies…one of the 
most striking features of contemporary western defence and security thinking.”  
However, in the case of the 2011 Strategy, the approach appears incomplete. 
This was also a criticism levelled at other countries’ experiences of quantifying 
risk and remains an issue of debate beyond the period and scope of this study. 
With regard to an emerging idea of a `security culture’ the rises of `new’ security 
matters of energy vulnerability, uncontrolled migration, critical infrastructure, 
financial and economic security, and emergencies/natural disasters.  These 
represent a broadening of security in the 2011 Strategy and, in terms of Buzan’s 
sectors (1998), can tally with the issues of energy security, human security, 
environmental security and economic security.  In this context, military and 
traditional security responses have very little place in delivering a result and, as 
argued earlier, while such approaches were not new and Spain’s response in the 
form of institutional and organisational methods offers a very state-led feel, the 
input of non-governmental and third sector actors is less evident.  The intention 
to deliver security through the private sector is passingly referred to as 
“crucial…[it] can provide important capabilities, such as global presence, 
technological expertise and economic, material and human resources” 
(Government of Spain, 2011, p.49). 
Organisational Restructuring and the 2011 Security Strategy 
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Given the pressures and expectations raised by the launch of a new process and 
methodology for delivering national security, the executive functions are a natural 
point to start and an attempt at innovation can be seen with the creation of the 
Consejo Español del Seguridad (Spanish Security Council).  This was to be 
nominally chaired by the King but located within the Moncloa, the seat of the 
Prime Minister, and in turn further influenced by the Executive Secretary coming 
on board from the role of Director del Gabinete de la Presidencia del Gobierno 
(Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister’s Office). 
 
In effect, the structure nominally places the responsibility for security with the 
Prime Minister’s power base at the Moncloa.  This reinforces executive control 
by the PM of the process and undermines individual activities such as stove-
piping.  Interviews with officials in the Defence Ministry expressed 
disappointment with centralisation of control away from what was traditionally an 
area of Defence’s interest. 
 
Figure 10: The Organisational Structure of Spain’s National Security 
Strategy (Taken and adapted from Spain’s 2011 Security Strategy) 
 
 
President of the Government (Prime 
Minister) although nominally in the name of 
the Crown 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
President of the Government’s Office  
(Prime Minister’s Office)  
Spanish Security Council Support Unit 
 
 
The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) is perhaps the single biggest 
organisational innovation of the 2011 Strategy.   With a similar body created in 
the UK in 2008, and the long-standing US equivalent having a high-profile role in 
international politics, there is evidence of policy import, which is a relatively new 
concept in Spain.  The 2011 Strategy is ambiguous about Spain’s new NSC, 
perhaps anticipating a period of `bedding in’ or at least in response to the 
Spanish Security Council (National Security 
Council) 
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direction of an incoming government, but as the next section shows, the Strategy 
would be subject to some reform.  The location of the Support Unit within the 
Prime Minister’s Office indicates that the executive is firmly in control of the 
activities of the Security Council.  While the position may be adequate from a 
functional perspective, the fact that the Council is both presided over and located 
within the Prime Minister’s domain points to a strongly centralised policy process.  
This matter will be discussed in the final chapter.   
 
Aspirations to drawing in a broader range of actors in drawing up the Strategy 
shows a wish to consider non-state contributions from non-state organisations.  
Spain’s think-tanks have been credited with a significant amount of input into the 
NSS writing process.  Javier Solana, perhaps Spain’s most prominent figure in 
NATO and the EU’s security policy, also played a very significant role.  In many 
ways, the output has the hallmarks of both the EU and UK Security Strategy, and 
in interview this was confirmed.  The UK, being a former colonial power, facing a 
domestic terrorist problem and having a strong tendency to look outside the EU 
can provide some useful indicators, but it is very much through a Spanish lens 
that analysis is best achieved. 
 
The Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Royal Elcano 
Institute (Real Instituto Elcano, RIE)188 are among the two most prominent think 
tanks within Spain and represent the input that non-governmental organisations 
are able to contribute, having played a contributory role in the 2011 Strategy.  
Both are well-established, internationally recognised NGOs with strong research 
in the fields of Spain’s overseas relations. The RIE could be considered closer to 
the established actors given that it receives funding and patronage from the 
Spanish state, whilst CIDOB is Barcelona-based and has links to both the 
Catalan administration and the Catalan party equivalent of the PSOE.  
Discussion of the role think tanks can and do play in Spain will be discussed in 
the concluding chapter, but in this case the limited role NGOs have traditionally 
played in policy appears to be changing positively, in that a more mature 
approach is settling in.  
                                                   
188 CIDOB.org and realinstitutoelcano.org offer a useful overview of the work, activities and roles of 
both organisations.  Other NGOs do exist but are considered of lesser importance.  A future area 
of study would be that of the role played in foreign and security policy-making by Spanish NGOs. 
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In summary, the chapter’s conclusion as regards the 2011 Security Strategy is 
that it should have been better considered.  A decade prior to it, academics such 
as Arteaga or Bardaji were echoed by Aznar, the PM, in calling for a national 
strategy.  The polemic nature of Spain’s foreign, defence and security policy 
perhaps explains why its creation was slow to materialise.  Interviews had 
indicated that, although the aspiration existed to conduct the strategy process, it 
was never treated as a priority, as among other factors, ministerial rivalry 
dictated inaction, which was compounded by the fact that Zapatero, the PSOE 
Prime Minister, had never been a strong advocate of a national strategy.189 
It is therefore the contention of this chapter that the 2011 National Security 
Strategy, the first formal Security Strategy in contemporary Spain, represented a 
radical break with previous models of security planning and strategy.  The launch 
of the process, which had been  intended to have a duration of five to 10 years 
before further review, mirrors some of the experiences of other countries when 
undertaking such an activity (such as the UK) and in many ways subsequent 
reviews have occurred far quicker than had been anticipated at the outset.  
Interviews with a number of individuals expressed some irritation that their input 
as `traditional’ deliverers of defence and security had not been heeded.  This 
was recently reinforced in interviews with other officials who felt that both the 
2011 and 2013 strategies represented a “loss” for the Defence Ministry. 
Spain’s Security Following the 2011 Strategy 
2011 was unlikely to be an opportune time for Spain to formally produce a 
national strategy.  Global events, domestic matters (so important in gaining the 
support and backing in such a contentious area) and the anticipated end of the 
PSOE/Zapatero government indicated that what could have been a leap forward 
in strategic planning, policy making and resource allocation was unlikely to be 
either well received or achieve its aim of delivering a safer Spain for the next five 
to 10 years. 
In spite of the length of time it took to produce Spain’s first formal security 
strategy: from originally being an aspiration of PM Aznar in 2003 to reaching 
fruition in 2011 after seven  years of PSOE rule, the first attempt was flawed from 
its inception in the summer of 2011.  As has already been argued, the rise of 
                                                   
189 According to Bruneau (2009, p.260) and interviews with Arteaga and Bardaji, Zapatero’s 
indifference to foreign and security policy was a key reason for the delay in producing the Security 
Strategy. 
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political mass-mobilisation, the near economic collapse of Spain’s economy after 
2008 and a PSOE government on the defensive in the face of defeat in 2011 all 
meant that any meaningful attempt at a strategy with a scope of “one 
decade…reviewed every five years” (2011, p.1) appears nowadays as optimistic. 
Criticisms were based on assumptions that it was short term, and lacked broad 
popular support.  Furthermore, its publication in the last summer of the PSOE 
administration meant that its relevance could be questioned given that the 
government was in its last months.  As the Arab Spring extended out from 
Tunisia to envelop the Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf states during what was 
already a tumultuous year for Spain and the EU’s Mediterranean states, what 
was a rather academic document that also lacked support from a broad political 
base seemed to be of questionable relevance when the whole context was in 
such a state of flux. 
As Colom states “…[it] received a lukewarm welcome because of its strategic 
indefinition, conceptual ambiguity and limited applicability…ineffective, neither 
framing Spanish security policy nor guiding a military transformation” (Colom, 
2016, p.9) 
By the end 2011, as the Arab Spring became a serious challenge to regimes 
across the Arab world,190 and with the PSOE’s credibility in sharp decline, Spain 
was literally at `a time of acute domestic crisis, certainly the worst since the end 
of the Franco dictatorship’ (Molina, 2013, p.3).  Domestic instability was not 
unique to Spain and across the EU the Arab Spring was accompanied by 
significant rises in illegal migration and a rekindled fear of Islamic terrorism.  In 
response to the lacklustre enthusiasm for the 2011 Strategy and the ongoing 
seismic issues in the Arab world, it is unsurprising therefore that the new PP 
government was keen to indicate that further strategy was in the pipeline. 
A new Defence Directive (DDN) launched in the early months of the PP 
government (in 2012) maintained some commitment to the process but pledged 
the incumbent government to a further Security Strategy, and also highlighted 
the strength of the four-yearly DDN system.  In effect, the ongoing approach of 
Directives can provide direction or indication in the absence of a new formal 
                                                   
190  By the end of 2011, Gaddafi had been overthrown and killed in the Libyan civil war and 
Mubarak had been toppled in Egypt, while Ben Ali in Tunisia was also removed.  The vulnerability 
of long-standing Arab regimes had been exposed and in a number of cases had produced violent 
civil unrest and war — notably in Syria — whose war which is now synonymous with producing 
global terrorism. 
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strategy.  As will be discussed there are some reasons to be optimistic with 
regards to future direction within Spanish security policy. 
The success of the PP in the 2011 General Elections meant that in the area of 
policy it was able to move ahead relatively smoothly, with a renewed National 
Security Strategy being published in the summer of 2013. In this case, cross-
party support was achieved (mainly from the PSOE) and although it appeared to 
be a different product, as examination will show, the 2013 Strategy is essentially 
drawn from the 2011 document.  Of note here is the move towards a more 
consensual approach, and in the Spanish Parliament (the Cortes) the 
endorsement of the 2013 Strategy by the Socialists lent gravitas and consent to 
a process that had traditionally been polarised.  Socialist support was perhaps 
unsurprising, as closer examination reveals that the two documents show 
significant continuity. 
The 2013 National Security Strategy 
The intervening period between the 2011 and 2013 strategies is briefly 
discussed in chapter 6.  However, the most significant output after the 2011 
document was its successor the PP’s 2013 publication. 
“a strategy that orientates the state’s action towards responding to current 
challenges by using the available resources flexibly and efficiently; a strategy 
that enhances our prevention, protection and response capabilities in an 
increasingly complex environment like today’s…” (Government of Spain, 
2013, pp. II & III) 
At 58 pages and approximately 20% fewer words than its predecessor Strategy 
of 2011, Rajoy’s call for a “new National Security System” represents much of 
what had been achieved two years previously.  It is still essentially a risks and 
threats-based strategy, highlighting security as a ‘public service….constantly 
updated and periodically revised” (Government of Spain, 2013, p. 4). 
Figure 11: Overview of Spain’s Security Strategy 2013  
(adapted and compiled by the author) 
Chapter and 
title 
Content Remarks 
Prime Minister’s 
Foreword and 
Executive 
Summary 
 PM demonstrates ownership 
of document. 
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Chapter one: 
A Comprehensive 
Vision of National 
Security 
Broad definition of “national 
security” 
• Four basic principles 
“orientates the state’s action 
towards responding to current 
challenges by using the 
available resources flexibly 
and efficiently” 
Chapter two: 
Spain’s Security 
in the World 
• Lists actors and regions of 
significance 
There are no unusual 
insertions. 
Chapter three: 
Risks and 
Threats to 
National 
Security 
• Lists twelve risks & threats; 
and five threat multipliers  
 
 
Chapter four: 
Strategic Lines 
of Action 
• Lists twelve areas of action 
and seventy nine lines of 
action 
Seventy nine lines of 
operation is a considerable 
number (see next page). 
Chapter five:  
A New National 
Security System 
• Lists eight principles and 
outlines structure 
Some significant institutional 
ordering is evident. 
 
Unlike his PSOE predecessor, the then Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy 
demonstrated a clear commitment to the second NSS through the foreword 
written in his name.  In turn, leadership by the PM is identified as a key principle 
in the fifth chapter and the role of the new Government Security Department is 
also expanded.191   The significance of the need for an amended Strategy is 
barely touched upon (cited as a `revision’ of 2011), although the assertion that 
“the dynamism of the environment and the national situation will require the 
National Security Strategy to be constantly updated and periodically revised” 
(2013, p.4), which is indicative of an aspiration to be responsive to events. 
24 months after the publication of the first Spanish National Security Strategy, 
the 2013 document follows a broadly similar direction with the same method 
developed in Defence Directives and the 2011 Strategy.  The content (namely 
the risks, threats and multipliers) had changed only slightly, reflecting validation 
of preceding work.  It could be argued that, although Spain’s foreign and security 
                                                   
191 Although indicated as a new response and commitment to the process of national security that 
included a ministerial appointment in government, it later transpired that there was no new funding 
for this initiative, and in fact cuts were made to security agencies to produce a new capability.  
(Interview with Felix Arteaga, Feb 2017). 
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policy is somewhat polarised, in the context of the need for a strategy there is 
consensus between the PSOE and the PP on this matter of security policy. 
Observations on the 2013 Strategy 
Whether Spain warranted a genuinely new strategy in 2013 remains open to 
interpretation as no significant international or domestic event had occurred to 
justify one.  Having disseminated the first attempt two years previously, analysis 
comparing the two strategies does not reveal any significant deficiencies 
(although the increase to 79 Lines of Action in chapter 4 is a significant 
quantitative leap).  What had developed was the impact of the Arab Spring and 
the rise of conflict in the affected countries, but to suggest that a significant 
reordering had taken place is unproven.  This study therefore concludes that it is 
in spite of both the change of government and the impact of the Arab Spring on 
Spain and the Mediterranean EU member states that the two strategies do not sit 
in isolation but are in fact an ongoing process — not dissimilar to the process of 
the Directives.  
This offers few surprises or innovations in the conduct of the PP government’s 
security policy in this period.  NATO, the EU and the UN remain key 
organisations, whilst the Mediterranean and Latin America feature heavily in the 
areas of interest.  Risks, threats and risk multipliers similar to the 2011 Strategy 
reflect more contemporary thinking on security, with significant emphasis on 
human security aspects of risk multipliers.192  Where there is some change in the 
content of the two strategies is in the institutional response. In effect, the second 
Strategy does not indicate any major change in the priorities or content of the 
strategies but rather a shift in how the PP viewed the institutional response. 
The PSOE’s support (as opposition party) for the second Strategy in 2012/13 is a 
positive omen, as parts of Spain (as in other European countries) had become 
polarised following the economic downturn that beset EU states.  In this sense, 
security policy within the Strategies was less polarised than it had been for some 
time in Spain’s contemporary history and, although the rise of new parties 
threatened some of the consensus, this represented a new opportunity for 
harmony in foreign and security policy between the centre left (PSOE) and 
centre right (PP).  Considering the discord prompted by Aznar’s support for the 
                                                   
192 Climate change, demographic imbalances, poverty, inequality, ideological extremism and the 
misuse of new technology are seen as the six risk multipliers.  These reflect a departure from the 
traditional threats model and are relatively new factors in the context of wider national security 
strategies. 
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Iraq war, the debate over full integration within NATO in the 1990s and disputes 
over the US role in Latin America, Spain could now be regarded to have entered 
a period of some harmony in its security policy. 
Whilst on an initial level, there is little divergence between the content, direction 
and aim of the two Strategies, further investigation reveals indications of some 
change in the aim of strategy `that orientates the state’s action towards 
responding to current challenges by using the available resources flexibly and 
efficiently; a strategy that enhances our prevention’  (Government of Spain, 
2013, p.III).  In effect, Rajoy appeared to be aiming for a clearer prescriptive 
approach, with a focus on prevention as well as identification of threats and risks.   
Examining aspects of the 2013 Strategy, it becomes apparent that, not only is 
there a `presidential element’ in the Strategy, but there are also indications that 
the PP saw the publication of strategy as an opportunity for a national system 
that supported foreign and economic policy. At a time when the global-focussed 
Marca España193 policy was launched, this was felt to justify the insertion of 
comments such as  
“the counterterrorism practiced by Spain for decades has allowed it to gain 
considerable experience that is also valuable in addressing new terrorist 
threats.  The effectiveness of the Spanish model for managing terrorist 
threats gives our country prestige abroad….places it in an ideal position to 
provide considerable added value to international collaboration in 
counterterrorism” (Government of Spain, 2013, p. 26) 
This observation represents a controversial departure from the tone adopted by 
a Party that had struggled so patently with terrorism only a decade earlier.  Quite 
how Spain can acquire prestige from its experience in dealing with terrorism is 
potentially questionable, but does demonstrate that the PP identified an 
opportunity for national advancement through its anti-terrorism posture, one area 
that had been noticeably securitised compared to the PSOE approach. 
It is in the aspiration to promote Spain through strategy where there is also 
divergence from the 2011 document.  Coupled with the Marca España 
programme, and the export-led approach initiated at the end of the PSOE term, 
this means there is some convergence in the notion of security policy supporting 
broader objectives in national foreign policy.  Even though this may appear 
                                                   
193 Launched in 2012, the Marca España concept supported an export-led policy of branding Spain 
both in terms of not only tangible exports, but also tourism, national influence and sporting 
success.  This was effectively an attempt to raise Spain’s profile overseas and promote its 
products and appeal as a place to do business and visit. 
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uncontentious, it can be interpreted as a formal hierarchy of policy with elements 
of security being led by national priorities.  While the Security Strategy deals with 
national security, in this case it is also subordinated to an agenda that pushes 
Spain’s soft power and the economic agenda of the Marca España initiative. 
In these circumstances the logic behind a second security strategy might seem 
baseless from a PP standpoint, given the continuity between the two documents. 
Yet the insertion of comments on the opportunities presented by success against 
terrorism, and the idea of projecting Spain as very much a front-runner by 
claiming that 
`Changes and trends in the security environment, its dimensions, and the 
responses required to preserve it are factors that influence the vision of 
National Security. Spain is among the most advanced countries in this field ` 
(Government of Spain 2013, p.6) 
…illustrates that there is an attempt by the PP to draw a line under the events of 
Iraq and the train bomb attacks and develop a forward looking vision of security.   
It is certainly true that the terrorist attacks have undoubtedly had a lasting impact 
on Spain’s national culture, psyche and identity, and the detrimental effect on the 
PP was unprecedented.  Hence the attempts by Rajoy to draw a line under the 
impact of the Madrid bombing by acknowledging Spain’s success, although this 
also provides an insight into his own personal convictions that the PP deserved 
recognition  having made Spain `more secure’.  The personal dynamic of 
Mariano Rajoy’s role194 in pressing this line is less well-documented, but, as will 
be discussed in the next chapter, the input of Prime Ministers during the last 20 
years has been fundamental to an understanding of how the Strategies have 
evolved, and the institutions with them. 
The creation of a National Security Council in the 2011 Strategy, albeit identified 
from a decade previously, requires more analysis.   Chaired nominally by the 
Monarch195, but in practice by the Prime Minister, this forum brings together 
Ministries, the Head of the Armed Forces and in certain cases autonomous 
communities and other areas of the public sector.  This National Security Council 
                                                   
194 Although beyond the remit of this thesis, the National Security Law of 2015 that was approved 
by the Cortes bore the personal stamp of Rajoy.  Writing about the controversial law in El Mundo 
he argues `Spain is the third safest country in the European Union, seventh in the world”. Although 
this was not backed up in the article with official figures, there is an attempt to build a narrative 
around security delivered by the PP.  El Mundo (2015, p6). 
195  One of the quirks of the transition to democracy in Spain has been the role of the monarchy in 
military and strategic institutions.  Although nominally ceremonial, Juan Carlos, who was King until 
2013, chaired Defence Councils among other security duties and this continued with the 
developments in the National Security Strategy. 
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is quite an innovation, but how it delivers security is very much at the behest of 
the Prime Minister. 
Clausewitz’s `Remarkable Trinity’ and National Security Strategies 
Prussia’s 19th century military strategist appears an unlikely tool in analysing 
Spain’s Security Strategies and subsequent activity within a body such as the 
National Security Council.  Clausewitz’s most famous concept, his `Remarkable 
Trinity’ (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) explains the enduring way in which war can 
be explained through violent emotion `primordial violence’, chance —`the play of 
chance’ and rational calculation `war’s subordination as an instrument of policy’ 
(Howard and Paret, 1976) (see Fig. 1 below).   With three overlapping 
tendencies, the hypothesis behind the Trinity illustrates that force is not 
explained with one single dimension of a nation-state (which is often the case in 
a neo-realist construct).  It is an interaction where the decision behind the use of 
force (or war) is the product of interplay between society (the `primordial 
violence’), the military (the `play of chance’) and the rational state (`war’s 
subordination as an instrument of policy’).   
The idea of `primordial violence or passion’ reflecting mass-opinion often 
escalates the conduct or outcome of rational decisions by states or leaders to the 
point where they almost inevitably lose control or direction as a result of the 
ensuing public mobilisation. Furthermore, the Trinity could also be applied to 
enemies (state or non-state), allies, or even factions within an alliance.  In the 
modern environment, this Trinity of forces means that those committing force 
(assumed to be the executive) understand themselves the Trinity and its impact 
within their own nation-state and those of other actors or stakeholders in a given 
conflict. 
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Figure 12: Clausewitz’s Trinity 
Clausewitz’s `remarkable trinity’ (adapted from 
Clausewitz: a short introduction). 
 
The Rational State 
                       (the executive) 
 
Primordial 
Violence 
(Passion) 
 
       (public opinion)            (security forces) 
  
Play of 
Chance 
(the 
military) 
 
A perfunctory look at any modern nation-state in a range of conflict-type 
situations shows the attraction of what is a simple model.  Whilst realism 
focusses on the state, the actual interplay between state and non-state actors 
with its impact on `primordial passion’, and to a lesser extent the military, are 
increasingly conditioned by the role of national media and global information 
networks, as has been acknowledged by critical analysts such as Fierke (2007), 
among others.  In Spain, on a number of occasions public opinion and passions 
can be inflamed under certain conditions with a direct consequence for national 
policy (such as via the indignados movement).   
In the context of a security strategy, an approach of directing the apparatus of 
the state towards meeting threats felt most pertinent to the state, and the 
`passion’ of its people is a useful tool for understanding the essence of broadly 
promulgated security strategy.  In sum, the Trinity helps to account for policies 
and a strategy process that match expectations of a civil society, along with its 
resources and tools within the confines of its rational leadership’s (the PM’s) 
priorities.  Clausewitz further adds that this is further complicated by the 
presence of uncertainty and the difficulty of decision-making with incomplete 
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information196, which is again something else touched upon in the two Spanish 
Strategies. 
Clausewitz’s `Primordial Passion’ and National Security Strategy 
In considering Spain’s security, the Trinity can provide a simple analysis of how 
Spain’s security policy process has advanced in the 21st century.  More so than 
other societies in much of the European Union, Spain has a population that is in 
some ways politically engaged in national politics.  In a country where large-
scale political demonstrations have actively expressed opinion on issues of 
terrorism, austerity and foreign policy (for example, the Iraq invasion mobilised 
millions of Spaniards who demonstrated on the streets during a visit by President 
Bush) the `primordial passion’ can be seen quite easily.  As previously argued, 
popular mobilisation such as in the case of the indignados has had a profound 
effect on politics in Spain and mass opinion continues to influence the debates 
over separatism and identity.197  Therefore, in providing an understanding of the 
Clausewitzean passion of a nation-state’s citizenry, Spain represents a clear 
example of how opinion or Clausewitz’s primordial passion can play a role in 
policy. Clausewitz’s model may have been about the conduct and nature of 
war198, but as the concept of war itself has changed (towards being more a 
reflection of a situation of insecurity), it is by no means a significant departure 
from it to take the view that the conduct of policy and strategy around a wider 
security paradigm is itself subject to the unpredictability of the Trinity and 
incomplete nature of information available to the policy-maker. 
Uncertainty, Risks, Threats and Multipliers in Clausewitz’s Trinity. 
Clausewitz’s `play of chance’, whilst generally associated with the conduct of 
military campaigning, with its inherent uncertainty, opportunity and risk, also has 
a function in explaining national policy.  By adjusting away from the traditional 
focus on military depending on the interplay of chance, towards one of 
uncertainty and risk it is possible to capture the essence of hazards and 
                                                   
196 The Clausewitzean concept of `friction’ helps to account for information gaps, uncertainty and 
misinformation.  In other words, strategy and the use of force are inevitably subject to 
unpredictable factors. 
197 Mass demonstrations over NATO membership, the Gulf War of 1991 and the invasion of Iraq 
are all cited examples of foreign policy and the `primordial passion’.   
198 There is a major debate within circles over the changing character of war.  To summarise, UK 
academics (Gray, 2005) have argued that war itself is changing whilst conflict has enduring 
features.  In the context of Spain, the nature of the range of threats is considered the most 
significant driver of security policy and in this case change has been inevitable. 
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uncertainty as envisaged in `On War’.  As Spain’s 2013 National Security 
Strategy states: 
“today’s globalised world is constantly changing, owing to factors such as the 
constant shifting of power centres with the rise of new powers; the 
consolidation of new international actors; the greater ability of individuals to 
influence….and there are new risks and threats to address…and adding 
complexity to the risks and threats of the current strategic context are their 
cross-cutting impact on different State and social structures and actors" 
(Government of Spain, 2013, p.6). 
It is this complexity and uncertain change that are captured in Clausewitz’s 
notion of `chance’.  The concepts of risks, threats and multipliers — all 
addressed in both Strategies — illustrate the challenges of constructing a 
strategy which by definition requires “lines of action capable of providing 
comprehensive responses to current challenges” (2013, p.6), and in many cases 
this response could be undertaken by the Spanish state’s military or civilian 
(police) forces, although also, given the broadening of the concept, state 
agencies complement the role of military forces.199  `Play of Chance’ deals with 
those organisations involved with uncertainty such as the state’s military, police 
and other organisations who possess recourse to force.  These have to prepare 
for the uncertainty of risks and threats and be prepared to mitigate the effects of 
multipliers, often without having to resort to military acts or violence200 but while 
still retaining a dissuasive and traditional hard security function.  As the 2013 
Strategy states: 
`The use of our Armed Forces can prove essential in conflicts…Spain must 
maintain a credible and effective defence capability of its own” (Government 
of Spain, 2013, p.24) 
National Security Strategies of other states (such as the UK) offer little detail on 
the achievement of security through force or violence unless it relates to the 
most significant political or strategic requirement (a different example could be 
the UK’s nuclear deterrence). In Spain’s case though, alongside the Strategy but 
subordinate to them, appear the Defence Directives, effectively the response by 
the relevant Ministries.  In Clausewitzean terms, Spain’s most recent Security 
Strategy aims to reduce the uncertainties faced by the state through identifying 
(being clear about) what the threat is, how it could be exacerbated (or multiplied) 
                                                   
199 The UME, a unit tasked with delivering emergency response to civil disturbances, military 
attacks or natural disasters is an example of nascent security organisations in Spain. 
200 The Perejil (Parsley Island) incident of 2002 is a recent example of implied force (troops and 
military equipment) deployed in support of territorial recovery to achieve the political aims of 
recovering the disputed territory without bloodshed. 
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and what the state, its allies or agencies can do to mitigate or minimise the 
impact of this event.  This model is not specific to Spain and recent studies of the 
UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review have also focussed on the risk 
aspect of managing national security, albeit not through the concept of 
Clausewitzean risk (Cornish and Dorman, 2013). 
The `Rational Actor Executive’ and Spanish Strategy-making 
Clausewitzean theory sees the `instrument of policy’ as a rational actor playing 
an executive function (Howard 1976, p.89) within the modern state.  This actor 
determining national security policy is an extremely widespread concept in 
contemporary analysis.201  Realists for example, see the modern state as still the 
referent object headed by a national decision-maker (Hill 2003, p.56).   In the 
case of Buzan, who looks at the role of sectors in a national security context, this 
rational actor model appears an appealing way of analysing how a state (such as 
Spain) articulates a response to a range of sector-based threats and reflects 
modern political systems such as Spain’s, which is essentially pluralist. 
By drawing on the idea of the traditional rational actor (in the 19th century, 
normally a monarch), the notion of the executive captures the idea of rational 
policy-making.  Nowadays of course, the rational monarchy has become 
replaced by modern executives in elected governments, in Spain’s case by the 
Presidente del Gobierno (the Prime Minister), who, as argued in the final chapter 
of this thesis, very much determines the outputs of national security policy from 
his or her position in the Moncloa Palace. (Carnero Fernández and Frías in 
Pereira, 2010) Spain’s foreign and security policy is in effect a product of this 
political arrangement and is little different from in other western democratic 
models, where centralisation has been a feature in spite of a pattern of 
devolution in many other areas of policy, such as health care, welfare and 
education provision (Heywood, 1999, p.119). 
A centralised (modern) state where successive Prime Ministers have sought to 
expand influence in security policy (and generally succeeded) means that the 
role of the Trinity’s rational actor is helpful in understanding the part played by 
executives in democratic security policy. In nearly all modern societies, strategy 
has tended to come from an executive, and this is often required by, or directs, 
                                                   
201 Most analysis of national foreign and security policy inevitably focuses on the role of the 
executive and central foreign ministries.  This reflects the realist tradition in much of the academic 
work in this field.  
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the military and state institutions.  Indeed, the role of the rational actor in security 
policy is reinforced by the modern nation-state and the global environment as 
well as subject to the whims of public opinion.  How this has been influential and 
developed in contemporary Spain is discussed in the next chapter.   
Clausewitz’s `passion’, synonymous with citizenry and the impact of the reporting 
of events on broad swathes of opinion, is more than just reflected in modern 
Spain’s experience.  This was demonstrated on the occasion of Aznar’s decision 
to support the US invasion of Iraq, when popular opinion was bitterly opposed to 
this, but there was no outpouring of enthusiasm or passion for the war, which in 
Clausewitzean terms undermined the PP government’s involvement.  This 
current reached its climax with the political impact of the terrorist train bombing, 
where opinion turned against the PP in an unprecedented manner, which led to a 
politicised security policy within Spain that has persisted for almost a decade 
after the event and only seems to have abated somewhat with the passage of 
time and the cooperation seen in the production of two national security 
strategies. 
In contemporary security policy terms, the relationship between the executive 
(the `rational’) and civil society (the `passion’) remains a useful tool for analysing 
the conduct or reaction of policy in the context of perceived threats and risks in 
an age of information and rolling media.  The concept of the `speech act,’ 
(Carlsnaes et al., 2004) a rational, albeit cynical, attempt to generate popular 
political support drawing on the force of `passion’ is a good example of how 
Clausewitz’s ideas can influence present analysis in spite of the intervening 
space of some hundred and fifty years between the two concepts. Whilst the 
construction of national strategies has little to do with the more ambitious 
aspects of the `Speech Act’, the identification, selection and language relating to 
specific threats or risks could be seen as part of a narrative for preparing for 
possible future invocations of the process. 
With the exception of the support for the US war in Iraq, `speech acts’ have not 
featured significantly in Spain in response to terrorism.  Even so, with the 
increasing relevance of the issue of separatism in recent years a new threat to 
the integral model of Spain could see this matter looked at more closely.  As 
regards Spain’s regional position, the delicacy of relations with Morocco and 
North Africa, which are the most fraught of all Spain’s bilateral exchanges, mean 
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that avoiding escalatory language appears to be a norm at the national level.202  
Both the 2013 and 2011 Strategies barely mention Morocco, and ignore the 
troubled nature of Madrid-Rabat nations on issues such as trade, immigration 
and territorial disputes.  Instead, Mali is given prominence, with only opaque 
references to the sensitive issue of the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla.203  
In all these cases, the concept of ‘Clausewitzean passion’ in its incarnation as 
violent emotion is definitely not invoked with regards to regional sensitivities. 
In Spain’s 2013 National Strategy, the calls for the `involvement of civil society 
and fostering of a security culture’ (2013, p.54) can be seen as a way of bridging 
the chasm between the passions of popular opinion and the realities of modern 
security policy.  Arteaga argues that a knowledge gap on the part of Spanish 
citizens explains the contrast between “the desire to intervene in public opinion 
and aversion to assuming the costs needed for this” (2013, p.27). In interview he 
goes further and sees this as a reason for Spain’s sometimes inconsistent 
support for international intervention.  In 2011, during the overthrow of the Libyan 
regime, Spain’s support204 for the US-led coalition to overthrow Gaddafi 
contrasted with public opinion where military involvement was not seen to be 
popularly supported.  The 2013 Strategy goes further in this this regard, and a 
Strategic Line of Action was to `Foster defence awareness and culture as the 
basis for Spanish society’s support for National Defence, paying special attention 
to young people` (2013, p.40).  In a society where young voters in particular 
flocked to `new’ parties and appeared disenchanted with established parties, 
attempts to engage what is a volatile group of voters will be difficult to measure, 
but this indicates the apprehension of policy-makers in dealing with public 
opinion and security policy. 
What do National Security Strategies Tell Us about Security in Spain? 
Returning to the Constructivist approach of Katzenstein, who identified strategy 
[policy] as reflecting interests, identity and the cultural environment is that 
interests, identity and the cultural context feature prominently in the two 
                                                   
202 This differs from sub-national and regional narratives which, particularly in the south of Spain 
are at times hostile towards Moroccan and North African labour and agricultural products, have 
occasionally impacted at the national level. 
203 This contrasts with the issue of Gibraltar, which the 2013 Strategy unambiguously describes as 
an “anomaly [that] poses security problems to Spain and Europe” (2013, p.14), indicating a political 
security emphasis on the issue of the disputed territory.  
204  Military assistance focussed on military aircraft playing a supporting role in attacks on Libyan 
regime targets.  Madrid’s contribution was not extensive, being more political than military, and was 
not publicised widely in Spanish media as the PSOE government was wary of arousing political 
protests. 
 
150 
 
strategies.  Social factors appear to take on to challenge the traditional interstate 
approach of security.  However, the role of actors – which interviews and 
research identified as being undertaken by a rather closed circle, generally 
remained separate from broader society (see Fig 13). 
Fig 13:  A return to Katzenstein’s model. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
According to analysis of the Strategies (and in passing the DDNs) interests 
remain focussed on traditional matters, and this reflects the fact that although 
economic security, the welfare of society and environment degradation are 
addressed, few tangible outputs are provided to achieve the security in these 
non-traditional areas.  If we take the indignados as an `interest’ in the sense of 
the Katzenstein model, then these interests feature in strategy, but not policy.  Of 
interest in this debate is what has enabled interests and norms to change, and in 
this case, the impact of the economic crisis cannot be understated.  In effect, the 
cultural shifts that occurred in the 21st century, do feature in the two published 
NSS.   
Through the three components of strategy within the Spanish nation-state, 
Clausewitz’s model offers a way to understand the process in its contemporary 
security policy.  The role of the Prime Minister has become increasingly powerful, 
as reinforced by the 2013 Strategy, where the `rational actor’ role played by the 
executive is reinforced throughout the document as a final arbiter.  This reflects 
the position played by the PM at the time Mariano Rajoy who, as a former deputy 
Prime Minister and Interior Minister,205 drew on his experience in previous 
functions in his career to underpin his accumulation of expertise within the 
                                                   
205 Spain’s Interior Ministry has traditionally been a powerful body.  Covering a number of key 
functions it is perhaps the most significant actor in domestic counter-terrorism and therefore 
security. 
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Moncloa and create a strong central `rational’ and calculating figure in the 
establishment of security. 
That the executive plays such a significant role in foreign and security policy is 
not confined to Spain and the experience of a whole swathe of developed nation-
states has seen a centralisation of foreign and security policy (Hill, 2003, p.56 
and Carnero Fernández., A & Martín Frías, 2011, pp 641-649).  While this 
relates less closely to the Clausewitz theory, the utility of the model of a rational 
actor interacting with the forces of `chance’ and `primordial passion’ offers a 
framework in understanding this interaction.  
It is through the interaction between the `passion’ and the `rational’ aspects of 
the Trinity that Clausewitz makes his most useful contribution to an 
understanding of process behind Spain’s national security development.  The 
emergence of widespread and profound economic insecurity in the decade after 
2007, and the subsequent indignados movement of 2011, expanded a national 
domestic agenda in Spain that was captured in the zeitgeist or `passion’ 
embodied by organised social protest.  So effective was this mobilisation that 
subsequent policy-making and strategy recognises the importance of managing 
the impact of austerity and disenchantment in contemporary Spain.  The 2013 
Security goes so far as to state: 
`economic and financial insecurity is currently one of the main risks and 
threats, not only because of the political and social unrest it causes, but also 
because it fuels and reinforces other existing risks’ (Government of Spain, 
2013, p.27) 
The practical nature of the risks, threats and multipliers approach in the 
Strategies offers a framework for the role of the state (or the `rational’ in 
Clausewitz’s Trinity) in allocating resources to address the demands of 
uncertainty, risk and threats.  The difficult transformation undertaken by security 
agencies in modernising Spain’s ability to improve understanding can be seen 
through the reorganisation of national intelligence gathering.206  Although not the 
topic of analysis in this section, the need for the rational actor to be informed 
properly, as well as to limit damage from uncertainty and imperfect knowledge 
being channelled through actors in dealing with events, develops the idea that 
                                                   
206 See Arcos (2016) for an account of reform and restructuring of Spain’s intelligence service, 
where 2003-2013 is cited as a difficult decade for the Spanish intelligence agency.  Its impact is 
discussed in the final chapter on policy-making. 
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the Trinity’s aspect of chance resonates strongly in contemporary security policy 
in Spain. 
Summary.  Spain’s Strategy Process and Spanish Security-making? 
Spain’s strategy begins from a progression of `security’ that began with the 
Defence Directives in the 1990s and culminated in the Rajoy government’s 
publication of the second strategy in 2013.  The content of the strategies points 
to a significant reordering of security to include welfare, economic security and 
institutional restructuring to create a number of new bodies tasked with reporting 
to the Prime Minister, most notably a national security council, and a centralised 
and strengthened executive, who went on to claim later that Spain had become 
one of the most secure member states of the European Union. 
To understand constructivism alongside Clausewitz within Spain’s strategy 
process, it is necessary to consider the initial premise of the chapter which 
centred on the establishment of the current Spanish Security Strategy.  Whilst in 
hindsight the creation of the Strategy could be seen as a natural progression, 
previous attempts at articulating strategy in Spain (such as Gonzalez’s 
Decalogue on the NATO question in 1984) were highly divisive across the 
political spectrum, and also within political parties. This was also influenced by 
the prevalence of the view articulated by Arteaga (2003) that Spain did not 
possess a `strategic culture’ and a body of traditional literature focusses on the 
normalisation of Spain’s place in the world, based on interests and actors that 
adopted and moderated norms over a period of decades but did not generally 
engage with citizens, all this was underpinned by the prevailing norm articulated 
by Ortega y Gasset’s `Europe is the solution’. 
As argued previously, the economic crisis established a new economic security 
agenda (or constructivist interests) in Spain which reflected trans-national 
impacts and, in Spain’s case in particular, mobilised large numbers of voters and 
citizens in ways still playing out in Catalonia, the party political system and the 
centralised nature of Spanish policy making.   
Clausewitz’s `violent emotion’ or the `passion’ element of his Trinity 
encapsulates the force of popular opinion as an interest, and mobilisation is 
reflected strongly in the Spain’s security `environment’.  The willingness of its 
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citizens to mobilise on interests contrasts with countries such as the UK207, and 
in this sense, his model of three forces where the government strives to deliver 
rational, measured outcomes in the face of impassioned public opinion while its 
agencies face risk, threats, uncertainty or chance is an attractive model that can 
sit alongside constructivist approaches of Katzenstein et al. 
National ability to `strategise’ is reflected in the Security Strategy process.  The 
initial draft of the 2011 Strategy was, according to interviewees, an open and 
transparent process involving think-tanks, retired senior politicians and 
government staff.  Whatever faults the Strategy may have had, the attempt to 
draw in outside agencies was innovative and reflects a maturing of the think-tank 
sector in Spain.   A constructivist interpretation identifies this as not really 
addressing wider social issues or interests, and organisations that were 
accessed did not fully reflect the cultural environment.   
That the first Strategy (2011) was replaced in less than two years is not unusual.  
The PSOE under Zapatero was less enthused about a formal strategy than may 
have been imagined, and the domestic economic focus of the government 
perhaps proved a bigger issue for the state than originally anticipated.  Exactly 
as happened in the UK, the first Strategy was short-lived, and did not survive a 
change of Government.  It is this paper’s view that the 2011 Strategy was not so 
much a failure, but instead succumbed to the extraordinary events that impacted 
on Spain’s economy, political system and the Arab world in 2011.  In this sense, 
the fact that the PP adopted the process and produced its own Second Strategy 
along the same lines is perhaps testament to the relevance of the 2011 Strategy 
and Spain’s capacity to strategise. 
Of ultimate interest is whether Spain is any more secure as a result of the 
national strategy process.  This is a matter beyond the thesis, but what can be 
observed from research in Spain is that the entire process in the formulation of 
security policy is little known, understood or written about in Spanish academia.  
Literature and references are barely known about in the wider context and a 
recent review of Spain’s literature on foreign and security barely mentions the 
two documents. 
                                                   
207 The Iraq war did mobilise huge numbers to call for peace in the UK, but generally mass 
mobilisation is not seen as often in the UK when compared to Spain.  Protests in support for the 
anti-capitalist movements were nowhere near the scale of Spain or even other European countries. 
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This lack of engagement perhaps represents the most significant take-away 
where security policy in Spain is concerned.  As an elite-led activity, DDNs 
offered an approach as to how the Spanish state used to frame security, it 
remained barely understood outside actual policy-making circles with broader 
interests and norms only playing a part-peripheral role.  As in other nation-states, 
there is little public debate and one of the great constraints on Spain achieving 
any sense of an appropriate role in the world reverts back to its citizens having a 
particularly distant engagement with its foreign and security policy.  Even the 
state itself draws on the need to engage younger Spaniards in policy (as 
identified in the 2013 Strategy), but as research has encountered, scholars tend 
to shy away from in-depth debate on Spain’s security, potentially a reflection of 
the distance between Spain’s traditional security deliverers (the military, the 
police, the intelligence agencies) and civil society, perhaps, to draw on a tired 
cliché, a legacy of the Franco era.  Until there is a fuller engagement by broader 
interests, groups and actors in creating security then the culture of security 
remains a constricted focus, too centralised and at the whim of Prime Ministerial 
power to genuinely deliver security on behalf of the nation state. 
The interaction with the Spanish Parliament, the role of the NSC, and the input 
from traditional and non-traditional actors in the Strategy will all be key to 
understanding the development of strategy in Spain.  The following chapter 
addresses the process behind security and strategy in Spain. 
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Chapter 6 
Spanish Policy-Making: Executives and Security. 
In the light of examining Spain’s National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013, 
the thesis argues that Spain’s security appears to have undergone a 
centralisation towards the executive, with only a fragmented and disjointed 
contribution on the part of civil-society, interests and even culture.  This section 
deals with an examination of the three Prime Ministers during the period of study, 
and includes a discussion of the institutional arrangements and a `culture of 
security’.  I conclude that by looking at the period from a constructivist model, 
Spain’s evolving culture of security points to a reordering of norms and interests 
that will continue to define how Spanish society evolves its perception about its 
role in the world.  
“We have lived in isolation, and it is very difficult to change the psychology of 
isolation” (Felipe González in Zaldivar & Ortega, 1992, p. 127). 
Until the late 1990s any study of Spain’s security policy would have focussed on 
the withdrawal of Spain’s military from decision-making and politics in a society 
that had been dominated by its experience of civil war, dictatorship and 
separation from Western Europe.  By the end of the 1980s, Spain’s transition 
had evolved into a process of successful democratic consolidation, and in that 
sense it represented a model to emulate (Preston, 1986).  In contrast with Latin 
America’s regime transitions at this time, this was a particularly attractive notion 
across the Spanish-speaking world, but in many ways the studies obscured 
understanding of how security policy was viewed and constructed at this time.   
Works (Linz and Stepan (1996), among others) undertake detailed examination 
of the sociological aspects of Spain’s democratic process and the military’s 
return to the barracks, whilst those more concerned with the specifics of actual 
policy-making in Spain were fewer in number and rarely touched on foreign and 
security policy.208  The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) took much of the 
credit for the consolidation after the transition of the late 1970s.  Following its 
1982 election, the PSOE deepened the process of normalisation of foreign policy 
(and by implication security policy) with the attainment of EU membership, 
                                                   
208  The literature review in chapter one discusses much of the literature arising from the 
challenges in looking at Spain’s security and foreign policy, most political science works on Spain 
until the mid-1980s focussed on its democratic transition. 
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settled the question of NATO policy and opened up debates about the 
relationship with the United States.  
In terms of managing the military, Spain’s democratic consolidation is well 
documented.209  While there is some study of the institutions that played a part in 
this role (particularly the detail behind reform of the Defence Ministry), among 
other works a broader look at the policy-making process has been less evident.  
Among the other institutions, the monarchy’s role should not be underestimated 
during this process either.  While the relationship between Franco and the 
monarchy was certainly well documented, the role of Juan Carlos in the 1970s 
remained a topic of debate even into the 21st century.  Even so, as will be 
discussed later,210 there are still some aspects of the monarchy’s role that 
warrant closer inspection as regards policy-making. 
The 1978 Constitution and Spanish Security 
Although almost 40 years old, Spain’s constitution is useful as to the origins and 
fundamentals behind its prevailing political culture and in this case, guides the 
notion of the nation’s culture of security which effectively means that perceptions 
and beliefs about security have their roots in national culture. (Katzenstein, 
1996).  Ratified and approved by referendum three years after Franco’s death, 
the Constitution of 1978 has been seen as a cornerstone of Spain’s political 
settlement and consolidation of democracy.  The document codifies Spain’s 
security policy-making, making it an appropriate place to start, given its role in 
lending form to processes and structures.  
In the case of post-Francoist Spain, the Constitution was not merely an attempt 
to draw a line under the previous dictatorship and political polarisation, but also 
sought to reflect the contemporary world and environment that Spain was 
emerging into: the Cold War was blowing up again following a brief respite in the 
1970s, the then European Economic Community was starting to become a more 
significant global presence and, with Greece’s application to join it in the 
Mediterranean, the EEC was extending towards Spain in Europe’s south.  In 
short, this was a world that was very different from that which had seen Spain’s 
previous democratic era in the 1930s. 
                                                   
209  Former Socialist Defence Minister Narcis Serra (2010) and Preston’s Spain the EEC and 
NATO (1984) among others offer detailed discussion of the implications on Spain’s internal 
ordering of its military and society as part of the democratic consolidation. 
210 See Preston (2004) Juan Carlos: A People’s King and Juan Carlos of Spain by Powell (1996) 
for a discussion of the monarchy’s role in modern Spain.  
 
157 
 
Transition heralded a new generation of political activists and elites who had not 
endured the events of the 1930s or 1940s, and were receptive to the new 
overtures made by Brussels, Paris and Bonn.  This European influence 
associated with a social democratic template was not lost on Spain, where a 
model of borrowing policy and structures has even now withstood the test of time 
(Security Strategy is one example).  Heywood (1995 and 1999) argues that 
Spain’s Constitution was based on the post-war West German equivalent, with 
an emphasis on stability and consensus, although other features indicate a 
French or UK model of policy-making.  Whatever lay behind the dynamics of the 
1970s that drove Spain’s transition, the long-term security and stability of Spain 
in the 21st century was evidently impossible to anticipate that far back.  Even so, 
the political arrangement of the 1970s has certainly influenced the policy process 
today, yet despite this a lot of the literature focuses on the journey and positivist 
notions rather than the particular features of policy. 
The 1978 Constitution remains fundamental to the functioning of foreign and 
security policy, whereas in other areas there has been significant evolution away 
from the model of a centralised Spain towards the autonomous communities, 
particularly with regards to health, education and regional development.  In the 
case of security and foreign affairs, Spain’s model is essentially unitary (see 
Heywood, 1995, and/or Ross, 2017).  Although on some issues (sub-national 
governance) the Constitution has become rigorously questioned, in matters 
pertaining to foreign and security policy, the constitutional provisions have 
remained unchanged. 
There are six articles in the 1978 Constitution that deal with the issue of security 
or foreign policy.  
Figure 14: Spain’s Constitutional Articles related to Security  
(Annotated and created by author.) 
 
Constitutional 
Article 
What the Constitution 
says/indicates 
Remarks 
Article 56 
The King211 is the Head of 
State. 
This is similar to other European 
monarchies (UK, Netherlands) 
                                                   
211 The King is always referred to in the Constitution rather than the Monarchy or the Crown. 
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Article 63 
The King can declare war or 
make peace following 
authorisation from the Cortes. 
This reinforces the role of the 
monarchy over the use of 
military force. 
Article 97 
The government directs 
domestic and foreign policy, 
civil and military administration, 
and the defence of the state.  It 
exercises executive and 
statutory authority in 
accordance with the 
Constitution and the law 
A reinforcement of the 
executive, but also maintains the 
pre-eminence of the 
Constitutional and legal process. 
 
Article 149 
The government holds the 
competency  to conduct 
international relations 
Whereas other areas of policy 
have seen the input of 
Autonomous Communities into 
policy, this remains the sole 
competency of the central state. 
Preamble 
The Spanish nation desires to 
establish justice, liberty and 
security, and to promote the 
well-being of all its members. 
Whilst relatively innocuous and 
common, this provides for 
aspects of the human security 
debate of the Zapatero 
government 2004-11. 
Article 17 
Every person has a right to 
freedom and security. 
 
 
The prominence of Spain’s monarchy in recognising and celebrating the 
military’s role in Spain’s stability and security reflects the sensitivities of Spain’s 
political and conservative groups in defence of the nation-state.  Article 56 of the 
Constitution reinforces the role of the King as Head of State and Article 63 also 
stipulates that it is the King who declares war or makes peace following 
authorisation from the Cortes.  This effectively secures a more than ceremonial 
role for the Monarchy in Spain in the post transition period and points to a role in 
defence and security, as was borne out by events in February 1981’s failed coup 
attempt.212 
The actual term security features on two occasions as a distinct concept in the 
Constitution: the preamble where we have “the Spanish nation, desiring to 
establish justice, liberty and security, and to promote the well-being of all its 
members”, (BOE, the Spanish State Gazette 1978, p.7).   In turn, Article 17.1 
underscores this by stating that “every person has a right to freedom and 
security” (BOE 1978, p.12).  
                                                   
212 The coup failed, in part due to the prompt actions of the King, who denounced the action on TV 
and refused to countenance any support for it.  (Preston 1986, p.201) 
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In sum, Spain’s 1978 Constitution projects the prevailing atmosphere of the 
nation-state transitioning to democracy on a European social democratic model 
of the state’s functions.  The role of the Prime Minister appears to be somewhat 
glossed over (perhaps reflecting the tensions over the executive’s powers at that 
moment in time).  As Muñoz-Alonso argues:  
“la distinción entre aprobar, que es la competencia del Congreso de los 
Diputados, y la de acordar, que corresponde al Gobierno, se nos antoja poco 
elaborado, discutible y hasta contradictoria”  (Muñoz-Alonso, 2010, p.669)213 
Nevertheless, in line with other developed nations and their democratic 
development, the centralisation of power and the assertion of the Prime 
Minister’s role has been a commonly-seen phenomenon around the world, where 
executives have generally centralised power, most notably in security and 
foreign policy.214  As will be discussed later in this chapter, the role of institutions 
with regard to policy, response and accountability is a recurring theme in 
security, foreign and defence policy. 
Presidentialism in Spain’s Foreign and Security Policy 
 “The Spanish Prime Minister has actually the status of president…he 
occupies a powerful position and is placed hierarchically above his ministers” 
(Soetendorp, 1999 p.61). 
As previously outlined, one of the key aspects of Spain’s `culture of security’ is 
the persistence of Presidentialism in security and foreign policy making (see 
chapter 2).  Whilst the Constitution offers a decreed outline for the arrangements 
for power distribution in security (and other) policies within the political system, 
many commentators and sources have reinforced the idea of successive PMs 
asserting power following the Spanish transition Van Biezen, (2007).  Pereira 
(2010, p.698) identifies the dismissal of Foreign Minister Morán by the PM 
González in 1985 as an early indication of excessive subordination of Spain’s 
Foreign Ministers to the Executive.215  Furthermore, the 1986 referendum on 
Spain remaining within the NATO alliance saw González as Prime Minister 
                                                   
213 “The difference between approving, which remains the competence of the lower house of 
parliament, and agreeing, which is in the gift of the government, seems poorly developed, 
debatable and even contradictory”  El Papel de las Cortes en la política exterior de España in 
Pereira  (Pereira,  2010). 
214 The notion of the Imperial Presidency was coined in the late 1960s to illustrate the growing 
influence and power of US Presidents in international security.  In the 1970s the UK recognised the 
concept of elected dictatorship, and in the 1980s and 1990s these trends were visible elsewhere. 
215  The first PSOE foreign minister Morán was known to be a `third-worldist’ and was popular 
among Spain’s Left. His support for Arab causes was seen as difficult to reconcile with the shift 
towards Europe and Atlantic postures, and as a result he clashed with figures who wanted a close 
relationship with NATO and the US. 
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perform a spectacular U-turn on the matter. In spite of deep misgivings within his 
own party, the Spanish left in general and contrary to his own earlier positions, 
this successful volte face by González demonstrated the leeway that a Spanish 
Prime Minister could deploy at that time (Camiller, 1986).  As will be shown, 
similar latitude was seen in the adoption of a staunchly Atlanticist approach by 
Aznar in 2001, demonstrating that Spain’s political system can be susceptible to 
significant and often unexpected shifts in strategy. 
An able and charismatic PM such as González showed it to be possible to make 
far-reaching shifts in policy with limited recourse to his own party or the 
institutions of government, often in the short and even medium term.  EU 
membership, after Spain’s accession in 1986, also deepened this autonomy as, 
institutionally, the European Council (effectively the Heads of Government) 
grants significant power to individual executives in EC (now EU) decision-
making, and in a political system such as Spain’s, which is devoid of 
Eurosceptism, EU decision making and Treaties are generally accepted and 
endorsed by voters and parties with very few problems in contrast to what occurs 
in other EU states. EU membership can therefore be said to sustain the 
centralisation of power in the Spanish executive. 
EU summits, treaty negotiations (such as Maastricht in 1992) and deal-making 
were an unparalleled opportunity for González to demonstrate his skill as a voice 
for Spain and the Mediterranean.  As Southern Europe’s second largest EC/EU 
member-state González developed significant respect for his ability and length of 
time in office to gain the confidence of powerful European leaders.  Spain’s 
experience of transition and consolidation of democracy was furthermore 
promoted as a selling point following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and its 
opening up to the West, as was argued by the proliferation of think-tanks and 
academics who promoted a Spanish model.  As Prime Minister, González 
achieved significant gains in cachet for Spain’s profile in the early 1990s, while 
also not only committing Spain to UN peacekeeping missions around the world 
(with the added prestige this brought with it for Madrid in the Americas and 
Africa), but also making tangible gains for Spain during the Maastricht Treaty 
discussions on the European Union that have continued to reap benefits even 
well into the 21st century.   
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The previously-cited example of Spain’s direct transfers from the Cohesion 
Fund216 led to increased EU funding as part of an arrangement whereby 
Mediterranean member-states did not oppose pre-accession aid for the former 
Eastern bloc countries and discussions with them, which demonstrated some of 
the paradoxes of Spain’s posture.217  However, González was able to exploit his 
personal authority (and popularity) by conducting policy outside the constraints of 
power (Kennedy, 2013). 
However, the 1990s showed that, after a decade in power, González and the 
Socialists had begun to expose the limitations and downsides of an inadequately 
constrained executive.  The highly controversial GAL case (GAL meaning 
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación –anti terrorist freedom groups) 
demonstrated perhaps the greatest abuse of power by the PSOE administrations 
and, coupled with a number of corruption scandals and sharp economic 
recession, saw the bridling of the government’s lack of restraint following the 
inconclusive Parliamentary elections of 1993, where the PSOE was forced into 
coalition with nationalist groupings.  Whilst this may have tempered the activities 
of González’s ambitions and even threatened his legacy, it demonstrated that a 
Spanish PM can abuse power when supported by a strong Parliamentary party.  
Apart from one or two measures taken at the time, little was done to alter the 
institutional arrangements of executive Presidentialism and this remains a 
recurring feature of Spain’s security and foreign policy model. 
This thesis is not the place to explore González’s legacy for Spain, however, his 
role as a successful PM depended on his personal authority, charisma and 
weakness of constraints upon him.218  Spain’s Constitution is not the sole reason 
for this Presidentialism, as much of it reflected the personal characteristics of 
González and Spain’s successful integration into Europe, combined with an 
environment that supported the PSOE’s actions.  In short, the Socialists under 
González facilitated the contemporary `culture of security’ – that of a strong 
executive in some ways constrained by an incoherent mobilisation by interests 
on issues of foreign and security policy.  The PSOE’s defeat in the 1996 election 
                                                   
216 See chapter 4 with regard to the importance of the Cohesion Fund. This still constituted a vital 
part of Spain’s public infrastructure investment 25 years after its inception. 
217 There was a threat to Spain’s financial benefits of membership (as a poorer EU state) as a 
result of enlargement to the former Communist east.  Traditionally poor, relatively backward, but 
enjoying political influence in Germany, meant that for Spain, EU enlargement presented a zero-
sum game where wealth transfers, investment and EU aid would be diverted from the EU’s existing 
Mediterranean member states to funding the integration of Eastern Europe. 
218 Even 20 years after retiring, Felipe González is accepted as a powerful, influential, even divisive 
figure in Spain’s politics, holding enormous sway within the PSOE, the media and the nation-state.  
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led to an expectation of a different approach by the Popular Party’s José María 
Aznar, but, this `culture of security’ was mobilised by the PP’s actions, showing 
that although a leader can shift the direction of national agenda, in conflict with 
entrenched interests and passionate (almost Clausewitzean) opinion carries 
significant risk. 
José María Aznar, The Partido Popular and Spain’s Security 1996-2004 
“The Popular Party has successfully strengthened Spain’s influence and 
weight on the international scene.  Spain today enjoys a prestige and 
international credibility which corresponds to the effort which has been put in” 
(Partido Popular 2004 election flyer cited in Kennedy, 2013, p.181) 
The electoral success of the Partido Popular (PP) in 1996 under the leadership 
of José Maria Aznar would inevitably change the socialist presidentialism of the 
previous 14 years.  Following the departure of González from Spain’s political 
system, it was only inevitable that change would occur, but it was hard to identify 
what form this might take at the outset.  The first four years in office (1996-2000) 
revealed a dual approach and, according to some, was marked by 
underachievement (Gillespie, 2002, pp 28-29).  Aznar adopted a significant 
change in posture as regards international security and alliances, while forging 
ahead with an enthusiastic pursuit of integration into the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) programme.  However, despite the lack of a clear Parliamentary 
majority, this period was notable for Aznar’s style of leadership and subsequent 
events that would shape Spain’s security stance in the new millennium.  Spanish 
society in this period did not undergo radical change, nor did the international 
scene radically shift in any marked way prior to 9/11. 
The pro-US Atlantic posture adopted by Aznar’s PP, before, and on assuming 
office, articulated that international security could be achieved by promoting a 
position at odds with the PSOE’s European-led approach (Arteaga, 1999, p.83).  
By developing a security approach that ran counter to the EU-led consensus of 
deepening foreign and security policy (namely through the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty),219 Aznar followed the approach of Tony Blair’s government: Spain not 
only could identify with European economic security (through trade and 
prosperity), but also embrace an Atlantic security model that underpinned the 
nation-state through proximity to US military power.  This approach however paid 
                                                   
219 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made significant progress in developing the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, this in itself was a product of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
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only lip service to deeper Spanish concerns about aligning more to the US and 
appeared to have little support among wider interests in Spain. 
Aznar’s new Atlanticism relished a closeness with Washington in the form of 
summits, US Presidential endorsement and media events.  In spite of the EU’s 
progress in developing treaties and adopting a more tangible security posture 
(such as its Common Policies and later Security Strategy), for the PP 
government, a public image of Aznar enjoying close ties to the USA was as 
important to Spain’s security as the single currency was in helping to assure 
Spain’s economic security, not to mention in generating significant benefits from 
investment, job creation and wealth transfer (see Arteaga, 2009). 
In addition, the EMU project demanded changes in economic governance, with 
reinforcement in the form of the Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, or 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, see Heywood, 1999, p.113).  The so-called 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria220 required rigorous management of debt and 
public spending that would eventually curtail the activities of previously high-
spending ministries.  Heywood (1999, p. 113) argues that this meant significant 
sway over ministries was now exerted by the all-powerful Ministry of Economy 
and Finance in support of the executive.  This executive dominance appeared 
vindicated, as Spain successfully joined the single currency as a founder 
member in 1999, cementing its aspiration to join the European inner core which, 
coupled with consistent growth, meant a second term for the PP was achieved 
on a platform of financial and economic success and not Atlantic-foreign and 
security policy. 
The second PP term under Aznar, like that of other leaders of the time, has 
become judged on his stance over support for the US War on Terror and 
invasion of Iraq in 2001-2003.  Much has been written about the decision of the 
PP government to support this war (see chapter 3).  In some ways Aznar’s 
decision has been depicted as unprecedented and an abuse of power by political 
opponents (particularly with the benefit of hindsight).  Yet in retrospect his first 
                                                   
220  The Maastricht Convergence Criteria demanded inflation reduced to a strict margin above the 
best-performing member states, Debt to GDP ratio of no more than 60% and lower interest rates 
(no higher than 2% above the lowest member state rates). In effect this was a fiscally conservative 
programme designed to reduce debt and spending by weaker economies prior to monetary union.  
It was never popular with labour movements, Unions, and many on the left due to its strict targets 
on public spending, in some ways this was the start of the `disconnect’ between monetary union’s 
demands and public opinion. 
 
164 
 
term in office from 1996 indicated that his approach and method was not so out 
of the ordinary.   
A sign that the Spain’s security posture was to shift under Aznar came with the 
formal negotiation and accession of Spain into NATO’s Integrated Military 
Command (IMC)221 relatively quickly after election in 1996.  Rapidly, frustration 
with the Paris-Berlin axis soon emerged, while the PP leadership wholeheartedly 
supported nearly all of the European agenda, on issues of the Franco-German 
cooperation,222 antiterrorism, and relations with the US and Latin America, 
Aznar’s PP quickly established a different stance, removed from that of the EU 
members, but also distinct from Spanish political culture. 
It is the assertion of this thesis that Aznar’s personality was a fundamental factor 
in the state’s shift away from long-standing tendencies in its security posture.  
Although the PP government supported monetary union, Aznar and his circle 
were simultaneously seeking positions with the US that were more Atlanticist in 
outlook.  Policy towards Cuba was an area where Aznar hardened Spain’s 
attitude in favour of Washington.  Communist Cuba had traditionally been an 
area where Spain had sought a more progressive foreign policy at odds with the 
Franco regime’s clear anti-communism.  The US Helms-Burton Law (1995), 
which was designed to dissuade trade away from regimes Washington 
considered hostile, provides us with a good example of the PP’s shift: while for 
Spain’s left, Helms-Burton represented US diplomatic aggression, the issue of 
Cuba’s human rights (and US benevolence) was seen by the Aznar government 
as overriding longer term concerns of Hispanidad (Spanishness) that resonated 
among a number of (often younger) Spaniards. 
The PP government’s support for US bombings in Iraq in the winter of 1998 was 
also indicative of this shift.  Whereas France, Germany and other EU states had 
significant reservations about the action, Aznar’s administration supported it and 
allowed the use of Spanish airspace and facilities for the attacks.  This would 
have been impossible a decade earlier and reflected the prevailing interests of 
Spain at this time.223 While the US and UK drew on UN Security Resolutions, 
                                                   
221 Spain’s military would come under command and control of NATO allies in certain 
circumstances and committed Spain to maintain and uphold roles within the Alliance. 
222 This tended to focus on the direct interests of France and Germany, such as enlargement 
towards the East, north European agricultural matters and central European military security. 
223 In 1986 Spain refused to support US airstrikes against Libya and in 1989 voted against US in a 
UN motion.  There is a long documented history of Spanish autonomy in the face of US military 
activity.  
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which other major powers in Europe opposed, this was not lost on Spain’s 
opposition parties, who saw this as a fissure in Europe’s hesitant attempt at a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that was further underlined by the 
tensions over NATO’s divisions and US posture towards the Balkans. 
Therefore, as previously discussed (Chapter 3), Aznar’s proximity to Bush 
(elected at the end of 2000) was not without precedent.  Backing for the 
Republican Helms-Burton Law against Cuba, political and logistic support for 
attacks on Iraq in 1998 and a cooling towards the Franco-German axis indicated 
that, nationally, the state was positioning itself in favour of a more transatlantic 
alliance.  This was as a consequence of both Aznar’s personal outlook and the 
experience of terrorism, though also a sense that Europe was not actively 
concerned with Spain’s security needs, while tangible gains such as missile 
defence offered by US programmes such as AEGIS224 meant that, not only was 
there an ideological affinity, but there were also practical hard security (mainly 
military) benefits to be had for Spain but these would be difficult to square in 
Spain’s security culture. 
Hard Security vs Civil Society’s Perceptions 
In terms of domestic security, for the PP at the start of the millennium the 
persistence of ETA was clearly the main security threat within Spain, whereas 
the greatest risk would be failure to join the single currency as a founding 
member.  Whilst these were not controversial for Spanish society and reflected 
broad opinion, security in Spain during the eight years of the Aznar government 
was represented by hard security, along traditional, military lines, combined with 
the promotion of national economic success through membership of the EMU 
and other European institutions, neither of these were popularly challenged, and 
it was only with Bush’s inauguration and subsequent escalations of 9/11 that the 
disconnect with Spanish public opinion became apparent.  
Aside from the terrorist attack, the election defeat of the Partido Popular in 2004 
can be attributed to policy positions adopted as a consequence of the style of 
Aznar’s governance.  While shifts in security and foreign policy are to be 
expected with a change of government, with the exception of full NATO 
                                                   
224 AEGIS was a ship base system that can defend against ballistic missiles.  Long a concern in 
the Maghreb with Algeria and Libya possessing missile systems and Libya occasionally launching 
them towards Italy.  Spain witnessing SCUD missile use against Saudi and Israeli cities in 1991 felt 
itself vulnerable (and still does) with large Spanish cities in the reach of such weapons (interview 
with Juan Moliner (Defence official) 2011). 
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integration in 1997, most of the significant changes of position lacked 
widespread support.225  In the case of the US’s war on terror this meant 
disregarding a mass-mobilisation of Spanish public opinion in a political system 
where suspicion of the US and its military is a norm.226  Even within the Partido 
Popular, whilst many welcomed Aznar’s closeness to Bush, elements within the 
PP required evidence of benefits from the arrangement.227   
Although an important trading partner of Spain, few Spaniards were unlikely to 
witness the benefits of closening to Washington, US commerce was dwarfed by 
Spain’s trade with EU countries.  The 2002 Defence Agreement (see Chapter 3) 
may have held some tangible gains for Spain, but these were still in specific 
areas such as technologies and infrastructure.  Traditionally, the PP had at times 
looked beyond Europe for political and financial inspiration, and some were 
drawn to the US economic model, which contrasted with that of Europe or Spain, 
in a country where the number of Spanish speakers outstripped even those living 
in Spain, therefore interests in a closer relationship with the US were not 
unreasonable from certain perspectives. 
Evidence shows little enthusiasm within the PP’s membership for Aznar’s 
posturing over the support for Bush in the build up to the invasion of Iraq.  Whilst 
Spain’s opposition had mobilised against the war (see Chapter 3), the PP’s 
support base was less eager to express its backing for such controversial policy.  
In foreign and security policy, Aznar continued the trend of Presidentialism.  
Intergovernmental summits, so attractive under his predecessor González, were 
continued and in some ways expanded, with a prestigious NATO summit in his 
first term followed by bilateral summits with countries such as France, Italy and 
the UK, extending through to very high profile summits under European 
Presidency in 2002 and, most notoriously, in the Azores, where Aznar stood 
alongside Blair, Bush and his Portuguese counterpart prior to the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq.  Sources (Elordi, 2003) and interviews point to Aznar having a close 
focus on personal relationships, with Blair and Bush in particular, which 
contrasted with the less cordial arrangements with Germany’s Schroeder and 
France’s Chirac respectively.  In effect, Aznar’s personality and face to face 
                                                   
225 Even at the time of the 1997 full integration, opinion was more indifferent to NATO than positive 
or negative on Spain’s membership. 
226 See Chapter 3, for an explanation of the mass mobilisation on this matter. 
227 Interview with Rafael Bardaji, Feb. 2017. 
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relations as in many countries foreign and security policy (Hill, 2003, p. 53) 
played a significant role in the PP’s strategy at this time.  
On balance, the PP and Aznar’s approach, of security delivered through Atlantic 
ties, contrasted with the more visible economic security opportunities offered by 
EMU and closer monetary integration.  This contrast was brought into relief by 
the Perejil dispute of August 2002, where Europe’s institutions were not seen as 
effective in assisting Spain’s case.   
The 2002 Perejil Crisis – An Analysis 
As identified during chapter 3, the North African coast has Europe’s last few 
territorial enclaves, consisting of the Spanish Autonomous Communities of Ceuta 
and Melilla, as well as islets such as Perejil.  In spite of EU membership, there 
was limited security provided in the traditional sense.  In particular, French 
interests were seen as being at odds with Spain’s, with suggestions that Paris 
tacitly backed Morocco’s claim.  With Perejil physically in the hands of Morocco’s 
military, which posed a clear situation for Spain, the occupation of its uninhabited 
territory was not a direct matter for NATO, as the territories were not included in 
Article V of the Alliance charter.228   
Aznar’s reaction was conditioned by two key audiences- Spanish public 
opinion229 that was almost Clausewitzean in its response (see Chapter 5) and 
that in Morocco, external to Spain’s cultural environment, where elites and public 
feeling rallied against a European former power (Larramendi 2003).  Morocco 
has traditionally struggled diplomatically (and economically) with Spain, having 
had a long history of intervention, colonisation and regional disputes including a 
fractious argument over fishing and agricultural goods entering the EU through 
Spain.  In Andalusia, where tensions have been most evident, the rioting and 
unrest in El Ejido (see chapter 3) inflamed tensions even further.  In effect, 
Perejil represented an unprecedented security challenge for Spain at the start of 
the millennium, with implications for international standing, domestic stability and 
future policy direction. 
                                                   
228 Article V of the 1949 NATO treaty commits members to defending each other’s territories in the 
North Atlantic area.  This did not extend to territories outside a clearly defined area which meant 
that the Spanish territories were not included (and fuelled Spanish indifference to the Alliance). 
229 According to El Mundo newspaper, 92% of Spaniards supported the military operation by 
Madrid.  www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/21342365.stm, [accessed 15 August 2009]. 
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Returning to the constructivist focus on the cultural environment, Spain’s 
troubled withdrawal from its North African colonies after 1945230 has had direct 
relevance for 21st century security.  Military-led campaigns to liberate Spanish 
territories were a humiliation for the Franco dictatorship, with the last territory 
(Spanish Sahara) being ceded while Franco lay on his death-bed in 1975.  In 
spite of Madrid’s assertions that Ceuta and Melilla have had links to Spain from 
the end of the 15th century, to Morocco the territories represent colonial vestiges. 
Perejil demonstrates the challenges to former colonial powers under European 
collective security.   Whilst EU membership technically offered Aznar’s Spain 
security and credibility in financial markets, as well as cooperation in foreign and 
security policy, in the matter of Perejil (and Morocco), historical sovereignty 
disputes were a challenge not regularly experienced by the EU membership.231  
Spain’s EU status did not deter Morocco from its non-violent seizure of Perejil 
following a sharp deterioration of diplomatic relations after 2001. 
Although only a short-lived confrontation, Spain’s handling of the Perejil dispute 
indicated the Aznar administration’s style and realist `culture of security’ at that 
time.  That the EU’s role was downplayed indicated a nationalist approach, 
reflecting popular opinion which mobilised quite rapidly against Morocco’s 
incursion.  Drawing on confidential interviews232 indicated a crisis management 
approach taken by Aznar, with a hard line taken against Morocco as well as the 
French government for its alleged support for Morocco’s actions. 
Re-elected with a majority strengthened Aznar’s hand in his security model, his 
dependence on nationalist parties within the Chamber of Deputies (the lower 
House) was removed, offering enjoy leeway in day-to-day governance, 
reinforcing a model of Presidentialism.  It is hard to predict what would have 
been different if Aznar had relied on coalition support in 2002, but the events of 
2003-4 are fundamental to perceptions of Spain’s approach to security in the 
modern era.  A combination of Aznar’s resolution to support the Iraq invasion, 
the groundswell of public engagement against the decision, and the subsequent 
                                                   
230 This consisted of a series of military skirmishes and occupations by Moroccan troops over a 
number of decades. There is little written on this matter, as it has been viewed as a humiliation for 
Spain’s military and government under Franco. 
231 The 1982 Falklands War between the UK and Argentina offers a very similar parallel although 
the physical fighting was a significant escalation from the Perejil example. 
232 Interviewees requested not to be cited on this matter, but highlighted the executive’s role in key 
decisions and how certain ministries were marginalised in favour of Aznar and a small coterie of 
Ministers, tensions with France were a notable (and sensitive) feature on this matter. 
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handling of the Madrid train bombing undermined the Presidential model of 
policymaking in Spain, with effects still being seen today. 
Aznar’s legacy did not just weaken a Washington-focussed security model, but 
also that of the strong executive.  Not only was the outcome of such policy a 
failure, but also the way in which Spain became fundamentally aligned towards 
the US in defiance of public opinion, was responsible for such a shift.  In 
hindsight ruptures with long standing norms in Spain’s international standing 
offered little to broad swathes of voters or groups but reflected an over-
centralised executive; many `interests’ in Spain had been unconvinced by the 
PP’s approach, and whilst this may not have led to the PP’s defeat in 2004, 
which was due to the handling of the Atocha bomb, the connection in voters’ 
minds with Iraq seriously impacted Spain’s standing as a credible presence on 
the military and peacekeeping agenda. 
José Luis Zapatero and the PSOE Approach to Security 2004-11 
“An accusation made about Rodriguez Zapatero is that he not only failed to 
increase Spain’s profile on the international stage, but also appeared to have 
little interest in the foreign policy sphere”  (Kennedy, 2013, p.179) 
For a government elected after one of Spain’s most traumatic election incidents 
in modern history, the terrorist attack and bitter recriminations led to the 
unexpected victory by the PSOE and overshadowed almost a decade of security 
policy.  Their platform of immediate withdrawal from Iraq meant that the 
perception of security remained contested between the main parties, and this, 
marked the debate for the first decade of the millennium.  Zapatero and the 
PSOE conducted a significant shift away from the PP’s enthusiastic embrace of 
Atlanticism, but it was less apparent what this entailed, as Kennedy argues. 
By politicising the Iraq conflict, Zapatero identified advantages in harnessing 
significant elements of Spanish popular opinion.  Zapatero’s first well-publicised 
act in power (the day after assuming office) was to order the return of Spanish 
troops from Iraq.  Later, during a fractious debate in the Spanish Parliament, he 
went on to denounce the PP’s posture, claiming it infringed international law and 
lacked a UN Resolution, this also reiterated public opinion’s vocal opposition and 
alleged that Parliament’s consensus had been broken. (Revista Española de 
Defensa, 2004, p.34) 
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Politicisation of Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq by Zapatero233 meant that, just as 
the Atlantic posture of the PP government had marked Spain’s security after 
1996, Spain’s security under the PSOE was dominated by a European and 
multilateral model, and what some argued was an unclear agenda.234  However, 
the most striking outcome was the implication for Spain’s relationship with the 
US, which took grave offence at the nature of Spain’s withdrawal from its 
coalition.  It is the contention of this section that Zapatero’s approach to security 
was more than a simple politicisation of the PP’s disastrous intervention with the 
US, in that it also offered a more domestic human security agenda that perhaps 
afforded society protection in a way that traditional models do not recognise. 
Whatever the case, the government reiterated a commitment to international 
legality and legitimacy. 
“Spain will assume its international obligations to defend peace and security.  
This we will do always, with just one condition: actions must be based on a 
prior decision by the United Nations or another competent international body” 
PM Zapatero (Kennedy, 2013, p.185). 
It is the PSOE government’s approach after its election that conditioned analysis 
of Spain in this period. The cooling of ties with Washington received most 
attention.  What is overlooked however,235 is that a different emphasis was 
adopted by the government, which went on to focus on domestic and broader 
aspects of `security’.  This is not to contend that there was no external security 
focus on the part of the Zapatero government, but instead a different emphasis 
emerged. This meant adopting aspects from the human security agenda, while 
also shifting away from the state as being the referent object towards a focus on 
individual or citizen-oriented aspects of security.   
It is more appropriate to view Zapatero’s (2004-2011) term in office as drawing 
on a domestic approach as its security agenda, with the government pursuing a 
social justice model centred on entrenched social problems within Spain, such as 
youth unemployment, and on innovative ideas relating to issues such as sex and 
gender equality.  These reflected a renewed preoccupation with social and 
human aspects of security but, given Spain’s strong Catholic conservative 
constituency, such an approach was not to be taken lightly, and whilst not the 
subject of this thesis, the bitter ideological battle over gender and sex equality 
                                                   
233 Interview with Rafael Bardají, Feb 2017. 
234 Interview with Felix Arteaga, Feb 2017. 
235 For the most part, analysis centred on traditional military aspects of the relationship.  The 
Elcano Institute’s Global Presence Index sees Spain’s military as traditionally not a multiplier of 
influence. 
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perhaps explains why the issue of `security’ has been less prominent a topic 
among commentators on the Zapatero years. 
Whereas some (Joyce, 2007, Arteaga 2017) have argued that Zapatero did not 
have a coherent approach to a security strategy, the 2004-8 period actually 
represented a significant reordering of ‘broader’ security priorities that more 
closely reflected Spain’s cultural environment. As argued in the previous chapter, 
civil society or aspects of the `Clausewitzean passion’ (primordial violence) in 
Spanish society were a product of a political disdain for the foreign policy 
ventures in Iraq and the occasional difficult moments in the mission in 
Afghanistan that challenged Spain’s civil society.236  The aspiration for involving 
Spain in overseas security military missions had become conditioned on a 
complicated raft of moral and legal issues underpinned by the vagaries of public 
opinion.  Yet Zapatero’s broad support base, traditionally indifferent to arguments 
requiring support for the US, meant there was leeway to pursue an agenda 
distinct from the González years, but one that reflected some of the significant 
social changes that had taken place in Spain since the late 1980s.237 
Zapatero’s Progressive Security Paradigm  
Through applying a broader understanding of security Zapatero’s approach can 
be analysed, with one approach relating to an agenda based on justice theories, 
particularly those of Pettit, Rawls and Barber,238 in a way that had been seen in 
other countries (such as the UK’s `Third Way’) and which emphasised a radical 
aspect of the PSOE’s domestic agenda.  Coupled with a number of longer term 
tendencies within the PSOE’s intellectual core, this articulated a social domestic 
security model that extended beyond the notion of just the State as the referent 
object, to one that would reflect social change and embraced society and 
revisited the idea of Spain as a European society. 
Campaigning in 2004, the PSOE had committed itself to a revitalised social 
programme on reducing domestic violence, citing it as a threat affecting 
substantial numbers of Spanish citizens).  This was subsequently approved by a 
                                                   
236 The 2003 `Yak’ incident saw a unit of 62 Spanish Army Engineers killed when an (obsolete, low 
cost) chartered aircraft crashed when returning troops from Afghanistan The issue became an 
ongoing embarrassment for the MOD with difficult questions regarding the equipping and funding 
of troops on operational duty discrediting military commanders and the minister. 
237 Spain’s significant social changes included female participation in the work place, educational 
achievement, and increase in Spain’s ethnic diversity, much of which challenged the patterns of 
work and behaviour of preceding decades. 
238  Kennedy cites Pettit’s Political Philosophy in Public Life as a dominant influence on Zapatero’s 
approach (Kennedy 2013, p.167). 
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considerable majority in the Cortes later that year alongside a platform of support 
and funding by the central government.   Not only was this policy a reflection on 
a radical tradition within the Spanish Left, but it also mirrored security thinking 
regarding feminist and sexual identity, which started to emerge in Spanish 
academia from the 1990s with a subsequent impact upon the Spanish Socialists’ 
agenda. 
“The elimination of discrimination was presented as being a  key concern for 
a government engaged in building a stronger, more democratic society”  
(Kennedy, 2013, p.170) 
Commitment to a more liberal social agenda through the legalisation of same sex 
marriage (in 2005) illustrated further radical engagement with a more socially 
liberal agenda (a role not traditionally pursued in Spain) and drew on the 1978 
Constitution to back this up.  Same sex marriage, a programme of combating 
domestic violence and the establishment of an `Equality’ ministry reflected an 
ambitious articulation of a domestic security agenda.  It is the assertion of this 
chapter that Zapatero’s PSOE was moving Spain’s security focus onto human 
security as the referent object, and in turn a more equal and resilient society in 
spite of entrenched conservative and Catholic opinion. 
While it is possible to credit the PSOE and Zapatero with a development-led 
security model, the international community had already identified a relationship 
between security and development.  The international Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were already a feature of Spain’s commitment to human security.  
Returning to Spain’s international security however, the state’s commitment to 
honouring its adherence to the millennium development goals, particularly the 
spending of 0.7% of GDP on development aid and a reinvigoration of the 
Cooperation Agency, has its roots in the International Development Cooperation 
Law of 1998.  However, as Hughes argued (1999, p.182), the institutional 
structures were clearly ill-equipped to meet Spain’s aspirations, particularly at a 
time when sophisticated and interconnected NGOs were emerging and playing 
an increasing role in Spain’s political landscape. 
Zapatero’s broadened security strategy, poverty reduction and assistance 
programmes were reinforced as a component of foreign and security policy in his 
first term (2004-8).  This reflected not only a focus on the human dimension of 
security, but also Spain’s wider global strategy to strengthen the non-Atlantic 
dimension of security.  One aspect here was the integration of the Cooperación 
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(Development Cooperation) Agency into the Foreign Ministry in 2004, as outlined 
by the Government’s Master Plan: 
“… to make Spain an active “peace-maker”, as the hallmark of a project for 
foreign, security and cooperation policy…Spanish Cooperation can draw on a 
large cast of players, from the General State Administration — particularly the 
Defence and Interior Ministries, the State’s Armed Forces and Security 
Forces — to NGOs and the private sector, and taking in the various 
autonomous and local administrations.” Government of Spain (2005, p. 69). 
Furthermore, the 2005 Master Plan outlined that the approach of preventing and 
resolving conflict would establish a “wider, long-range and inclusive overseas 
action strategy.” Government of Spain (2005, p. 69).   
Aid funding and increased support for debt relief, poverty reduction programmes 
and the active pursuit of the MDGs were a feature of Zapatero’s second term, 
where, in spite of the early indications of the financial crisis, there was a clear 
attempt to create a different foreign and security policy agenda. This was not 
without criticism, and one observation is that the approach was not well 
communicated to wider Spanish opinion, engagement with Latin America in 
particular did create some controversy. 
“For Zapatero, pulling Spain out of its former alliances was not compensated 
by entry into any other alliance.  For this reason and because of his childish 
left-wing tendencies, Zapatero’s policy led Spain to seek alliances with any 
anti-American leader who crossed his path” (Bardají, 2006, p.26) 
Spain’s significant armaments industry was implicated in sales to Venezuela 
where, after significant criticism from Washington and pressure from the US 
State Department, a humiliating climb down over export licences reflected badly 
on the PSOE government.  Whilst Bardají’s language may have overstated the 
government’s approach, a warming of relations with Cuba reinforced an 
impression that the PSOE sought confrontation with the US on foreign policy 
matters. 
Latin America, a perennial priority for Madrid’s overseas relations and a source 
of influence and security, was paradoxically a victim of the development success 
of most economies within the region as they became middle-income countries 
with the subsequent loss of aid from Europe.  Therefore, for Spain, although its 
traditional priorities of Latin America and North Africa have at times featured in 
wider security efforts, there was a cost from ‘Europeanising’ or escalating 
matters of concern in international fora with tangible consequences on other 
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areas of policy.239  Relationships with third parties (such as the EU) inevitably 
impacted upon Spain’s traditional bilateral strengths, as was shown a number of 
times in Spain’s Latin American policy.240 
Zapatero’s premiership had two key international security policy priorities:  
effective multilateralism and a refocus on European institutions.  Although part of 
these two priorities related to Spain’s broader national mood in the period 2004-
11, in reality it reflected the desire for a more consensual approach reinforced by 
the 2005 Organic Law that underlined the need for Parliamentary approval for 
the use of force.  Whether multilateralism reflected Zapatero’s personal values is 
unclear, but evidence suggests that later events, which witnessed increased 
troops in Afghanistan, support for the challenging UN mission in southern 
Lebanon and military support for the coalition against Gadaffi, meant that 
Spanish society and the PSOE would still undertake military operations without 
language of existential threats, including the speech act. 
By focusing policy on a more institutionally-European approach through the 
medium of CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), there were clear 
priorities that differed from those of his Partido Popular predecessor, although 
also a reassertion of the European vocation that dates back almost a century 
among Spain’s liberal thinkers in the form of the regenerationists (see chapter 
two). Whether this is a crucial aspect of the PSOE’s vocation is unlikely, but it 
does indicate a tradition that sets out a model of integration that predates the 
European project. 
Zapatero and the United Nations Alliance for Civilizations (UNAOC) 
Sources (Arteaga & Bardají) have portrayed Spain as having retreated from an 
overseas posture, but there are examples of this not being the case, with a more 
nuanced approach.  Zapatero’s ‘Alliance for Civilizations’, launched in 2004, was 
an ambitious attempt to create a cross-civilizational movement for interaction in 
conjunction with one of Spain’s closest allies in the Middle East, Turkey.  This 
approach did not achieve much prominence among western states and the 
UNSC but it was well-received by Arab states and gained some early traction at 
                                                   
239 Europeanisation’s impact on national policies is a central theme in Europeanisation and 
National Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, Ruano, L. (2011). 
240 The Spanish relationship with the Communist regime in Cuba underwent a number of 
challenges after the 1990s as formerly Communist states increasingly questioned the EU’s posture 
in Cuba.  The Czech Republic in particular demanded a harder EU line on Cuba’s human rights 
abuses which contrasted with Spain’s engagement. 
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the UN General Assembly’s membership with the backing of Kofi Annan the then 
Secretary General. 
UNAOC represented a determined push by Spain to promote a forum of 
engagement between the Islamic and Western states, focussing on civil 
societies.  Drawing on a good working relationship between Turkey and Spain 
(Madrid supported a possible Turkish EU accession), the initiative’s support at 
UN grassroots level generated some momentum, but a lack of concerted support 
by more influential countries has, like a number of initiatives in the UN, never 
fulfilled its potential, which is perhaps less a comment on Spain’s role in the 
process than an illustration of the reality of the UN’s structural deficiencies.  
The Alliance for Civilisations has endured, and remains a preoccupation of the 
Foreign Ministry within ongoing backing from the UN. It retained some support 
from the PP, which shows that some bipartisan continuity endures from the 
Zapatero era, but UNAOC cannot be described as a significant success of the 
government of that era, but more a reflection of the PSOE’s approach to framing 
security and foreign relations differently. 
In backing ambitious multinational peace support operations, the support for 
international legal sanction by the PSOE showed a desire to promote Spain 
within the United Nations, and to a lesser extent NATO, in spite of some 
portraying Zapatero as lacking a policy.  During his tenure, Spain undertook 
significant troop deployments to the UN mission in Lebanon, increased forces in 
Afghanistan and wholeheartedly supported EU missions (in the Balkans), 
thereby challenging the view that a retrenchment by Spain was underway.241   
Whereas the Bush administration cooled towards Spain following its withdrawal 
from Iraq, the PSOE’s adoption of a more European stance to promote Spain 
and its previously more progressive posture offered some alternative structure, 
than just anti-Americanism.  The PSOE’s 2004 National Defence Directive (DDN) 
reinforced Spain’s participation in international missions only under conditions of 
compliance with international law and Parliamentary approval in the Chamber of 
Deputies, further reinforced by the 2005 Organic Law.  This has underpinned 
Spain’s intervention in a number of successive missions to this day and marks a 
feature of contemporary Spanish security. 
                                                   
241 This was reiterated in interview with a Juan Moliner (MOD official) in December 2011. 
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The 2005 Organic Law242 was passed to prevent a repeat of the Iraq war 
decisions and reflected the prevailing cultural environment at this time.  Aznar 
had been accused by PSOE politicians of deploying Spanish military forces with 
the US prior to its invasion of Iraq despite there being a questionable legal basis.  
Although Spanish troops did not attack Iraq militarily, the Navy Frigate Álvaro de 
Bazán supported the US Navy in the Persian Gulf during the attack and invasion 
phase. Technically, even though Spanish troops deployed into Iraq after the 
invasion (and once a UNSC Resolution had been passed) to assist with Iraq’s 
reconstruction, humanitarian mission and rebuilding, the legitimacy of Aznar’s 
decision has never has been completely accepted.  This has been ossified by 
the events of the March 2004 Atocha bomb attack.  In the minds of many 
Spaniards (Dannenbaum, 2011, p.307; Jordan, 2006, p. 227) the bombing was a 
direct outcome of Spain’s involvement with the US.  Hence the publication of a 
DDN and an Organic Law which allocated power to the Congreso de los 
Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) to “acordar la participación de las Fuerzas 
Armadas en misiones fuera del territorio nacional” (Muñoz-Alonso, p.699).243  
This has subsequently become a norm imprinted on Spain’s security that exists 
to this day. 
Deliberation on publishing a national security strategy emerged in Zapatero’s first 
term.  Aznar had originally called for such a strategy in his final year in office, but 
the issue was reinforced in the 2008 Defence Directive, which explicitly endorsed 
the publication of a strategy.  Anecdotally,244 there was no enthusiasm for a 
strategy by the Zapatero administration, despite PSOE figures such as Javier 
Solana, the ex NATO secretary general and EU foreign affairs representative, 
pushing for such a process.  One explanation is that there appeared to be no 
capital for the PSOE in re-awakening the spectre of issues that had dogged their 
PP predecessor (nor the 1980s rows over NATO).  In the absence of the 
Strategy until the very last months of the PSOE period in office (publication was 
in the summer of 2011), no clear position emanated from the PSOE beyond what 
was contained in the Defence Directives.  It was only at his swearing in as Prime 
Minister for his second term in 2008 that Zapatero acknowledged the need for a 
                                                   
242 Organic Laws are a long-standing feature of Spain’s political and legal system and are endowed 
with an additional semi-constitutional status.   
243 “..resolve on the participation of the Armed Forces in missions outside Spanish territory”.  
244 Various interviewees (Bardají and Arteaga among others) reinforced this point when pressed. 
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strategy, which was subsequently reaffirmed by Defence Minister Carme Chacón 
before the Parliamentary Defence Committee (Arteaga, 2009). 
Chacón’s appointment as Spain’s first female Defence Minister aimed to indicate 
further change.  A relatively young Socialist politician, her appointment signalled 
a change about gender and security that represented a symbolic shift.  While a 
gesture, Chacón’s conduct demonstrated that women could play a role in Spain’s 
security,245 and while her legacy is not outstanding, the fact that the PP 
appointed a female Defence Minister in 2016 upheld such an agenda.246 
Therefore, although there is a rather mixed record on the PSOE’s approach to 
security in its period in government, the period did witness notable change and 
modernisation.  In policy terms, the 2004 Defence Directive and 2005 Organic 
Law were the start of a process of change and organisation that culminated in 
the 2011 Security Strategy and the system that now exists.  Less obvious was 
any reduction in the power of the executive, and in particular, Presidentialism 
appears little affected by the legislative changes of the decade, meaning that in 
effect, the Cortes and its constituent parts continued to play only a minor role in 
determining policy or the accountability of the executive, and that the influence of 
interests remained unclear.  
The PSOE Government’s Approach To `Traditional’ Security. 
In terms of traditional, ‘hard’ security (Alliances, state relationships, foreign policy 
and defence among others) the PSOE aimed to return to a European-led 
approach to Spain’s security relationships.  Within 12 months, the PSOE 
witnessed the EU’s accession of the 10 East European states comprising some 
74 million people.  This European focus indicated a return to a longer-term 
Europeanisation-style approach of previous PSOE years but which, coupled with 
the ambitious internal social programme of equality and empowerment, reflected 
a dual strategy of continuity within Europe’s institutions with a simultaneously 
more radical social model of citizen-centred domestic strategy that drew on a 
long progressive tradition of thirdworldism (Pollack 1987, p.158).  It is the 
argument of this thesis that the PSOE’s approach drew on long standing 
                                                   
245 Chacón’s visit to Spanish troops in Afghanistan while visibly pregnant was reported around the 
world with mixed reaction.  Zubeldia cites Chacón’s ‘inexperience’ as a major feature of her tenure 
(2014, p.28). 
 246 Another legacy was Spain’s promotion of a female-led agenda in the UN in an initiative that 
was to be continued by the PP’s Rajoy (El Mundo 30 Sep. 2015, p.6). 
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aspirations to assert a more progressive security model, drawing on its interests 
within its support base and intellectual tradition. 
A traditional defence-security paradigm of the PSOE’s approach appears less 
coherent. As relations with Washington deteriorated to an all-time low following 
the withdrawal from Iraq, this did not necessarily lead to a more or less secure 
nation-state in the following years.  As the suicide attacks in London the following 
year (2005) demonstrated, many civil societies made the connection between 
the war in Iraq and an increase in domestic terrorism and insecurity, which was 
irrelevant to traditional military power. 
In 2006, the Foreign and Defence Ministers endorsed the difficult UN 
Peacekeeping mission in Lebanon with a sizeable Spanish contingent, which 
would prove costly with a number of soldiers killed.  Spain’s record of support for 
peacekeeping served as a counter to those claiming that Spain had withdrawn 
from the PP government’s ambitious plans for an active, specifically middle tier 
status, given developments in the Zapatero government’s Mediterranean policy.   
However, as the withdrawal of Spain’s forces from the Kosovo mission would 
indicate in 1999, the national priority (reflecting the idea of Spain as a `nation’) of 
not supporting separatist movements would trump support for wider regional and 
international institutions.247 
The Security Posture of the PSOE 2004-11 in Review 
In hindsight, Zapatero’s governments are now judged by the near collapse of 
Spain’s economy that coincided with the government’s second term in 2008.   
Literature regarding the security (and foreign policy) of the period mainly 
focusses on the state’s rejection of the PP’s Atlanticist model and a shift towards 
the multilateralism espoused by Zapatero, whose influence over the policy 
process differed from his predecessors.  However, the impact of the issues of 
historical memory248 and social justice ensured that a broad security concept of 
Zapaterismo did exist, but had fewer roots in a security model with `the state’ as 
                                                   
247 Spain’s 2009 withdrawal from peace support roles in Kosovo was expected following the 
territory’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.  Spain had always been troubled by 
NATO and UN intervention in Kosovo but felt obliged to support European allies. The declaration, 
however, was impossible for Spain to support and remains so (interview with high ranking Defence 
advisor, Oct. 2015).  
248 Spain’s Law on Historical Memory was designed to shed light on aspects of repression, 
violence and suffering during the civil war and Franco’s dictatorship.  It unearthed difficult and 
troubling aspects of the period, and whilst the government could claim it helped reconcile and 
develop a narrative of the time, others viewed it as politically inspired.   
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the referent object and was more about social and human security reform based 
on society and to a lesser extent nation. 
This period represents an example of constructivist interpretations of `interests’ 
to explain change.  Whereas the Aznar model implemented a change in policy 
reflecting a top down approach (driven by the PM’s own agenda and 
personality), under the PSOE after 2004, the progressive shift reflected aspects 
of the contemporary development and human security thinking that were in 
vogue among certain parts of its support base.  In this case, the model of 
Katzenstein (1996) emphasises the importance of interests (from the Spanish 
development community and the Left) to explain the shift towards a different 
ideological approach, whilst not immensely popular from an electoral basis, such 
an agenda represented the persistence of aspects of thirdworldism among the 
Spanish left.  
The PSOE’s domestic security shift was less about a process of securing the 
state, but more concerned with a vision of securing a different referent object.  In 
Spain’s case this focussed at that time on diverse groups such as domestic 
abuse victims, gay and transgendered citizens, and immigrants (who had 
entered in record numbers and where attempts to legalise them were a policy 
priority). From the perspective of this thesis, the 2004-2011 period can only be 
seen in the context of before and after the financial crisis of 2008 (chapter 4).  
Before 2008, there existed a genuine attempt to redefine security, the 
relationship of the citizen and the concept of security, based on a model similar 
to that of interests, values and the cultural environment, yet the economic crisis 
of 2008 was so profound that it irrevocably undermined the PSOE’s notion of the 
state, and overturned political allegiances within Spain.   
The events of the 2008 financial crash, the rise of the indignados, the Arab 
Spring and the election of the PP government in 2011 abruptly ended the 
Zapatero government’s hopes of establishing a different paradigm of security. In 
some ways, interview with a senior official249 in the Defence Ministry gave the 
impression of it being a time of business as usual as Spain was set to return to 
more traditional policy making. 
The three key security themes of the Zapatero government, multilateralism, a 
renewed concept of human (or citizen) security and the withdrawal from a model 
                                                   
249 Juan Moliner, Spanish MOD December 2011. 
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of Atlanticism, were challenged by the Arab Spring, but most of all by the impact 
of the economic crisis of 2008.  From a constructivist approach, the words, 
rhetoric and policies of his first term were not enough to make a long term 
meaningful shift in Spain’s understanding of security, nor its cultural 
environment.  Zapatero’s paradigm of a Spanish security culture marked by 
consensus and multilateralism, in tandem with a return to the Europeanisation 
model meant that there was a continuity with the aspiration of Spain achieving its 
appropriate place in the world,250  the challenge lay in defining it and more 
importantly embedding it in within cultural environment of national security 
something that eluded both Aznar and Zapatero. 
Spain’s approach to finding its place implied membership of the EU’s inner circle, 
the G20, NATO and serving as Europe’s interlocutor with Latin America.  Key 
state institutions and the economy survived the events of 2008-11, but 
Zapatero’s vision did not and the humiliating defeat for the PSOE in 2011 not 
only wrecked the vision of Zapaterismo, but also set in train political 
disenfranchisement from the PSOE’s support base that were to have 
implications for years to follow. 
While some describe Zapatero as having a “poor record as a chief foreign policy 
actor” (Gillespie, 2011, p 74) the reality is more complicated.  Zapatero inherited 
a highly politicised foreign and security policy scenario, a legacy of a mobilised 
segments of civil society and a cultural environment that encouraged interests to 
compete for influence.  Katzenstein’s approach reinforces the importance of 
interests and political elites have sought to accommodate their needs.   
Zapatero’s boast (2008) that Spain was the world’s 8th largest economy some 
weeks prior to the crash demonstrated the fragility of the imagined state.  Unlike 
the case of his predecessor, Aznar, defeat is difficult to attribute to Zapatero’s 
security stance, but paradoxically Spain’s economic insecurity, which found 
expression in unemployment, slowdown and banking failures, was very much a 
cause for losing power.  This period offers a valuable insight in interpreting 
change in security, and the capacity of the Spanish state to recognise and act on 
                                                   
250 This was reinforced by Spanish academics’ (the Royal Elcano Institute) attempts to measure 
Spain’s position in the world.  Using a sophisticated formula that tracks Spain’s influence and 
insertion into the world, the Elcano Global Presence index has charted the country’s place in global 
rankings, traditionally 11th the world, this dropped to 12th as a result of the financial crisis.  See 
www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en. 
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sudden shifts in interests, ideas and norms.  In both the cases of Aznar and 
Zapatero they were incapable of achieving this. 
Return of the Partido Popular — Mariano Rajoy’s Approach 2011-3 
At his third attempt, PP leader Mariano Rajoy became Prime Minister in 
November 2011, following an electoral victory that reflected the profound 
economic crisis as well as political disenchantment with the previous 
government.  There was no huge outpouring of popularity for the PP, but more a 
reflection of a desire for change.  As was argued previously (see chapter 4), the 
perception of economic security (for both the individual and the state) had 
become so challenging for the PSOE in its final months of government that the 
defeat for the Socialists was never in doubt. What was also apparent was the 
frustration made clear the interests of younger voters (the indignados), in 
particular because their security needs and voices were ignored by Spain’s 
elites. 
Under the Partido Popular (PP) government, it was quickly apparent that there 
was to be no major alteration in security policy in the mould of 2001. This was 
due not only to the profound economic problems that the government found itself 
in, but also an awareness that shifting foreign and security policy risked 
polarisation.251  Instead, the first months saw speculation over a possible banking 
collapse, and potential ejection from the Single European Currency, which had 
become the chief concerns for Spain’s policy-makers.252  There rapidly 
developed a convergence across the political spectrum at the end of avoiding 
this fate, so by 2011/2 national economic instability security at state or 
macroeconomic level was key to its perception of an existential threat, while 
broader conceptual debates about security posture and international relations 
had to take a backseat.  The executive in this period was under pressure to 
communicate an atmosphere of normality. 
“In June 2012, after Spain’s Popular Party (PP) government requested up to 
€100 billion in European aid for the country’s banking sector, Prime Minister 
Rajoy refused to even use the word ‘bailout’ when informing the population” 
(Hare, 2012, p.463) 
Within less than 12 months after election, five different austerity programmes 
had been launched by the PP government in Spain, underlining the impact of the 
                                                   
251 Interview with Rafael Bardaji February 2017. 
252 Interview with José Ignacio Torreblanca (European Council on Foreign Relations) December 
2011. 
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early reaffirmation of the 2011 Security Strategy, and persisting with the policy 
process led to both a handful of institutional changes following the 2011 election 
and publication of the 2013 Strategy (chapter 5).  Given the profoundness of the 
economic crisis, Rajoy’s focus on domestic economic security, was both an 
imperative (financial competence was a recurring message on the altar of 
maintaining confidence) and about shielding the Spanish state from the danger 
of ejection from the single currency. Thus the first years of the Rajoy government 
were in effect a `hidden’ crisis response, as the financial recession evolved from 
a global problem requiring multilateral efforts and initiatives (such as under the 
2010 Spanish Presidency) to one where the referent object to be secured was 
the economic viability of the Spanish state.  Much of this centred on the centrality 
of membership of the Euro.  Fortunately for the PP government, Greece, Cyprus 
and Italy provided even more dramatic failings than Spain, so international 
interests were less focussed on Madrid, but the impact was nonetheless severe. 
The construction of a response to the depth of the economic crisis was 
accompanied by a return to a traditional threat, that of ETA.  Rajoy’s former 
career in the Interior Ministry influenced a decision in reasserting the harder line 
that accompanied the PP upon its return to power. ETA’s fundamental weakness 
had been exposed by less effective attacks and apparently dwindling support, 
yet dealing with ETA was one of those areas of Spanish policy strategy where a 
bipartisan divide between the PSOE and PP was still maintained, which will be 
discussed in the final chapter. Needless to say though, the return of the PP to 
power saw no significant change in posture from the efforts of previous robust 
PP administrations.  The difference was that ETA remained substantially weaker 
and decreasingly effective.  In the wider scheme of security, 2011-13 saw ETA 
remain marginal as a threat to the existential well-being of the Spanish state and 
its citizens, with a ceasefire being declared and ETA increasingly undermined by 
arrests and political isolation. 
The Arab Spring and Spanish Security 
Whilst not central to national strategy, Spain’s perspective of the Arab Spring 
illustrates the pressures within the Katzenstein model.  Given the proximity of 
Spain, and the presence of a significant diaspora workforce, the interaction 
between a national approach (drawing on EU and NATO members) with that of 
Spain’s cultural environment inevitably reflects domestic interests, norms and 
ideas.  In this case, where the nation-state’s security is influenced by ideas and 
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prejudices, Spain faced both domestic pressure to maintain a secure nation-state 
but at the same time, articulate a response based on its norms of promoting 
peaceful change. 
Relationships with Maghreb nation-states such as Morocco are best understood 
in the context of Katzenstein’s cultural environment where the interplay between 
interests and identity is deeply ingrained within public consciousness, populist 
anti-immigrant posturing and economic/diplomatic necessity of a functioning 
relationship.  On dealing with North Africa, the PP traditionally faced more 
difficulties in bilateral relations with Morocco than its predecessor, the PSOE.  
However a continuity emerged based on summits, personal relationships and 
mutual respect between the monarchs253.  The Arab Spring crystallised matters 
for Spain’s progressive interests,254  who welcomed opportunity for change and 
the possible removal of authoritarianism.  But, as events progressed, these 
prospects were countered by increased instability, migration and new threats 
such as the emergence of Islamic State group, and the expansion of Al Qa’ida 
related factions in the Maghreb.  Paradoxically, the Arab Spring created more 
insecurity than had the predecessor regimes, and crystallised a debate between 
Spanish interests seeking a more radical posture by Madrid in support of 
change, and those traditional economic interests which feared financial 
upheaval, conflict and uncontrolled change. 
Rajoy’s new PP government also inherited Libya’s post-Gadaffi chaos and 
Syria’s civil war, these demonstrating that peaceful change were very unlikely in 
many cases.  In the case of Syria, although Damascus was never politically 
close to Spain, the humanitarian aspects of the conflict did lead to calls for 
support for intervention (Arteaga, 2013). Even so, in several interviews with 
Defence Ministry officials in 2011 and 2015, it was made clear that involvement 
by Spain would not take place without a clear international mandate from the 
United Nations, and even then this would not be major priority at the time. 
Arteaga (2013, p.27) argues that Syria reflected the difficulties of articulating a 
regionally active approach in accordance with Spanish popular opinion; there 
would be vocal calls for involvement in the media and from opposition parties, 
                                                   
253 Spain’s monarchy has featured heavily in diplomacy with Arab rulers in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
and the UAE among others. 
254 Spain has long hosted interest groups, human rights organisations and movements such as the 
Saharawi government who are unable to operate under more repressive regimes.  This has 
occasionally created some tensions with North African governments but also points to some 
influence on the part of Spain, and adds to a mosaic of links below the level of inter-state relations. 
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but not an opinion or voice that would authorise Spanish leadership or military 
assets.  This gave the impression of a reactive approach to international and 
domestic security problems, in spite the two Security Strategies published in this 
period.   
Whereas Spain had traditionally seen a role for leadership, activism and 
influence in the region of North Africa and the Maghreb, the 2011-3 period would 
not see significant success for Spain adopting a leadership role.  This was in 
effect due to the cultural environment as much as regional pressures, but the fact 
was that the international community itself was poor in articulating a coherent 
response due to the myriad national and economic interests that related to 
historical, political and religious connections with the region at a time when even 
the US was criticised for not playing an active part. 
Summary.  Security Culture and the Executive 
Following victory in November 2011 and through to 2013 it is the contention of 
this thesis that the executive power used by Rajoy appeared notably more 
`presidential’ in contrast to Zapatero, his predecessor.  Backed by a majority in 
the Cortes, and assisted by a weakened opposition demoralised by defeat, in 
Parliamentary terms the political threat now seemed to reside in the growing 
number of nationalist MPs, particularly from Catalonia.  Although the complex 
problems from the Arab Spring faced Spain’s South, with Europe focussing on 
the recovery of its economies and NATO increasingly concerned with Russia’s 
renewed interest in former Soviet republics255, it was in the domestic economic 
sphere that Rajoy’s priority in security can be found, reflecting the realities of 
Spanish influence after a number of years of austerity and political divisions. 
The 2008 financial crisis, with a spate of bank failures in Spain’s regions (partly 
due to the regional devolution of preceding decades), facilitated significant 
centralisation, increased control and oversight by the Bank of Spain (Chislett, 
2012, p.129).  This has had the effect of consolidating further powers to the 
executive.  Additional measures such as the creation of a Financial Security 
Intelligence unit (again answerable to the PM’s Moncloa power base) meant that, 
institutionally, Rajoy’s premiership had more control than predecessor 
                                                   
255 Russia’s intervention in Georgia (2008), and then increasingly in the Ukraine and former Baltic 
Republics was of less concern to Spain than perhaps to Germany or Poland.  One interviewee 
stated that NATO’s main concerns (Russia) were not Madrid’s, leaving Spain more vulnerable to 
what Madrid actually perceived as threats.  
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administrations particularly given the ongoing nature of the crisis, perhaps 
reflecting his experience and close relationship working under PM Aznar. 
The financial crisis’s impact across the country undermined the ability of the 
Autonomous Communities and municipalities to deliver services and 
governance, thereby reinforcing Madrid’s pre-eminence in a system that had 
become heavily devolved over years previous to this.  Coupled with a Security 
Strategy process (see previous chapter) that legitimised centralisation, this 
meant that Rajoy’s first years in office were a concentration of authority and 
power unprecedented since the time of the PSOE under González.  Whilst much 
of this arose from the crisis management nature of policy-making, requiring swift 
action, it was also indicative of a certain style of leadership and an emerging 
security culture based around Presidentialism. 
As argued in the previous chapter, 2013’s Second Security Strategy 
institutionalised this centralisation in Spain’s Security policy process.  Although 
brief, the two years of the PP’s return to power gave few indications of any 
polemic shift from the PSOE’s previous term in office.  What was evident in 
2011-3 was that the Zapatero/PSOE model of multilateralism was little changed. 
A global economic crisis, the lack of a single (international) response to the Arab 
Spring, and the EU’s single currency predicaments, all meant that, for the PP 
government in 2011-3, the security issues facing Spain required a domestic 
crisis management response to Spain’s financial problems that posed an 
existential threat to the country.  Whilst the Security Strategies offered the 
reassurance of a broad-based multi-agency approach, the emergence of a 
‘national security’ concept, with a department directly answerable to the 
Moncloa, has led to a strong ‘Presidential’ executive for the purposes of dealing 
with the matter at hand.  With no clear Ministerial lead, a fragmentation of 
responsibilities, and the National Security Council initially sitting under the PM, 
centralisation and Presidentialism have come to characterise Spain’s institutional 
and organisational policy response.   
During interviews, it was acknowledged that since 2011 the PP had embraced 
the concept of a centrally-controlled security strategy process under the direct 
supervision of the Prime Minister.  This was further reinforced by the 
appointment of an under-powered Jefe de Gabinete to oversee the routine 
management of the National Security Council (NSC).  One criticism that arose 
was that the position was filled by too low-ranking a civil servant.  In comparison 
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with the UK, where its NSC was headed by a senior, highly-experienced civil 
servant with cross-government experience,256 Rajoy’s Jefe de Gabinete was felt 
to be too junior to achieve effective coordination.   
Given the responses to Spain’s financial crisis, the impact of the Security 
Strategies of 2011 and 2013, the institutional changes to policy control of the 
financial sector and the historical role of Prime Minister Rajoy in dealing with 
(predominantly ETA) terrorism and fiscal intelligence oversight (again 
answerable to the PM), it becomes evident that the Security Policy process 
remains distinctly in the hands of the Executive within the Moncloa palace and 
that, following a brief interregnum under the PSOE, Presidentialism has returned 
to Spain’s security culture, with a marginalisation of interests and identity due to 
austerity, a weakened civic identity with regard to foreign affairs and a fractured 
opposition, this led to controversial legislation in restricting the ability of groups to 
protest.257 
The period 2000 to 2013 saw three separate premierships that offer a number of 
insights into Spain’s strategic culture.  Katzenstein’s simple, yet effective model 
demonstrates how ideas and identity come together to create within the cultural 
environment, a space for a national security culture to emerge.  All three case 
studies of the successive governments have reflected an interplay of interests, 
demonstrating a Spanish identity, and a security culture focussed on a medium 
sized power, that is integrated in, (or perhaps dependent on) powerful 
international organisations.  Whilst there has been (and remains) a profound 
domestic polarisation between the elites and civil-society regarding relations with 
Washington in security, overall Spanish strategic culture is marked by a powerful 
executive, perennially mindful of a readily-mobilised politically motivated 
population but more constrained by the need to act in conjunction with major 
powers under a clear international legal mandate.   
Constructivist approaches with an emphasis on shifting identities, powerful 
financial interests and a fractured domestic political system, demonstrate that 
simply producing national strategies has yet to produce a more convincing and 
                                                   
256 The appointment of Peter Ricketts, a very senior and respected career civil servant as chair to 
the UK National Security Council reflected the contribution required and expected from a state civil 
servant.  Furthermore, as the NSC has evolved in the UK, the role of a powerful Civil Servant has 
remained fundamental to the model’s success.  In interview, the UK’s NSC was seen as a template 
that Spain should have followed.   
257 In December 2014, the Ley Orgánica de Seguridad Ciudadana (Citizen’s Safety Law) was 
passed by the PP government that significantly restricted laws of association, assembly and 
demonstration  
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integrated policy making approach within a culture of security.  Instead, there 
persists a `Presidentialist’ style dominated by a powerful executive articulating a 
vision that is not adequately countered by Parliamentary opposition, but by rising 
interests (such as Catalan nationalists) outside of the main political system which 
is likely to lead to further disputes. 
Spain’s security has traditionally lacked a strategic approach, and has, on too 
many occasions reflected politicisation whilst impromptu crisis management has 
underlined this trend.  The events of 2004 and the subsequent economic slump 
of 2008 mark a change as to what security in Spain actually meant.  In spite of a 
documented process of strategy-making, the existential threats have not been 
accepted or defined clearly enough.  The traditional definition of security: the 
‘absence of threat of violence, or use of force’ (Buzan, 1998) does not help 
clarify the matter as, given the broadening of security, so evident since the end 
of the Cold War, the 21st century has significantly increased the range of security 
issues in Spain. 
Since 2011, security culture in its broadest term has come to embody two policy 
strands.  The first has been to keep Spain’s position within the Single Currency 
and European Monetary Union to maximise economic and political benefits from 
EU membership (this further accords with the concept of Spain as an essentially 
European society).  The second aspect focusses on a more traditional security, 
namely to secure Spain from threats to Spain’s integrity and interests (in 
accordance with the Security Strategy).  This has meant support for allies 
wherever possible, but at minimal risk or cost to Spain’s own domestic stability.  
Hence, military force would support the overthrow of Gadaffi’s regime but, under 
national caveats, combat missions would not involve military attacks.  Syria 
would not witness the same engagement due to risks of following the US against 
domestic public opinion, so in effect security would be pursued in the context of 
blended diplomacy via NATO and the EU, which would see a policy of 
engagement with both institutions, but with an acceptance that both were 
inadequate for Spain’s needs.258  
                                                   
258 Following Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and subsequent interest in Ukraine and the 
Baltic states, Spain argued that its traditional security concerns (the Maghreb) were again not 
receiving the required level of serious attention.  In effect, it would have to demonstrate and lobby 
for security issues pertaining to its interests.  This has parallels with the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(before the Barcelona process/UfM) where González and his foreign ministers argued for a 
security forum for the Mediterranean. 
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Whilst proximity to Washington could have conferred some benefits to Spain, as 
Arteaga stated previously (2005) there was no clear model for security in the 
event of realignment from a Washington-centred approach.  This dilemma is an 
issue that has challenged Spain since the very first Defence Agreement of 1953: 
in the absence of a close alliance with Washington what would Spain’s security 
posture look like?  Zapatero perhaps came the closest to articulating an 
alternative vision, but the effects of the economic crisis (and Zapatero’s failure to 
frame a strategy) in 2008 meant that the vision never bore fruit. 
The Shaping, Framing and Delivery of Spain’s Security 
During the three administrations of Aznar, Zapatero and Rajoy, Spain witnessed 
significant and lasting challenges to Spain’s political system, economy and global 
influence.  The millennium marked a sense that Spain had reached a highpoint in 
its international standing (Gillespie, 2001, and  Pereira, 2011), which was almost 
on a par with the ebullience noted in 1992.259  But in security terms, as this 
thesis has argued, a centralisation has remained evident, particularly in the 
framing of security as institutional shifts, the constitutional settlement and 
challenges to devolved administrations have been evident.  Strategy is still 
shaped by an overcentralised bureaucracy and at the behest of a Presidential 
executive, this is itself a product from the transition to democracy.  Security 
policy remains only loosely subject to institutional checks according to the 
Constitution, which on the issue of strategy making and policy delivery 
remains ambiguous at best. 
  
                                                   
259 1992 marked the Barcelona Olympics, the successful Seville Expo, the opening of the high 
speed AVE train and a relatively high profile role in orchestrating the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
while the Ibero-American summit process was also developed and Spain celebrated the 500th 
anniversary of the ‘Discovery’ of the Americas. 
 
189 
 
Chapter 7. 
Spain’s National Security: an Appraisal. 
 
This thesis has developed a constructivist analysis drawn from Katzenstein’s 
model of post-war Japan to consider the approach undertaken by three separate 
Spanish administrations in responding to unpredictable and significant shifts in 
Spain’s domestic and international security.  In conjunction with the Copenhagen 
School’s sectors approach, the Katzenstein paradigm of a culture of national 
security has offered a tangible methodology in understanding Spain’s 
contemporary situation based around three referent objects that of Spain `the 
nation’, the Spanish `state’ and that of Spain as a `(European) society’. 
 
The evolution and production of Directives and Security Strategies in chapter 5 
offers some insight from the standpoint of an empirical analysis, but their value 
as indicators of a real national security situation is less apparent.  I have 
attempted to examine the relationship between the executive, civil society and 
the state through using Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’, with the executive 
playing the role of the rational actor, but this does not address `national 
interests’, hence the use of the Katzenstein model to consider identity and 
culture.  In this chapter, the thesis looked at policy outcomes under the three 
premierships, and in particular focussed on the role of the executive in what were 
quite distinct directions in policy, which in turn raises the idea of a culture of 
security. 
Throughout the research, the Constitutional arrangements outlined in the 1978 
Constitution underpin process and, in effect, democratic Spain has a record of 
almost 40 years of security policy-making under a variety of governments.  The 
Clausewitzean trinity based on military strategy does not help explain the 
process whereby successive Spanish executives (i.e. the rational actor) have 
determined what constitutes national security policy and how this is then framed, 
nor does it consider the concept of ‘national interest’ which can be considered 
through the concept of a `culture of security’. 
The Presidentialism model (Heywood 1999, Pereira 2010) enables Spanish 
Prime Ministers significant leeway in determining how security is articulated.  
And, as I have argued, the limited ability of the Spain’s legislature to hold the 
executive to account, as well as its impact on policy, is also seen to have 
remained marginal within the National Security Strategies.  Wider discussions 
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have focussed on the model of the Agency-Structure debate (Carlsnaes and 
Smith, 1994, p.16, or Hill 2003, pp.25, 57), which offers a different approach in 
foreign policy, and could be used to frame security policy.  This chapter will 
explore the impact of constitutional and institutional arrangements, but 
recognises that they alone do not completely explain the inconsistency in Spain’s 
culture of security, Presidentialism and contemporary policy this is discussed as 
part of the thesis. 
Security Policy: A Definition. 
Security Studies, like International Relations theory, is fragmented as a 
discipline, but it is useful to consider an amended definition or description of 
security, for the purpose of this research, as ‘the absence of threats to acquired 
values’ (Luttwak, cited in Terriff, T., et al. (1990, p.17).  Advancing this, I would 
argue that Security Policy encompasses ‘those policies and actions taken to 
maintain an absence of threats to a nation-state’s values and well-being’.  This 
has challenges, for, as this chapter will demonstrate, the concept of values and 
norms as inferred from Katzenstein’s approach and the idea of national interest 
advance the analysis but do not always offer simple explanations. The concept 
of ‘national interest’ is often seen as playing a central role in understanding 
foreign and defence policy, yet in security policy this relationship is less clear, 
given the vagaries in defining not only national interest(s), but also the model of 
more than one referent object.  Nearly all works, however, assume national 
interest to be a significant determinant of security policy when considering 
nation-states. 
In this case of Spain, earlier chapters identify that a lack of bipartisan agreement 
over what constituted Spain’s ‘Strategy’ meant that national policy responded to 
events only reactively and could be driven by personalities in the executive.  It is 
also the contention of this thesis that there exists little agreement between elites 
and academics over what constitutes ‘security policy’ in Spain, which has 
contributed to a gap between Spain’s security policy and national interest. 
Furthermore it is useful to identify and separate foreign, defence and security 
policy.  As was outlined in the literature review, the understanding of security is 
dominated by International Relations theories and schools of thought that divide 
along profound and often ideological lines.  As a result, one approach is to view 
the three policy areas as consisting of interrelated overlaps, with a hierarchy.  In 
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some models, security policy consists of defence policy and elements of foreign 
policy along with other aspects of interior policy, among others.260  
Cleary and Chuter (2006) identify a hierarchy of ‘government’ policy, where 
foreign policy is the most significant policy area.  Having its own Ministry, 
network of embassies and missions, and the cachet of representing the country 
and state, this pre-eminence is simple to visualise.  In nation-states such as 
Spain, France and the UK, the position of Foreign Minister is a prestigious post, 
often only subordinate to the Prime Minister.  In Spain, Foreign Ministers have 
not made the transition to Prime Minister, although in the case of Javier Solana, 
he did progress to NATO Secretary General and also the EU’s head of Foreign 
Service.  In effect, foreign policy is considered to be the overarching coordination 
of a state’s external relations and often the representative of a country and its 
civil society with regard to key allies, hostile states but also within global 
institutions. 
Spain’s Foreign Policy — the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (and Cooperation) 
Literature on the modernisation of Spain’s external relations has informed the 
development of a significant part of this thesis.  It is evident that in the eyes of 
many, despite the broadened agenda in research, security policy often remains 
synonymous with defence.  However, as Chuter argues (2006, p.47) there exists 
a tangled policy hierarchy which is little analysed, with defence policy sitting 
beneath security policy, which is in turn actually subordinate to foreign and 
government policy.261  Constructivism’s approach, focussing on interests, ideas 
and identity offers a clear view on not the policy, but the issues behind it.  In 
Chuter’s model, (for the purposes of analysing defence admittedly) defence is a 
product of national foreign and security policy, with a Ministerial determination of 
how national interests should be turned into policy objectives.  The same is 
assumed in this thesis, that security policy is subordinated to foreign policy 
(although there is greater prominence of the Interior Ministry), with Ministries 
                                                   
260 UK military doctrine explains security policy as consisting of over-lapping ‘ovals’ of defence and 
foreign policy (with foreign policy being the all-encompassing sphere).  Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst Military Analysis Module B –International Security (Department for International Affairs, 
2004). 
261 Chuter also explains that there is a more tangled hierarchy in which input and decisions are 
more complicated and non-linear, which reflects the true nature of policy-making (p.49), but he 
generally omits the merit in adopting models such as Katzenstein or broader theories in policy 
making. 
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arbitrating the final aspect of national policy within the context of Cabinet 
government. 
Spain’s Ministries and Security Policy: the Interior Ministry (Ministerio de 
Interior) 
Traditionally the cornerstone of the Spanish state in domestic affairs, and more 
so with the  emergence of a modern nation-state, further than any other Ministry, 
Spain’s Interior Ministry is the least researched by academics looking at 
security.262  However, its size, breadth of activity and resources mean that the 
Ministerio de Interior should invite further research.  With a vast number of 
employees263, an annual budget of 12 Billion Euros and an organisational 
structure that actually has a “Ministerio de Seguridad”, then it is here that 
perhaps the process of ‘securing Spain’ is most relevant.  In particular, the 
relative climate of peace (or rather, the decline of armed conflict or terrorism 
within the Spanish nation-state) has elevated the Interior Ministry to a key 
function in determining how Spain’s security is maintained. 
The broadening of security — to encompass economic security, energy security 
and even now human security implies that a number of national Ministries 
determine policy in these areas and in turn strategies.  For example, energy 
dependence on hydrocarbons has been a preoccupation of Spain for more than 
20 years.  Successive energy ministries, in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry, 
have endeavoured to maintain a consistent energy supply from unstable supplier 
countries such as Algeria and Libya.  At the same time, in the context of the 
development agenda and the security threat posed by large scale immigration 
from less-developed African countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation’s lead264 in determining Spain’s external needs is fundamental to 
national policy. 
                                                   
262 Interior Ministries are often of little interest to foreign states, businesses or International 
organisations.  Interior policy takes place within a state’s borders, focussing its impact on a civil 
society within a nation-state.  As a result, such ministries are powerful, with large numbers of staff, 
and influence lives in ways that other ministries do not. They are, however, little researched 
regarding security, except by those focussing on aspects of domestic policy such as crime, policing 
or the judiciary. 
263 More than 220,000 police officers alone (source Ministry of Interior), plus hundreds of 
thousands of civil servants across Spain, between those directly under the control of Madrid and 
the autonomous communities. 
264 At the turn of the millennium, a significant success by Spain was the creation of a cross border 
gas pipeline of Algerian gas through Morocco to Spain.  This is one of the only cross-national 
agreements on energy between Algeria and Morocco. 
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The Interior Ministry’s role is somewhat different, in that it deals perhaps more 
directly with Spain’s population or civil society more than any other Ministry.  The 
Lorca earthquake of 2011 saw the Interior Ministry respond through coordination 
of the national effort with the autonomous community and the local government 
council.  It is this interface with blue light response265 and the newly created 
Military Emergencies Unit (Unidad Militar de Emergencias, UME) that places the 
Interior Ministry at the forefront of civil society’s security, alongside the traditional 
role of policing.  It is here that day to day security is coordinated. 
Furthermore, the fight against ETA terrorism in Spain has been the Interior 
Ministry’s major success, it successfully dealt with a prolonged, violent terrorist 
threat.  The Ministry oversees agencies delivering law and order along with the 
judicial and penal systems that coordinated the national response to ETA’s 
campaign.   Prime Minister Rajoy, a former Interior Minister himself, related his 
role as a former Interior Minister to the constancy of the PP’s robust stance 
against ETA. 
Figure 15: The Structure of Spain’s Ministry Of The Interior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source:  Spanish Ministry of the Interior: organigram translated and annotated 
by the author). 
With the exception of terrorism (essentially the ETA threat prior to 2004), 
academic literature pays very little attention to the role of the Interior Ministry in 
national policy on security. Spain’s Interior Ministry is perhaps an area for future 
research, given its size and importance in dealing with the aspects of security 
                                                   
265 Blue light response would be those services responding in an emergency such as fire services, 
paramedics and health workers, in conjunction with the law and order agencies. 
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discussed in this thesis.  That the State Secretariat for Security is included under 
the Ministry is indicative of the ostensibly ‘central’ position enjoyed by the 
department within national security. 
The Contemporary Foreign Ministry – The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs And 
International Cooperation (MAECI - Ministerio De Asuntos Exteriores Y De 
Cooperación Internacional) 
Initial examination of ‘security’ in academic literature relates to the idea of 
international policy, and Spain’s standing in the world, its external relations with 
international organisations, and other nation-states, and focus vis-à-vis global 
phenomena have been reviewed and discussed.   In this context, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs266 assumes a coordinating role for both Spanish national policy 
and that of other governments and supra-national organisations (such as NATO 
and the UN).  
It would be reasonable to expect Foreign Affairs to have increased in activity to 
reflect Spain’s reinsertion in international organisations and increased overseas 
relations since the 1970s.  Yet in 2002 El País newspaper identified that the size 
of Spain’s diplomatic staff had not increased since the transition to democracy, in 
spite of a significant expansion in government and, more recently according to 
analysts, that it suffered from a ‘lack of political relevance and insufficient 
resources’ (Molina et al. in Hocking (2005, p.273).  Certainly, from the 
perspective of a researcher attempting to find access to the MAECI, it was found 
to be closed and rather curt in dealing with approaches, giving it the impression 
of being more inward looking.267   
It is the assertion of this thesis that from an initial examination, MAECI is not up 
to the task of delivering or articulating an effective security policy, especially 
when one considers the impact of the broadening of security as a concept.  
Although prestigious and high profile in media and presentation terms, Spain’s 
foreign ministry appears unable to offer more than an outward appearance of 
Spain’s security, even given the significance of its role in this and the relative 
                                                   
266 The Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Foreign Affairs) became Asuntos Exteriores y 
Cooperación Internacional (MAECI) in 2004, reflecting an attempt to formalise and coordinate 
Spain’s aid programme with its external relations.  This not only reflected the need to have more 
joined-up programmes, but critics also saw it as a politicisation of the aid budget. 
267 As many as four separate approaches to the Ministry were rebuffed over a period of years.  
Access to the Ministry Archive was restricted. 
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size of its staff and resources.268  Its somewhat limited role in a broadened 
security agenda is furthermore overshadowed by the impact of EU membership 
on Spain, and significant effort by diplomats and overseas staff focusses strongly 
on Brussels and other institutions. 
The Spanish Defence Ministry (Ministerio de Defensa de España) 
The Defence Ministry would traditionally have been considered the most 
appropriate place to articulate Spain’s security as a consequence of the historical 
emphasis on hard, military security.  As should be evident from the research 
focus on defence matters in the preparation of this thesis, security is regularly 
commented on as synonymous with defence,269 but what has been identified 
during this research is that the Defence Ministry is not the key institution in either 
determining or delivering security in Spain. 
In-depth access270 to the Defence Ministry has uncovered an institution that is 
steadfastly focussed on purely defence matters rather than broader areas of 
security.  The intersecting relationship between defence institutions and security 
is commonplace and extensive throughout research in other states. In the UK, 
the Quadrennial Review integrates defence and security as a policy outcome, 
whereas in Spain the policy structure of NSS makes the distance between 
defence and security perhaps more noticeable, and also reflects the political 
nature of the institutional arrangements of the autonomous communities, who 
have traditionally had an almost non-existent relationship with the Defence 
Ministry271 and yet, are often the local institutions brought to bear in dealing with 
events, risks and threats to security such as the Lorca earthquake in 2011 or 
illegal migration. 
While chapter 5 broadened the concept of security through Defence Directives at 
a national level, and, in a number of ways Spain’s military forces have indeed 
developed a broader role in defining national security through participation in 
                                                   
268 In 1996 the Foreign Ministry had 5,637 employees, which compared to 125,000 non-military 
staff in Spain’s Ministry of Defence.  The context of such a disparity becomes even more evident 
when one considers the size of the Interior Ministry, which has in excess of 650,000 staff. 
269 The focussing of defence and security on the same context has long been a tradition on the part 
of academics in Spain.  Rodrigo’s chapter ‘Western alignment’ in Gillespie (1995), and more 
recently Navajas Zubelda’s piece, ‘Security and Defence policy in Contemporary Spain’ (2014), are 
examples that illustrate a long legacy of overlapping research between the two areas. 
270  The Defence Ministry proved the most accessible of all Spain’s government institutions in the 
research phase of this thesis. 
271 This was forcefully put to me in interview with a Defence Ministry official who expressed 
frustration at the uncoordinated and politicised nature of relationships with autonomous 
communities in civil defence matters.   
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peacekeeping and military reform, the research nevertheless demonstrates that, 
given the multitude of security threats identified in the 2013 Security Strategy, 
the inevitability of a multi-agency approach (starting from a range of ministries) 
has become more apparent. Indeed, despite initial reticence, more than one 
official has stated272 that the Defence Ministry has relinquished a role in 
articulating security policy. 
Spain’s National Security Council, Ministries and the 2013 Spanish 
National Security Strategy 
It is evident that institutional and constitutional arrangements do not provide a full 
explanation as to how changes and shifts in security perceptions are reflected 
through interests, identity and norms.  This tension is explained through applying 
a constructivist approach with a focus on culture, as the process exemplified 
through the Strategies remains at odds with the realities of modern civil society. 
Within the National Security Strategies, and in particular the role of the National 
Security Council, the latter was created to oversee the national response and 
contribution by Ministries to security policy.  The strategy itself is ambiguous 
about how the NSC is to function, although it was assumed that the Ministries 
represented would deliberate over the circumstance under discussion. 
While Spain’s system of Defence Directives was evidently the remit of the 
Defence Ministry, and in some ways the Prime Minister’s office (the Moncloa), 
the system of National Security Strategies launched in 2011 and updated in 
2013, does not provide a clear direction as to the responsibilities of articulating 
security at Ministerial level.  The 2011 Strategy (see chapter 5) was Spain’s first 
formal strategy and, as stated, did not assign a specific Ministry to any tasks 
emerging to consider them on an ad hoc basis.  However, the 2013 Strategy 
instigated some changes and identified a role for Ministries, amending the body 
to a National (not Spanish) Security Council.  However, in spite of the 2013 
Strategy’s amendments in favour of a National Security Council, the role of the 
Interior Ministry remained yet to be distinguished from that of other ministries, 
suggesting significant scope for an evolutional development whereby broadened 
security reflects this. 
                                                   
272 Interviews and emails with officials in 2011, 2015 and 2017. 
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In the sphere of Defence, Spain’s policy is subordinated to the National Security 
Strategy.273  This accords with the UK model, where Defence’s direction derives 
from the NSS and is a response to strategic direction.  Research within the 
Spanish Defence Ministry indicates that policy is driven by Defence Directives, 
which themselves reflect the priorities of national government (and the National 
Strategy).  
                                                   
273 This is reinforced by announcements on the Ministry of Defence (www.mde.es) website, and 
also in internal publications and journals. 
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Figure 16: The Composition of Spain’s National Security Council. (Source: Government of Spain (2013)).
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The relationship of the Security Strategies to foreign policy is less clear.  The 
mission of Spain’s foreign ministry is to ‘plan, direct, implement and assess 
Spain’s foreign policy and development cooperation policy […] following the 
principle of unity of external action’,274it is not the guarantor of state sovereignty, 
nor does it have the resources or manpower to respond to significant matters or 
deliver security policy.  In this case, Foreign Policy is simply the output of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAECI) and it is perhaps more 
pertinent to relate policy to external relations.  Story (1995, p.2), proposed that 
external relations (his preferred concept to Spain’s policy) always have an 
internal dimension, in effect arguing that you could not distinguish external 
relations from the domestic orbit.  This could be said to apply to security policy 
where external and internal aspects of security cannot be treated separately in 
a liberal democratic system such as in Spain. 
Spain’s Strategies of 2011 and 2013 demonstrate that no single ministry 
possesses overall control.  It is this situation which leads to the analysis, 
supported in the case studies and interviews that the Spanish Prime Minister 
retains a powerful role, and whilst it might be necessary for security policy to be 
so fluid to confront a multitude of threats by using a range of ministries and sub-
national governments, given the historic Presidentialism within Spain’s political 
system, this issue should not be accepted as a wholly positive outcome.275 
Although examination of ministries is beneficial in comprehending disparities, 
sizes and capabilities in delivering security policy, it is the contention of this 
thesis that ministries are less relevant in identifying and delivering security 
policy than traditional or ‘hard’ security approaches.  From the perspective of an 
empirical analysis, ministries offer useful input, but in qualitative terms, 
interviews and literature indicate that examining security policy per se is not 
served by analysing ministries alone, in spite of the attractiveness of the context 
but by considering wider social factors as Katzenstein states: 
`Security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors’ 
Katzenstein (2006, p.2). 
                                                   
274 www.exteriores.gob.es, [accessed 19 Sept. 2017]. 
275 In interview with Bardají, a former senior advisor to the PP, it was emphasised that this 
ambiguity that deferred decision making to the PM reflected Rajoy’s need for control over the 
policy process at a time when the economic crisis overruled a lot of daily political decision-
making. 
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And in tum, what constitutes this notion of security interests is not fixed, the 
Spain of 2011 has different national security from the Spain of 2001.  Therefore, 
the contention of this thesis is that contemporary Spain has (like other nation-
states) witnessed an evolution of the concept of security, and that this in turn 
has seen a wholesale transformation of what comprises security policy.  Most 
literature, however, reinforces a misguided concept of security policy as being 
inextricably linked to the government’s external relations and the well-being of 
the nation-state within the international system, and something unfortunately 
much less about civil society or individuals.  In contemporary Spain, as chapter 
6 identified, whilst Zapatero attempted a redefinition of how the State would 
define and deliver security, the government was defeated due to the impact of 
the banking crisis and rise of economic insecurity.  In effect, in spite of the 
efforts of existing works, security policy has still not been defined adequately 
with regard to modern Spain’s civil society and nation-state.  It is at this point 
that the impact of constructivism requires analysis. 
Constructivism, National Interests and Spanish Security  
“‘I define the national interest as the objective interests of state-society 
complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic 
well-being, and collective self-esteem” (Wendt, in Burchill p.185) 
Spain’s political institutions, structures and interests are key to identifying and 
explaining national security policy. Traditional studies focus on Ministries, 
executives and other bodies to explain policy outcomes such as directives and 
national positions.  Spain’s Defence Directives and the case studies under 
discussion, as well as its more recent national strategies, have all pointed to a 
political structure that has produced mixed success in policy outcomes (such as 
the invasion of Iraq) driven by what at first appear as never-ending variables.  
However, by drawing on the idea of culture, identity, interests and norms, then 
some semblance can be presented in the form of a Spanish security culture. 
The impact of culture draws on the paradigm offered by constructivism in 
emphasising how domestic politics affects security policy.  The case studies of 
the Iraq war and Spain’s economic crisis illustrate the role social events (or 
determinants) have on Spain’s security agenda and policies.  Constructivists 
would argue that Spain’s security is a product of its political culture and 
environment.  The Spanish nation-state’s experience of the last century, even 
pre-dating the Franco regime, do actually influence how domestic society 
comprehends its security.  Using Katzenstein’s paradigm, the ‘state’ is a 
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reflection of the nation’s social identity — the heated debates about Catalan 
and Basque nationalism and devolved powers illustrate the politically charged 
nature of Spanish national identity and its difficult relationship with the State. 
Katzenstein276 asserts that “norms, identity and culture contribute to national 
security” (1996 p.54) and that the roles played by society, actors and interests 
are fundamental to this process.  He goes on to add “norms establish 
expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment, and about 
how these particular actors will behave” (1996, p.54). 
Observing that ministries have a less than uniform input to security, 
constructivists offer a view that something much more than ministries alone 
provides the focus for understanding domestic inputs into policy.  Returning to 
the brief occupation of Perejil (Parsley Island) by Morocco in 2002, true to 
character, Spain’s media responded by looking at the military and diplomatic 
dimension to the crisis, reinforcing a norm that in Spain any territorial dispute 
with North Africa would demand a military-centred response, with public opinion 
playing a Clausewitzean-type of escalatory role.  The initial actions by Morocco 
may have surprised Spain (as did France’s response) but the outcome was not 
unpredictable since Madrid despatched military personnel and peacefully 
recovered the contested territory.  Morocco may have challenged a 
contemporary norm of not challenging the boundaries of an EU state, but 
examination of Spain’s loss of the Spanish Sahara under similar conditions in 
1975 reveals that there was a historic link between the two acts, in many ways 
reflecting Morocco’s political environment from the standpoint of the 
constructivist approach. 
Katzenstein’s approach (see figures 4 and/or 13) identifies a process where 
interests, identity and policy relate to the culture or ‘environmental structure’, he 
argues that a state’s identity reflects its cultural environment, therefore Spain’s 
democratic consolidation in the 1980s created a security model based on its 
cultural environment.   
Spain’s model of democratically controlled Armed Forces was promoted to the 
Eastern European transitions in the 1990s, but much more widely around the 
world to include the Ibero-American international community.  This was 
                                                   
276 Initially Katzenstein drew upon the example of Japan to develop his argument. There is a 
useful parallel with Spain, given its relative marginalisation from typical western academic 
thinking in spite of a relatively globalised economy and society not dissimilar from western nation-
states. 
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consolidated via high profile summits, as well as the endorsement by Spain’s 
monarchy of a national programme of cultural assertiveness based on language 
and the arts using the Cervantes Institute (Instituto Cervantes).  This reflects a 
Spanish identity of a crafted regional and cultural power that was promoted by 
successive governments277 and became a norm to follow in the 1990s 
generating a sense of development, perhaps explained by the ambition of both 
Aznar and Zapatero of seeing Spain fulfil a politicised destiny, but despite some 
measure of success in promoting a positive image of Spain, exactly how such 
branding relates to national security is less clear, this reflects the perennial 
issue of measuring security. 
Significant research into Spain’s identity278 exists, as it does (aside from this) on 
Spain’s security after EU accession in 1986 and at the end of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s (chapter 2).  Identity and security have remained as areas of 
study that are distinct from each other though.  Successive governments were 
generally supportive of all aspects of the European programme, with only the 
Aznar period reflecting a desire (or ideological drive) to embrace a Washington-
focussed model of security.  In studies of Spain’s foreign, defence and security 
policy, there has been little mention of culture, but almost an unwritten 
acceptance that Spain’s histories, its nationalities and location all contribute to 
its identity and in turn its policies.  This is perhaps the significance of 
Katzenstein’s model, and in the absence of IR theories that might offer an 
understanding or explanation regarding Spain’s experience, the concept of 
identity and culture is arguably most significant in the case of Spain’s actors, 
institutions and policy outcomes. 
One of the recurring criticisms of contemporary Spain has been the fact that it 
lacks a strategic culture.279  Sources (Arteaga, Torreblanca and Simón) talk of 
policy-making lacking a multi-agency or strategic approach.  The strategic 
deficiency is exemplified by a number of phenomena, such as periods of 
intermittent relations with Morocco and a failure to assert leadership in the 
                                                   
277 The Cervantes Institute is probably the best example of the attempts by democratic Spain to 
promote a model of Spain that is effectively a cultural export.  Spain’s significant success as the 
third most visited country by tourists reflects not only an economic, but also a cultural 
achievement.  The establishment of the Marca España in 2012 is another good example. 
278 There is no shortage of works on the nature of Spanish society, social profiles and other 
aspects of its civil society.  How these relate to its security is a theme identified as part of this 
research. 
279 Arteaga makes an early case in his work in 2003, but as far back as 1987 Pollack’s work 
identifies a flexibility and inconsistency to Spain’s international relations that imply a lack of 
strategy.  Torreblanca also argued (2001) that Europeanisation offered a suitable alternative to 
constructing a national strategy. 
 203 
 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM),280  and best through the polarisation of the 
debates over relations with Washington. This deficiency is an impediment to 
effective policy-making, and even the 2013 Strategy identifies the need to 
imbue a strategic culture.   
Arteaga’s criticism (among others) reflects a distinct interpretation of the 
security policy process. Elites and institutions may lack a strategic culture as he 
claims, but his models generally do not embrace notions of broader security 
identity.  In this case, security identity is not only shaped by national culture, but 
also encapsulates interests and what are perceived as threats.  The separation 
between Spain’s security policy, its national culture and civil society which 
undermines policy is a theme which this thesis pursues.  In a decentralised 
nation-state that contains historical nationalities pressing for autonomy and is 
geo-politically dispersed, the capacity of Madrid’s political elites and Ministries 
to construct a coherent approach to security through the paradigm of culture 
has been rarely addressed in research.  In this case, an adapted model of 
Buzan’s captures the notion of referent objects, securitising actors (or 
interests). 
Buzan and the Copenhagen School’s model was originally intended to analyse 
aspects of France’s security policy in the 1990s, the amended approach 
developed as part of the thesis develops the idea of three Spains, that of the 
`nation’, the `state’ and Spain as a `European society’.  The amended model 
then identifies threats to these referent objects.  Whilst it could be highly 
subjective, the approach helps to articulate the notions of security that prevail 
within the idea of a security culture in Spain.   
Spain as ‘Society (or as a European society), this notion draws on the 
fundamental idea of the norm in Spanish political culture and discourse derived 
from the idea of the Spanish regenerationists (based on the work of thinker 
José Ortega y Gasset) that the solution to most of Spain’s challenges and 
deep-seated problems can be found within Europe.  The obvious model is that 
of a liberal nation state, integrated and based on shared values with nation-
states such as France and to a lesser extent Germany.  Such an interpretation 
has proved deeply attractive to Spanish politicians, elites and opinion-formers in 
the media and underpinned much of the discourse towards European 
                                                   
280 Union for the Mediterranean is the institution evolved to represent the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, established by the EU and regional states in 1995. 
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accession and integration since the 1980s, 1990s.  In nation-states such as the 
UK, such European enthusiasm is difficult to identify and is drowned out by 
voices that argue that a pre-EU accession period is a golden age and that a 
sceptical voice is often the norm. 
Spain as `nation’, is perhaps one of the more enduring models of security and 
one that reflects aspects of the realist school that is so prevalent within security 
studies, that of sovereign nation-states seeking to maximise benefits and well-
being within a competitive system.  In the case of Spain, with clearly defined 
borders, history and culture, conflict in recent decades has regularly centred on 
national questions of identity and culture.  Whilst the 21st century has seen 
fewer disputes of this type, the occupation of Perejil by Morocco in 2002, and 
contemporary demands of national separatism clearly define issues of 
significant magnitude in modern Spanish security policy and in modern Spain 
among younger voters the idea of nation is sometimes seen as an idea tainted 
by Francoism’s rhetoric and ideology.281   
Spain as a `state’ within the model reflects the emergence of a contemporary 
Spanish political system that is a product of the Francoist regime’s 
transformation into a democratic modern nation-state.  In this model, Spain’s 
transition to democracy, based on a European social democratic model282 is 
interpreted as possessing institutions, structures and norms that reflect the 
practices of European nation-states. 
 
                                                   
281 Many Spaniards are uncomfortable with the idea of nation as having a Francoist tinge.  The 
emergence of the 1930s Republican flag in recent years as a badge of identity, represents an 
alternative, at times radical rejection of the Spanish nation at rallies and political meetings. 
282 Heywood 1995 and 2000 argues Spain’s policy making model is based on West Germany’s 
Constitution. 
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Figure 17: Spain’s Culture of Security  
(adapted from Buzan, Waever et al.283 
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     North Africa 
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                 The historic Nations  
   (Autonomous Communities) 
 
                                                   
283 Adapted from Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998, p.172) for the purposes of this research certain sectors and groups have been amended. 
284 Anti-EU interests are almost negligible within Spain.  Occasionally elements of the Spanish far-right (Francoist supporters) and he far-left have occupied this ground.  As 
securizing actors these occasionally manifest themselves within protest groups, such as elements of the indignados, or anti-immigrant voices which are currently few in 
number. 
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From this study, Spain’s policy-makers remain pressured to resolve perennial 
issues regarding Spain’s place in the world (such debates are often veiled 
behind the EU’s relationship with Spain) though also to engender a sense of 
security in Spain.  The reality is that security policy is undermined by the 
Spanish political system’s failure to reflect and address its culture of security 
with the three distinct referent objects being framed by elites whose norms and 
behaviours are at odds with the nation-state’s security environment and in turn 
this does not reflect the cultural aspects and identities prevalent in 
contemporary Spain. 
The prevailing presence of the Presidentialism concept in policy demonstrates 
that the executive remains the focal point for analysing security policy (as 
illustrated in the previous chapter).  Elected at the end of 2011, Rajoy showed 
little appetite for shifting the current institutional arrangements away from the 
executive-centred approach and, if anything, his centralisation of the finance 
unit and proposed national security law demonstrated an even further 
accumulation of power in the PM’s Moncloa power-base.  The two National 
Security Strategies are a useful starting point for examining the relationship 
between national policy and Spain’s security culture, but are no panacea for 
what is contested by institutions, social movements, national ethnic identities 
and actors. 
Spain’s Security Culture, National Interest and the National Security 
Strategies (NSS) 
The thesis argues that the two National Strategies contribute little to securing 
Spain per se and offer little more than an institutional snapshot.  History is 
marked by many efforts at documenting security and defence being overtaken 
by events and the 2011 Strategy was a good example, its publication coinciding 
with the Arab Spring some weeks prior to the final drafting of the Strategy. 
The 2011 Strategy was not created as a positive policy step with a clear end-
state and goal as chapter 5 argued, and it was not received in an appropriate 
manner.  The PSOE’s elites had not proved clear advocates of a national 
strategy and it was by no means certain what these would provide for 
successive Spanish executives who had traditionally benefited from 
Presidentialism’s ad hoc approach to policy. Norms had evolved from the late 
1980s of a civil society that had embraced European integration, a confident 
United Nations at the end of the Cold War and a US superpower that appeared 
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unchallenged from a national policy perspective until the events of the 21st 
century into a less unified vision as the security agenda broadened. 
By 1999, the norms from that period were significantly challenged, Spanish 
peacekeeping had become less positive and, in the case of Kosovo, detrimental 
to Spain’s national interest, as NATO’s intervention raised difficult questions 
about the use of force, and separatism.  EU and UN peacekeeping had not 
been a panacea for international security and the US appeared at significant 
odds with allies.  As discussed, Aznar’s decision to support the US in Iraq was 
an attempt to redraw the changing norms in a way that sat more comfortably 
with his own vision of Spain’s security identity, rather than that of its national 
interest as defined by Wendt (1999, p.8). 
Aznar’s decision to support the Iraq war was a step too far given Spain’s 
prevailing security culture and identity, its national interest was evidently at 
variance with Spanish military action supporting the US.  Spain’s military and 
elites were unprepared for this intervention, and as events turned against the 
operation, the Spanish security environment deteriorated to a point of near-
collapse, division and loss of faith in institutions following the Atocha train 
bombings in 2004.  Returning to Katzenstein’s model: policy is a product of 
interests in conjunction with an identity emerging from Spain’s security 
environment.  The events of 9/11, exceptional though they were, did not reflect 
a long-term change in the norms which made up Spain’s security environment.  
As has been argued in this thesis, Spain’s existential security was not 
challenged by 9/11, and therefore the securitisation and speech acts were 
undertaken inappropriately given the shift in Spain’s political and military 
posture it implied. 
National Security Strategies seen as a statement of higher government policy 
after Chuter’s model should reflect Spain’s norms, identities and interests, and 
the production of the two documents in 2011 and 2013 would be a reflection of 
events and the environment of the preceding years.  Certainly, whilst the 2013 
Strategy did reflect the direction, and in many ways the priorities, of Spain’s PP 
government, whether it genuinely reflected the national security environment is 
not apparent, as there is an ambiguous relationship of interaction by the policy-
makers with the wider security environment of civil society, NGOs and local 
autonomous communities. 
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By its very nature, a strategy document represents a snapshot of what a state 
seeks to achieve and, while not the same as policy, a strategy outlines the 
ways in which security can be delivered.  Ballesteros identifies that the US and 
NATO approach of ‘ends, ways and means’ explains the initial intent of the 
Spanish National Security Strategy process.  ‘Ends, ways and means’ is a US 
military doctrinal term to outline the objective (the ends), through methods and 
actions to accomplish the objective (the ways) in conjunction with the resources 
required (the means).  This approach,285 which was initially encapsulated in 
2005 by the US Department of Defense, has subsequently ben adopted by 
many NATO states as a military planning tool. How it relates to Spain’s process 
and civil society remains unseen (there is little on this topic beyond the 
Ballesteros work of 2018) but it does reinforce a traditional notion of an overlap 
of security and defence matters. 
The Copenhagen School and Spanish National Security Strategy 
The Copenhagen School’s model, analyses security through sectors and there 
is a more appropriate accommodation of how security policy and strategy relate 
to each other through five different national sectors (Buzan et al., 1998, p.7).286   
Buzan’s five sectors draw on broadened notions of security, which transfer the 
referent object to be secured away from the nation-state towards the 
fundamental referent object of each of them.  So in the case of the 
environmental sector, security extends beyond national boundaries towards 
issues such as climate change and desertification in North Africa and in turn 
articulates threats to Spain in a more regional or cross-border context. 
 
At the outset, the research methodology needed to identify and adopt an 
approach to understanding Spain’s security beyond the conventional divide 
between realism and the liberal approach.  As outlined in the literature review 
such debates do little to inform an approach to Spain’s security and this led to 
the paradigm offered by the Copenhagen School, where the Spanish nation-
state marked shifts in the three referent objects, driven by changes across a 
number of sectors. 
 
                                                   
285 Eikmeier, C `Ends, ways and means — a logical method’ in Military Review, itself from US 
Joint Operational Planning Tool, 2005.  Which demonstrates the blurring between military 
analytical techniques and blurred boundaries with academia. 
286 See chapter 2, but these consist of the military/state, political security, societal security, 
economic security and environmental security sectors. 
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Katzenstein’s model offers an analysis based on security and national cultures 
that applies well in post-1945 Japan, but is less clear in the context of 
contemporary Spain.  The 2015 claim by then Prime Minister Rajoy that Spain 
was the most secure member of the EU was a domestically pitched message, 
287 it was not repeated significantly as a national statement but more a 
justification for his party’s approach towards protest and domestic political 
dissent.  Particularly in response to the perceived threat of indignados.  
 
The Copenhagen School’s approach lies in its appropriateness for a systemic 
analysis which offers a straightforward approach in understanding 
contemporary Spain.  In the context of this thesis, the relevance of the 
economic sector to Chapter 4’s case study of the impact of the financial crisis.  
This dimension of the nation-state’s security argues that the near collapse of 
Spain’s economy challenged the referent objects of Spain’s security culture as 
much as, if not more, than the terrorist attacks of ETA or the Atocha bombing of 
2004. 
 
Environmental security has proved one of the least problematic issues for 
national security, as well as the broadened agenda, given the prominence 
accorded to environmental degradation and climate change in the national 
consciousness and norms by both public opinion and policy-makers.  In Spain’s 
case, this matter was embraced by the NGO community, as were aspects by 
military analysts, given the fact that the relationship between African migration, 
poverty and environmental issues impacts on Spain.288  Literature and 
awareness regarding the security implications of climate change is 
commonplace and, although the threat or impact is often articulated in national 
terms, the fact that the Spanish MOD has identified it as a threat going back 
more than two decades in its defence directives289 is not lost on academic 
analysis.  The sectors approach can thus be applied to a methodology in 
analysing the impacts of threats on Spain’s NSS. 
                                                   
287 Rajoy’s claim was made in El Mundo a centre right newspaper which generally supported the 
Popular Party and was not challenged or questioned at the time, and although subsequent to the 
period under review, reignited the debate about security and state response to legitimate protest. 
288 In 2015 I was able to undertake a short visit to Mauritania and met informally with Spanish 
diplomats working on the problem of migration. The issue was spelt out clearly with a visit to 
Nouakchott’s vast fishing fleet manned by migrant Senegalese workers, many indentured in 
slave-like conditions.  The push factors of poverty in West Africa were spelt out forcefully during 
the trip and Spain is often the first EU country to receive and try to mitigate the high levels of 
migration. 
289 As early as 1996, Spanish Defence Directives had identified climate change as a factor 
affecting national security. 
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Comparison of the sectors approach with the two National Security Strategies 
brought to light a correlation in the approach and response, although one 
observation in connection with the Copenhagen School is that it does come 
back to the state as the starting point (and generally the end point) for the 
analysis.  Therefore the relationship between the sectors approach of Buzan et 
al. and that of Spain’s Strategies, with their emphasis on ministries and 
segmented response, means that there is a certain affinity as regards these 
issues.  Ballesteros (2015) echoes this view with a useful discussion on 
national strategies, but does not make the explicit link with Buzan and the 
Copenhagen School. 
 
Figure 18: The Relationship between the Copenhagen School’s Sectors 
and Spain’s National Security Strategies. 
(Source: author’s annotation of existing sources) 
 
The above table identifies how the Copenhagen School’s sector’s approach 
offers some interpretation of the 2 national strategies of 2011 and 2013, in this 
case it offers a synthesis of the shifts in state or military security with an 
acknowledgement of the environmental sector, the economic sector and also 
some link of societal security in the 2013 Strategy. 
Economic security, as has already been argued in this thesis (Chapter 4), 
highlighted the importance of non-state referent actors (individual citizens) in 
determining a government’s viability and consent.  The rise of the indignados 
movement alongside mass youth unemployment, wage falls and a spike in 
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business failures devastated the Spanish PSOE’s support to the point of the 
party facing an existential crisis.  On the environmental security side, as has 
already been argued the emergence of an accepted climate change security 
agenda at the start of the period under review, along with acceptance in the 
model of illegal migration, amply shows that the broadened security agenda has 
emerged.  How this approach of sectors however transforms into a strategy is 
less clear and it is in this that the Katzenstein model offers some explanation. 
Societal Security and Political Security, the Challenges of Constructivism 
Societal and political security, perhaps among the two most significant aspects 
of constructivism, appear the least considered aspects of the Spanish National 
Security Strategy process, this is in spite of the evidence indicating that support 
for Spanish institutions, the democratic process and the integrity of the nation 
state faced major challenges, in addition to the three referent objects previously 
outlined.   By its very nature as a national security strategy, the concept of 
Spain as a nation-state is a given.  The Copenhagen school identifies societal 
security as ‘ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social 
group.  Society is about identity (Buzan et al., 1998, p.119), and in this case 
society in Spain is both inherently served by Spain’s constitutional and power 
structure, but also the idea encroaches upon the sensitive matter of identity and 
nation in Spain.  Buzan was writing at a time when the Balkan conflict (among 
others) was apparently fuelled by identity, and is less concerned with a nation-
state’s constitutional arrangements, and so this idea of society and identity sits 
less comfortably within his model when applied to Spain. 
Katzenstein focuses on a nation-state’s society, particularly in terms of it 
competing with the state in articulating values, norms and culture in creating a 
security environment (which Buzan et al. do not deal with).  But when analysing 
Aznar, for example, his model would point to the impact of contested security 
norms leading to rigidities (inflexibility) in policy, which, in Spain’s case, ended 
in policy fiasco and damage to its most important relationship (with the US) 
outside Europe following Zapatero’s politicised withdrawal.  However, a 
constructivist approach with an emphasis on interests, ideas and identity 
suggests that Aznar’s action was not wholly irrational, he himself identified 
closely with Bush, drew inspiration from a concept of Atlanticism that Blair also 
promoted and did not comfortably identify with a model of Europe-led security 
that the PSOE’s González had bequeathed him. 
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Nonetheless, the Security Strategies themselves can meet both paradigms.  
The sectors approach of the Copenhagen School is generally embraced by 
both Spanish Strategies (which themselves draw on a threats model of the 
DDNs).  In the case of the Katzenstein model, this thesis argues that for the 
Security Strategies’ process to function effectively in Spain, an interaction 
between Spain’s vibrant civil society and political culture, and the strategy 
process needs to take place. 
The Copenhagen School’s sectors approach offers a model that is generally 
simple to analyse.  However, applying the sectors’ approach to national security 
in Katzenstein’s model does not immediately converge.  The NSSs mark 
institutional responses and reflect the broadening of security and its impact on 
Spain’s state or national reaction and less about the idea of interests and 
cultures. 
Ballesteros (2016, p.62) identifies strategy as “a public compromise between 
the political system and its peoples” and he acknowledges the Copenhagen 
School but sees the role of an NSS as ‘contributing to social development’ 
(2015, p.18)290 rather than responding to it. 
Constructivism can provide an insight into how the two Spanish NSSs engage 
with the policy process by interacting with the interests relevant to the sectors.  
That the Spanish 2013 Strategy subsequently (after 2014) produced specific 
strategies on cyber threats and maritime security illustrates a way in which 
sectors can impact on national security.291  This in turn draws us back to the 
model offered by Katzenstein earlier in the chapter. 
Whilst the two models are evidently not inter-related, when considering Spain’s 
contemporary security policy the role of sectors is helpful in identifying the 
interests that converge on or influence national policy or the ‘national interest.’  
In 2005, Spanish arms sales to Venezuela became a diplomatic matter with 
Washington in an issue that dogged Zapatero’s government and underlined the 
importance of economic interests, jobs and the technological sector, but this 
also clashed with interests that demanded a good relationship with the United 
States.  Both interests were of a similar vein and more nuanced issues such as 
                                                   
290 Ballesteros makes reference to the role of family, community, institution or ethnic group to 
provide security to individuals, drawing on an unpublished thesis (p.110). 
291 These strategies were subsequently published later (2015) and do not fall within the remit of 
this research. 
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ideology and politics entered the debate, culminating in a climb-down by the 
PSOE as one set of interests and values gave way to another. 
The Copenhagen School articulates a way in which (sectoral) interests impact 
or play a part in the constructivist approach of Katzenstein where these 
interests coalesce around issues on a case by case basis.  Dynamic change to 
norms and values often appear within a ‘sector’ context before that of the 
national agenda.  The impact of climate change emerged in the environment 
sector and was adopted by NGOs, and by the end of the 1990s it was being 
acknowledged in Spain’s Defence Directives.  Such a shift in norms and 
identities witnessed the development of environmental NGOs, which in Spain 
joined the mainstream debate from a position where traditionally such actors 
had been relatively marginal when compared to those in other EU states.   
Looking at the argument behind the economic sector, out of the bank failures of 
the 2008 financial crisis, political identities in Spain shifted relatively quickly as 
the practice of major political parties of clinging to an economic orthodoxy 
faltered and, as chapter 4 argued, this led to sudden support for new parties 
and an existential crisis for the PSOE, even though it had once been perceived 
as the institutional party of democratic Spain. 
Culture and National Security: Final Remarks. 
As the thesis has argued, until recently, Spain’s national security has been 
difficult to identify and interpret, being claimed by institutions and invoked for 
the speech acts underpinning the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  This is because the 
concept of security is a contested norm, based on contested values in a nation-
state that although stable, has exhibited upheaval due to events that have 
challenged the idea of Spain as a state and nation.  Attempts by the executive 
to redefine Spain’s identity since the 1990s (by Aznar and Zapatero) have failed 
in at times spectacular fashion, not just culminating in electoral defeat but 
appearing to inflict medium or long term damage to their parties and standing.   
The context in cultural and institutional terms is of a nation-state where the 
centre’s (itself a somewhat challenged idea) relationship with its devolved 
administrations of historic nationalities and developed autonomous 
communities have contributed to the modern failings of the nation-state.  
Domestically, and in a Westphalia-sense of the state central government is 
undisputed, however, in reality the central nation-state’s approach to national 
security is incomplete.  The emergence of new political parties, the 
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reawakening of Catalan nationalism and the stubbornness of both the current 
government and Basque nationalism to end the ETA problem illustrates that 
domestic divisions exist over norms that do not exist elsewhere in similar EU 
states.  The two NSS in their current form focus more on unitary nation-states, 
with solutions that can be delivered under the direction of a prominent executive 
from the Moncloa palace as opposed to a dynamic process that heralds 
strategic change.  
The Copenhagen School’s approach and Ballesteros both acknowledge (2015, 
p.65) that both the state and society should be considered as referent objects, 
and as chapter 4 illustrates, Spain’s society is not always acknowledged in the 
process than might be imagined.  In the case of Iraq, this disconnect led to 
contested norms and identity which culminated in shift to the PSOE’s approach.  
Security strategy in Spain has never been so extensively documented as in the 
last two decades.  Two national strategies, numerous of quadrennial defence 
directives, in addition to summits, position papers and agendas, ranging from 
the EU presidencies to Mediterranean Union events, have generated an 
impression that the Spanish state is an effective ‘medium-sized’ power. 
However, by focussing on the constructivist paradigm where the idea of 
national security is the reflection of identity, interests and the environment 
(national culture), Spain’s executive is too often the main determinant 
This chapter has attempted to identify the challenges regarding what comprises 
Spain’s national security and where it is determined.  With Spain’s transition to 
democracy in 1976, and the ending of the Cold War in 1990 followed by the 
global war on terror in 2001, Spain’s approach to national security has been 
dominated by shifting certainties, ideas and norms.  State structure, and social, 
legal and political norms demonstrate that a presidential-style of policy-making 
sit awkwardly alongside a civil society that possesses deeply-held views and 
interests as to how the Spanish state should respond on a number of key 
topics. 
Spanish defence policy, at one time proactive in meeting new legal and social 
norms, has retrenched since the 2004 withdrawal from Iraq, and this has 
accompanied new political considerations enshrined in subsequent legislation.  
Since then, while the military have responded to peacekeeping in what has at 
times been an expeditionary manner, this has been subject to constraints and 
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political considerations that interviewees have cited as obstructive to Spain’s 
standing. 
Domestic structures and partisan perspectives still account for the 
comprehensive character of Spain’s security policy, where traditional military 
concerns sit within broader economic and political notions.  But the distribution 
of decision-making power, skewed towards the PM’s power base in the 
Moncloa palace and key ministries, has diminished not only the prevalence of 
military perspectives, but also the wider input of academic research and 
debates.  Katzenstein (1993) acknowledges that domestic and normative 
context do not closely track rapid changes in the international system.  In 
Spain’s case certain norms explain some inconsistencies in how it deals with 
global shifts and the subsequent events outlined in the research.   
Buzan and the Copenhagen School explain risks, threats and security through 
sectors and normative agreement (such as that of the centrality of the 
European project), which allows for policy adjustment (such as engagement 
with ETA by the PSOE), whilst contested norms also explain the intransigence 
by the centre-right towards ETA’s peace proposals. 
As is well documented, the virtues of military relations with the US are hotly 
disputed in Spain and such issues will continue to feature regularly on the 
political agenda.  On the other hand, EU relations are rarely questioned, and 
have enabled outcomes that more often than not benefit Spain to flourish while 
scepticism rarely appears in national dialogue. 
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Chapter 8. 
Conclusion  
 
This thesis set out to identify and analyse how contemporary Spain has 
created, framed and delivered its national security in the 2000-2013 period.  
Entering the new millennium, Spain was trumpeted as one of Europe’s success 
stories, given that it had emerged from a repressive right wing military 
dictatorship in the 1970s to become a core member of the European Union.  
Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, as the EU’s fifth largest economy, Spain 
appeared confident and eager to spread its influence, its economy and fiscal 
measures having met the convergence criteria for the Single Currency and with 
Spanish multi-national corporations having cultivated a major expansion of 
Spanish interests around the world, most notably in Latin America. 
With the exception of ETA’s ongoing campaign, it was difficult to anticipate what 
could challenge Spain’s national security at the start of 2000.  The Partido 
Popular government had been re-elected with an increased mandate, a good 
relationship had developed with Washington, and Spain’s military had been 
transformed by a modernisation programme that that had both embraced the 
ending of the widely disliked national service requirement (known as “la mili”) 
and led to Spain becoming a full member of NATO’s Integrated Military 
Command. 
Within a decade, the certainties of the new millennium had disappeared, 
Spain’s economy had entered its worst downturn in decades, with record 
unemployment, huge numbers of business failures and a banking sector, once 
a key engine of growth, on the brink of spectacular collapse.   On top of this, 
Spain had suffered one of Europe’s worst terrorist attacks when Islamic 
extremists bombed four commuter trains at Madrid’s Atocha station, killing 193 
passengers and injuring more than 2,000.   
The reasons for the bombing are complex but in the minds of many Spaniards it 
was attributable to the Aznar government’s support for the US invasion and 
occupation of Iraq.  Conversely, it is easy to understand the effects of the 
Atocha train station attacks in March 2004.  Not only did the world’s media 
cover the event exhaustively, making an explicit connection to the violence in 
Iraq, but the effects of terrorism on western audiences have become an 
accepted aspect of modern life.  Less easy to comprehend was the impact of 
the economic crash of 2008 where, in spite of economic indicators and social 
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repercussions from the events, the effects on broader aspects of contemporary 
Spanish society have been just as significant, if not more prolonged.  This 
thesis did not originally set out to capture the events of the financial crash but 
during the research it became increasingly apparent that they were wholly 
germane to gaining a proper understanding of Spain’s security.  
Although Spain’s economy has recovered somewhat, and it has outwardly 
found its feet again in the wake of the Atocha bombings, how civil society has 
evolved from the events of the decade is another topic in itself.  This thesis has 
explored the idea of security being driven by an ever broadening range of 
issues (such as individual economic well-being) drawing on the idea that the 
Spanish nation-state’s traditional role continues to change. 
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Figure 19: The Shifting Nature of Spain’s Security. 
Research Question  
How is Security 
 Created? 
1)  Based on a securitisation model of three referent objects: 
state, nation & society. 
2)  Drawn from a shifting notion of security, loosely on a 
sectors approach, but also a declining notion of traditional 
or `hard’ security. 
3)  Dominated by an Executive `Presidential’ style in a state      
still marked by a consolidating democracy 
How is Security 
 Framed? 
1) Framed (by different interests, elites and groups) in terms 
of the referent objects. 
2) Challenged by a fluid model of economy and nation, driven 
by shifts in interests and organisations as a result of the 
financial crash and regional nationalism. 
How is Security 
 Delivered? 
1) Via a changing approach where security is less identified 
through the preserve of the military or state apparatus, but 
one where different ministries, non-state actors, interests 
and sub-national government operate. 
2) Through an uncoordinated environment which drives a 
centralising `Clausewitzean’ function on the part of Spanish 
Prime Ministers through a nascent National Security 
Strategy process. 
  
Limitations in existing literature and research.   
In reviewing the literature on Spain’s security, it was apparent that the external 
relations model promoted by Spanish and foreign academics did not address 
the shifts and societal changes that impacted on Spain’s security and 
institutions.  The European Union, NATO and other international bodies (such 
as the Union for the Mediterranean) have proved important to Spain in its 
overseas strategy but do not wholly explain the perception of threats, the 
impact of change on society and the role of individual effects on a nation’s 
response to security challenges.   
Outside Spain, research on the country does not feature prominently in any 
literature on security, states and strategy.  There is a dearth of studies on what 
is in fact a considerably large member state of the EU, and home to more than 
45 million people.  Even within the country, research on Spanish security, 
defence and foreign policy is limited, and much of the research produced often 
narrates a perspective that is politicised or not widely distributed.  The input and 
role of theories and institutions has proved inconsistent and somewhat narrow, 
reflecting the lack of a broad school on the topic of Spain’s security and 
external relations.  This is not to say that no quality output exists, as research 
bodies of some standing, such as the Elcano Institute and C’IDOB for example 
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do contribute to a certain insight, but their output compared to, say, a nation 
state such as the UK, or even the Netherlands for example, is limited and not 
widely disseminated beyond specific audiences. 
Security studies, in a broader sense characterised by even the briefest of 
reviews, have traditionally been dominated by the realist approach and 
focussed on major powers such as Russia, the US and Europe’s bigger nation 
states.  In the case of Spain though, despite being its size, research on security 
and the issues facing Spain number only a handful.  The broadening security 
agenda is, and has been, of assistance to the research process, yet within 
Spain itself, the field is still somewhat narrow and introspect. 
The research undertaken has attempted to resolve some of this shortfall by 
drawing on three components 
(1)  An in-depth examination of the process of security policy outputs (Defence 
Directives, National Strategies) through investigation into primary sources on 
the topic, such as the documents in question 
(2)  Interviews with those advising and constructing security over the period in 
question; within Spain’s defence community in particular the research benefited 
from sessions with a number of staff and both named and unnamed individuals 
who were willing to offer observations on the delivery of the strategies, Spain’s 
response to the incursion at Perejil and the conduct of external relations during 
the period. 
 (3)  Accessing a body of literature, sources and information leading up to and 
during the timeframe of the study, including conferences and meetings.   
What the research contributes to knowledge 
My findings in the early part of the study show that the paradigm of the realist 
and liberal approach are inadequate in assisting an analytical framework. 
Although there are some helpful aspects to be found in realism’s focus on the 
state and the liberal approach to institutions, I found that an explanation 
encapsulated in a theoretical approach that fused Clausewitz and the Sectors 
approach of the Copenhagen school within a Constructivist framework (based 
on the Katzenstein model) lent a great deal of support to my analysis.   
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Moreover, this approach does not have to be confined to Spain and I consider it 
as applicable to other nation-states or case studies, particularly those that are 
less-researched such as in Asia or other non-EU states. 
My approach is summarised through the following diagram that demonstrates 
the contribution from the three paradigms. 
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Figure 20: Spanish Security Policy Through Three Paradigms. 
 
Whilst constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach were 
undertaken as part of the proposal and question process, it was only mid-way 
through the research that the Clausewitzean `remarkable trinity’ began to 
feature in the analysis.  A recurring theme in the study proved to be the 
distribution of power in favour of the Spanish executive.  This has not 
significantly altered, the executive (the Prime Minister) has been described as 
pre-eminent in the policy process since the 1980s (Heywood, 1989). The thesis 
analysed this allocation of a dominant role by reflecting on it with the use of 
Clausewitz’s `remarkable trinity’, which identifies a rational actor directing 
strategy and managing the state’s resources (such as the military) to respond to 
`chance’ or uncertainty, while simultaneously responding to, or communicating 
with the primordial violence or passion of public opinion and society.   
Clausewitz’s works are more complicated than the thesis would suggest, but it 
is the inherent simplicity of the `trinity’ that has proved suitable for explaining 
the executive’s role in the Spanish strategy process.  There do exist 
shortcomings in the Clausewitzean model, as it is essentially a 19th century 
paradigm that does not account for the role of interests or groups for example.   
In 21st century Spain such actors are crucial to understanding the way security 
has emerged and been identified, as well as organisations in the mould of 
environmental NGOs, social movements such as the indignados and even 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) like banks and industrial concerns, which all 
play a key role in modern Spanish security.  It is Katzenstein’s constructivist 
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model built on his baseline of identifying Japan’s security as a nation-state 
which elucidates that particular country’s interests in a very different way from 
many Anglo-Saxon models. It is thus along similar lines that I have made the 
same arguments about Spain in that its distinctive positions both internationally 
and domestically are products of its environment, norms and structures. 
Taking approaches from the Constructivist school, I have argued that the 
nation-state’s response has been largely institutionally-focussed, whereby 
initiatives begun with the Ministry of Defence have led to a process that 
includes importing policy (from the UK among other areas). Furthermore, the 
executive’s role has been augmented in spite of exhortations to add more 
accountability to the strategy process.  This phenomenon is not confined to 
Spain and, globally, the centralisation of power within the executive has been 
commented on in all manner of regimes and governments.  Although in Spain, 
as PM Aznar discovered in 2003/4, this does not imply a blank cheque granting 
PMs untrammelled freedom to act as he or she may choose and, although I see 
parallels with the Rajoy administration, the shadow of Iraq continues to sit 
around the use of military force by the Spanish nation-state. On the other hand, 
whilst peacekeeping as a tool is identified during the Zapatero years, its role 
and place within the understanding of Spain’s security remains to be defined 
more clearly. 
The research also provides an analysis of the Zapatero government’s approach 
to security, a number of works have identified an incoherence to the PSOE’s 
term in office but, drawing on a broadened notion of security, the thesis argues 
that the period was perhaps more ideologically driven and reflects the 
narrowness of the analysis prevalent when looking at the Socialists in this 
period.  Although not a key aspect of the thesis, further research into the 
Socialist government’s approach to development and external relationships is 
another area that I would like to have undertaken, given the innovations that 
were dismissed by a number of commentators at the time. 
The study of the National Strategy process itself has barely been undertaken 
within Spain, and certainly there is very little written about these initiatives 
outside Spain.  I draw some loose comparisons with the UK process and 
identify some convergence in both method and outcome from the two nation-
states.  Whilst the UK has much more written about its Strategies, Spain’s 
attempts in some ways echo the efforts undertaken by EU members in 
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particular, and hypothetically a more longitudinal approach could be of interest 
as a further research topic in this field based on the approach undertaken with 
regard to the system of Directives and Strategies incorporated in Spain’s 
security. 
A minor discovery, but a nonetheless insightful one, was the usage of the word 
resilient in the vocabulary of policy makers.  In English resilient means “The 
capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.”292  In effect, in a 
national security context it means to withstand and overcome threats or 
impacts.  Studying the UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy, it alludes to 
resilience on a number of occasions, particularly in the context of local 
communities and sub-national authorities (local government), with the UK’s 
Cabinet Office now taking the lead in resilience planning and reviews of 
sectors. 
During interviews with officials in Spain, a directly equivalent word was found 
not to exist.  In interview with an official (who contributed to Spain’s NSS) it was 
acknowledged that there have been discussions that have sought to hit on a 
word that might successfully encapsulate the concept of resilience.  It is not the 
place of this thesis to embark on a fully-fledged investigation of the implications 
of vocabulary shortcomings, but even so, it is symptomatic that Spain, its 
institutions and actors do tend to turn to a different vocabulary in attempts to 
convey exactly what is signified within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of writing about 
international security.293 
Constraints and Further Research Directions 
Spain as a nation-state has emerged from its economic crisis and indeed been 
badly buffeted by various impacts, yet a number of constants have endured.  In 
spite of the damage inflicted on its economy, it still retains a coherent voice 
within the inner core of the EU and remains one of its most prominent members 
in the field of peace support operations.  Spain can lay claim to have actively 
participated in all of the missions and operations under the EU’s Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) arrangement, making it the only member 
state to have done so.294  A detailed study of its support lent to the EU’s 
                                                   
292 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/resilience (accessed 12 Mar 2018). 
293 It is claimed (Arteaga in interview 2017) that Resiliencia in its loan-word sense will start to be 
adopted in future works, but many Spaniards have expressed confusion at the use of the word 
and the concept. 
294 Statement by Director General Policy Spanish Ministry of Defence (Elena Gómez Castro) 24 
Jan 2018 www.rie.es [accessed 28 Jan 18]. 
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PESCO and UN missions was considered as part of the research but this was 
not considered applicable at the time of writing, thereby offering the chance to 
study this at a future moment in time.  Spain’s commitment to regional security 
demonstrates a real achievement on the part of its international security 
cooperation approach and this offers further areas for investigation. 
The emergence of loud Catalan demands for separation and independence 
mean that the idea of securing the Spanish `nation’ is likely to be a future area 
of debate both within and outside Spain.  Within the state institutions 
themselves, it is highly likely that the Prime Minister (drawing on the model of 
Clausewitz’s `rational actor’) will remain the focal point for crisis response, short 
term reaction to events and the driver of security in contemporary Spain.  
Nascent institutions such as the National Security Council, the financial markets 
warning unit and other innovations and strategies remain to be tested and, in 
the opinion of this research will be at the behest of the powerful Spanish 
executive.   
Nation-state security has evolved from being a concern of the Defence 
Ministry’s Defence Directives (and Interior Ministry’s counter-terrorism policing 
function) to a broader state-wide policy objective articulated through the NSC 
(National Security Council) within National Security Strategy of 2013.   Although 
still nascent, the NSC appears competent both in delivering a strategy at the 
national level to guide policy, but also in offering a coordinating function in 
response to events where required.  At the time of writing, there remains a 
sense that both the NSC and the NSS have yet to be properly tested by a crisis 
in the traditional meaning of the word and this could offer further avenues for 
future research. 
Implications for Policy. The Future of Spain’s Security 
The concentration of power within the office of Prime Minister (Presidente del 
Gobierno) is a recurring theme of the research.  Since the events of 2004 and 
the publication of the two National Security Strategies the likelihood is that the 
executive will continue to dominate security policy. Although the establishment 
of the National Security Council offers some indication of timely input from other 
bodies into strategy, only further examination will be useful.  Security 
perceptions in this sense, imply a two-level game where, on the domestic front, 
security will relate to grassroots matters such as crime, economic well-being, 
housing and local environmental issues, while on a national level global matters 
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such as climate change, international terrorism and state-conflict will represent 
the stage. 
Discussion of whether the Copenhagen School sits within the neo-realist, 
constructivist, post-modernist tradition was not the aim of this thesis.  What 
emerged though, is that significant aspects of the research came to look at how 
Spain responded to security issues based on a definition proposed by the 
Copenhagen School.  What the research has identified is that the concept of 
what security actually means is perhaps more relevant than empirically-based 
policy outcomes.   
It is only by returning to the model/paradigm of constructivism, where Spain as 
a `European society’ is articulated, that an alternative (regenerationist) 
approach is seen.  Drawing on the idea that Europe is a solution to the security 
issues facing Spain’s civil society, this model identifies an emotional attachment 
to hispanidad and a sense of separateness (from Europe) as undermining 
success in a range of measures such as economic indicators of employment or 
national incomes.  The model of Spain’s European vocation representing 
something to be secured is a challenge for those seeking to analyse security, 
as a referent object has traditionally been something more tangible such as a 
national asset (oil, fishing rights) or even territory such as Perejil.  
In this situation, where securing the European vocation of Spain associated 
with the philosopher Ortega y Gasset’s dictum of “Spain is the problem, Europe 
is the solution” cannot be done through `state’ security, as its roots are in 
Spanish society.  Attempts by politicians and elites to secure Spain’s place 
within Europe has been uneven to say the least, often in part due to political or 
personal reasons, but as chapter 4 argued, the economic crisis that beset 
Spain created conditions that significantly undermined Spain’s place within the 
EU, and constraints imposed by the ECB in Frankfurt engendered significant 
social reactions. Fortunately for this critique as a `European society’, major 
political parties have remained supportive of the European model, although it 
has not escaped criticism, further research could be undertaken on changing 
Spanish attitudes towards the European Union.295 
`All security is political’ wrote Buzan (1988), and in Spain where the social 
division, political cleavage, dictatorship and democratisation feature so distinctly 
                                                   
295 The Podemos Party injected a sense of criticism into the Spanish Left’s relationship with 
Europe, citing the role of big business in the EU’s economic model and its corporate nature. 
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makes it perhaps the most exciting and challenging case-study facing a nation-
state in the shaping of its security.  Its politics, society and people will continue 
to demonstrate that being secure as a state is not the same as being secure as 
a citizen, and that the interplay of institutions, peoples and ideas is so much 
more than a series of dry policy documents. 
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APPENDIX ONE:  
INTERVIEW MATRIX296 
DATE LOCATION INDIVIDUAL TOPICS REMARKS 
May 
2000 
Cortes 
(Spanish 
Parliament) 
Javier Rupérez US – Spain 
relationship 
Ambassador to US 
(research for previous 
academic postgraduate 
study) 
Dec 
2011 
Madrid – 
European 
Council on 
Foreign 
Relations 
(ECFR) 
José Ignacio 
Torreblanca 
Spain’s 
economic 
crisis, the 
monarchy, 
indignados 
movement 
Commentator/academic 
on contemporary Spain 
Dec 
2011 
Madrid, 
Defence 
Ministry 
Juan A. Moliner 
González 
 
Defence and 
Security 
Policy 
Director General – 
General Security Policy 
Ministry of Defence 
(Director Gabinete 
Técnico SEGENPOL) 
Sep 
2015 
Madrid 
Defence 
Ministry 
Enrique Fojon  
Lagoa 
 
Defence and 
Security 
Policy 
Advisor to Defence 
Minister 
Sep 
2015 
Madrid 
ECFR 
Ignacio 
Torreblanca 
the 
monarchy, 
indignados 
movement 
Commentator/academic 
on contemporary Spain 
Sep 
2015 
Madrid Unnamed Defence 
Ministry official 
Spain’s 
security 
Policy 
Serving Military officer 
(did not want to be 
identified/cited) 
Sep 
2015 
Madrid Felix Arteaga Spain’s 
Security 
Policy 
Advisor on Spanish 
Security/Foreign/Defence 
policy (Real Instituto 
Elcano) 
Jan 
2017 
Telephone Javier Ruperez  Spain’s 
overseas 
relations 
Ambassador to US 
(former) 
Feb 
2017 
Telephone Colonel A Rabbit 
(British Army) 
 
Spanish 
security 
policy 
UK Military Defence 
Attaché to Spain (2006-9) 
Feb 
2017 
Madrid Rafael Bardají Spanish 
security 
policy 
Security Advisor to PM 
Aznar (1996-04) 
Feb 
2017 
Madrid Former Spanish 
Defence Attaché to 
UK 
 
Spanish 
security 
policy 
Serving Military officer 
(did not want to be 
identified/cited) 
Feb 
2017 
Madrid Felix Arteaga Spain’s 
Security 
Policy 
Advisor on Spanish 
Security/Foreign/Defence 
policy 
Feb 
2017 
Madrid William Chislett Spain’s 
financial 
crisis 
Commentator on Spanish 
economic policy 
                                                   
296 In addition, casual conversations/conference presentations have been utilised with input from 
A Dastis (Partido Popular Foreign Minister until 2017), Juan José Ibarretxe Markuart (Basque 
leader) several unnamed military personnel.  None of these have been directly cited in the thesis.  
A number of individuals requested not to be cited due to their position and employment terms 
which barred them from discussing matters with outside individuals.  These sources have not 
been named at their request. 
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APPENDIX TWO: 
Abbreviations. 
BOE = Boletín Oficial de Estado (Official State Bulletin) 
CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIDOB = Centre d'Informació i Documentació Internacionals a Barcelona 
(Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) 
DDN = Directiva Nacional De Defensa (National Defence Directive) 
EC = European Commission 
ECB = European Central Bank  
EMU = Economic and Monetary Union  
ESF = European Social Fund 
ETA = Euskadi Ata Askatasuna (Basque fatherland and freedon) 
GAL = Grupo Antiterroristas De Liberación (Anti Terrorrist Liberation Groups) 
IMF = International Monetary Fund  
IU = Izquierda Unida (United Left) 
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
PP = Partido Popular (Popular Party)  
PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party) 
UfM = Union for the Mediterrnanean 
UME = Unidad Militar de Emergencias (Military Unit for Emergencies) 
UNAOC = United Nations Alliance of/for Civilizations 
UNSC = United Nations Security Council 
WEU = Western European Union 
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APPENDIX 3 
Websites and Online Resources 
 
www.abc.es 
 
www.cidob.org/es 
 
www.defensa.gob.es 
 
www.elmundo.es  
 
www.elpais.es 
 
www.interior.gob.es 
 
www.lamoncloa.gob.es 
 
www.nato.int 
 
https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/revistas.html 
 
www.realinsititutoelcano.org 
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